Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd. v. R., [1969] S.C.R. 221 (1968)
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Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd. v. R., [1969] S.C.R. 221 (1968)
Supreme Court of Canada
Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd. v. R., [1969] S.C.R. 221Date: 1968-11-01Sunbeam Corporation (Canada) Limited (Plaintiff) Appellant;andHer Majesty The Queen (Defendant) Respondent.1968: April 25, 26; 1968: November 1.Present: Cartwright C.J. and Fauteux, Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Spence and Pigeon JJ.ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO.Criminal law-Appeal to Court of Appeal-Question of law alone-Minimum resale, price specified by manufacturer-Whether acquittal of attempt resale price maintenance subject to appeal-Presumptions-Whether sufficiency of evidence question of fact or law-Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 814, ss. 34(2), 41(2)-Criminal Code, 1953-54. (Can.), c. 51, s. 584(1)(a).The appellant corporation, a manufacturer of electrical appliances, was indicted on four counts of attempting to induce retail dealers to resell its products at prices not less than the minimum prices specified by it, contrary to s. 34(2) (b) of the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 314. The evidence tendered consisted in large measure of documents such as letters addressed to all dealers in certain commodities, price lists distributed to dealers and interdepartmental correspondence. The appellant was convicted on two counts and an order of prohibition was granted. The trial judge acquitted on the other two counts on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of inducement. An appeal by the Crown from the acquittal was allowed by a majority judgment of the Court of Appeal which also varied the order of prohibition. The corporation appealed to this Court.Held (Judson, Spence and Pigeon JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed in part and the verdict of acquittal restored.Per Cartwright C.J. and Fauteux, Martland and Ritchie JJ.: The finding by the trial judge that the case presented by the Crown did not establish the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not involve "a question of law alone" so as to entitle the Attorney General to appeal to the Court of Appeal under the provisions of s. 584(1) (a) of the Criminal Code. Section 41(2) (c) of the Combines Investigation Act provides that documents, such as the letters in this case, which were in the possession of the accused "shall be admitted in evidence without further proof thereof and shall be prima facie evidence" that the accused had knowledge of the documents and their contents and that anything recorded in them as having been done, said or agreed upon by the accused or its agent, was done, said or agreed upon. The trial judge is in no way precluded by that section from considering the weight to be attached to that evidence in considering the issue of the accused's guilt or innocence. Accepting the view of the Court of Appeal that the evidence here was sufficient to support a conviction, the further question of whether the guilt of the accused should be inferred from that evidence, was one of fact within the province of the judge. It is well settled that the sufficiency of evidence is a question of fact and not a question of law. However wrong the Court of Appeal or this Court may think that the trial judge was in reaching the conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient to satisfy him beyond a reasonable doubt, this error cannot be determined without passing judgment on the reasonableness of the verdict or the sufficiency of the evidence, and these are not matters over which the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction under s. 584(1)(a) of the Code.Per Judson, Spence and Pigeon JJ., dissenting: The evidence contained in the documents produced at the trial amounted to an admission of an attempt to induce dealers to sell at not less than a specified minimum price. There was no evidence which could give rise to a reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence so as to rebut the presumption created by s. 41 of the Combines Investigation Act. Reasonable doubt must be based upon evidence adduced at the trial. There was therefore no course but to convict the accused.The Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the acquittal by the trial judge. It was an error in law for the trial judge to charge himself, as it would appear that he did, that the Crown in order to support the charges had to prove an inducing by agreement, threat or promise. The Crown had only to prove the intent to induce and an overt act toward the accomplishment o...See the full content of this document
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