Defence Dilemmas: Continental Defence Cooperation, From Bomarc to Bmd

On February 17, 2005, The Economist magazine published a short piece on Canada that said that people in Ottawa had taken to referring to Paul Martin as "Mr. Dithers." After years as a sure-handed and courageous finance minister, it was said, Martin had now proven to be a timid and indecisive prime minister. So far, he had been too slow to initiate a foreign policy review and too quick to use federal government money to buy peace with fractious provinces, and now it seemed he might flip-flop on the question of Canadian participation in the US ballistic missile defence (BMD) program. Martin had said one of his top priorities would be restoring good relations with the United States after a series of gratuitous provocations by Jean Chrétien, and that he was personally in support of Canadian involvement in missile defence. But the longstanding and widespread opposition to missile defence within the Liberal party rank-and-file had intensified, and opposition within the general public was seen to be growing as well- particularly in the politically pivotal province of Quebec. Less than a week later, the issue was forced when the newly designated ambassador to die United States, Frank McKenna, told reporters that Canada was already involved in missile defence, in the sense that NORAD would provide the missile-tracking data that the BMD system would depend on. The next day, Martin told the Commons that Canada would not participate in missile defence after all.

The opposition Conservatives, and many pundits on both sides of me border, argued that this was just more of die same kind of America-bashing political opportunism that supposedly drove Jean Chretien's decision not to support die US-led war in Iraq two years earlier, and warned that it would only aggravate bilateral tensions, and possibly even provoke some kind of retaliation from US officials or American business leaders. There was no retaliation, but it was clear that the Bush administration was annoyed by Martin's apparently sudden reversal, and by his decision not to alert the White House before making the public announcement (CTV News, 2005; Jones, 2005). Critics condemned die decision as a failure of leadership, and attributed it to Martin's not having the "guts" to openly debate die issue, or to face domestic political criticism. The "Mr. Dithers" characterization stuck tight, and ultimately proved to be one of the heaviest weights around his neck in me January 2006 election.

Former Canadian diplomat John Noble (2005) argued at the time that one could get a better sense of Martin's failure on BMD by comparing it to what past prime ministers had done in similar situations. Close collaboration on continental defence was essential for Canada, he argued, so leaders had a responsibility to try to push it through, even in the face of substantial public opposition. Even Pierre Trudeau, not known for backing down from confrontation with the United States, apparently understood this, as seen in...

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