Comparing local cross-border relations under the EU and NAFTA.

• Author: Brunet-Jailly, Emmanuel
• Position: North American Free Trade Agreement

INTRODUCTION (1)

The literature on cross-border relations provides us with different reasons for the existence and development of cross-border linkages (that is--the connections that span an international border); it suggests that such relations may take place because of (1) free trade, because they are in the interest of (2) international organizations, or (3) central states, or (4) because regional governments and/or cities take cross-border initiatives. Some authors also suggest that such relations result from (5) local sociological, economic, or cultural elements and from (6) geographical proximity.

For instance, international relations specialist Duchacek, focusing on the role of states and international relations, classifies the international activities of non-central governments. He offers a taxonomy of international relations of non-central governments: (1) "global paradiplomacy" describes the case of a region that creates and maintains a worldwide network of offices, (2) "trans-institutionalized" relations exist when limited contacts occur between two regions, and (3) "cross-border regionalism" describes the "interaction between peripheral local and provincial, state, cantonal, or Lander governments." (2) A critique of this approach is that it does not really pay any attention to local governments.

The last definition of cross-border regionalism is the starting point of this study of cross-border relations, a study that primarily focuses on local governments. Should we expect different outcomes in two different free trade areas, namely, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU)? This essay compares cross-border urban regions located on the Canadian-American border (Detroit/Windsor, and Niagara) with those spanning the borders of France and Belgium (Lille-Euroregion) and the Deutch-German border (Enschede-Euregio). (3)

The argument presented in this paper is that each supra-national regime (NAFTA and the EU) imposes adjustments upon central-local intergovernmental relations that impact greatly on local governments. The scope and policy capacity of central states in North America are reduced by market pressure without strengthening local authorities. In Europe, however, the intermeshing of all levels of government weakens central-state control and enhances the power of local governments. In cross-border regions of North America, intra-metropolitan regional competition exists in principle, and there are few examples of cooperation. In the EU, intra-metropolitan regional cooperation develops in principle: networks and mechanisms of governance expand across borders as a result of local governments seeking resources and opportunities in response to European Commission regulations and policy frameworks. In Europe there are also examples of competition due to market pressure; however, competition between localities is not exacerbated by integration. The local government perspective is used to ask how and why cross-border relations in both free-trade areas may differ. Comparative studies illustrate the importance of transnational regimes and states; the local governments of the EU and NAFTA differ in their institutional structures and opportunities. The European regions (Lille and Enschede) are compared to the North American cross-border regions the Niagara, and Detroit and Windsor; in all case studies there are examples of cross-border cooperation initiated by local and regional elites who have been motivated to become international actors in response to both economic competition and economic and (in Europe) political integration.

In the Detroit-Windsor-Niagara cross-border regions, intra-metropolitan regional competition exists in principle, and there are few examples of cooperation. In the EU, intra-metropolitan regional cooperation develops in principle; networks and mechanisms of governance expand across borders as a result of local governments seeking resources and opportunities in response to European Commission regulations and policy frameworks. There are examples of competition due to market pressure; however, competition between localities is not exacerbated by integration.

Furthermore, each supra-national regime imposes adjustments upon central-local intergovernmental relations. In North America the scope and policy capacity of central states are reduced by the imperative of free trade and market pressures without strengthening local authorities, whereas in Europe the intermeshing of all levels of government weakens central-state control and enhances the power of local governments.

The first section of this paper reviews the literature on cross-border relations and discusses ways to re-conceptualize these relations. Economic integration as a functionalist argument is detailed. Then the roles of supra-national regimes and of federal, state, and provincial levels of government are examined. The core of the paper is divided into two sections that focus on relations of cooperation and competition at the local government level.

2. CONCEPTUALIZING CROSS-BORDER RELATIONS

   In general, the scholarship on cross-border relations suggests that economic actors create a borderless economy. It also suggests the development of region states. (4) Another argument is that local political and economic relations perforate borders. (5) Denis Maillat asserts that a "privileged relationship" resulting from a "proximity effect," (6) itself the consequence of shared language, culture, and market proximity or of commuter frontier workers, best characterizes cross-border relations. (7) Another argument is that international organizations may also have an interest in cross-border linkages. For instance, the European Commission plays an important role in encouraging cross-border cooperation between local-level actors. (8) Another example of an international agreement fostering cross-border relations is the intergovernmental conference for the Great Lakes in North America. (9) However, central states may want to control borders. This seems to be the case in Ireland, (10) France, and Mexico. (11) Hence, cross-border relations may cause tensions between local and central levels of government. The international activities of non-central governments may endanger national sovereignties. (12)

   The cross-border literature also suggests that market forces foster cross-border relations because they foster systems of functional interdependency. This first functionalist view assumes that free trade limits central states' macroeconomic control mechanisms, which, in turn, create the conditions of enhanced trade activities across borders. Originally, functionalist theory suggested that international regimes might result from cross-border links. For instance, David Mitrany believes that integration results from the propagation of communities' beliefs, values, and loyalties so that a sense of belonging, or Gemeinschaft, develops. For functionalists like Mitrany, a bottom-up process is central to integration because political decisions imposed from above would be fragile. The sense of community is essential because it gives sovereignty and authority to the international organization functionally in charge of social and economic welfare. (13) In The Borderless World, Ohmae suggests that free trade--and, particularly, cross-border, culturally homogeneous, free trade areas--do not follow political arrangements but, on the contrary, emerge despite the absence of political arrangements or, in the best scenario, precede political arrangements. (14)

   A second functionalist assumption, however, is that competition prevails, fostering competitiveness and distrust. The literature on urban political economy presents the competitive city paradigm. Peterson, for instance, suggests that market forces exert a structural constraint on local governments. In City Limits, he contends that the overall market structure limits the policy choice of cities, states, and central states. (15) Market forces naturally organize the policy responsibilities of each level of government. Contrary to national politics, Peterson explains: "Cities have very few policy options (p. 111)" ... "It often becomes issueless politics (p. 115)." Overall, the literature on urban political economy focuses on competitive patterns of interaction of local governments. Competition and market pressure limit local choice.

   Do international organizations, central states, and local governments mediate this free trade and thereby foster or limit cross-border relations? International organizations may have an interest in fostering cross-border linkages. This is also suggested by neo-functionalist approaches which tie integration to the rise of international organizations such as those that emerged at the end of the 19th century. (16) Neo-functionalist approaches also link integration to the rise of international organizations that manage peace and economic and social reform. (17) Such groups would foster integration because they would develop and manage cross-national institutions and cross-border programs. Haas argues, for instance, that the linkage of functions and politics is central to an understanding of integration. (18) He explains that integration results from the development of a central body of institutions and elites that are driven together by a common interest. Integration refers "exclusively to a process ... of increasing interaction" of national states with a body of supra-national institutions. (19) Integration would result from functions expanding from one policy area to another in the so-called spillover process. Spillover increases the scope and authority of the higher central institution, thereby reducing the power of national states. (20)

   Local and regional actors may also try to circumvent their dependency on central states by using powers and resources they have gathered from relations with each other and with international...