The Crown and Prime Ministerial Power.

• Author: Lagasse, Philippe

This article elaborates on the relationship between the Crown and prime ministerial power through the lenses of the confidence convention and royal prerogatives. The article highlights how the prime minister's status as the Crown's first councilor complicates the operation of the confidence convention, the means which the House ultimately determines who heads the governing ministry. The article then outlines how the prime minister's discretionary authority to exercise key royal prerogatives serves as the foundation of the centralization of government around the first minister. Rather than seeing the centralization of power in the prime minister as a form of 'presidentialisation', the article argues that it is more accurately understood as a form of 'regalisation', owing to its source in royal authority.

Queen Elizabeth II surpassed Queen Victoria's time on the throne on September 9, 2015. The Canadian government marked the occasion commemorative bank note, stamp, and coin. Monarchists celebrated the event and politicians made statements. But most Canadians probably shrugged. Polls indicate that Canadians are ambivalent toward the monarchy. (1) If we were to rewrite the Canadian constitution from scratch, it's unlikely that Canada would have a sovereign. There is no longer a deep affection for the Crown as an institution or unifying symbol of the nation. A notable number of Canadians hold these feelings, of course, but no honest monarchist can think that most people share these sentiments. The Queen herself is admired, and Will and Kate draw crowds and sell magazines, but the Crown is not revered.

Given lukewarm Canadian sentiments toward the monarchy, it is tempting to assume that the Crown itself is unimportant and that this apathy toward the monarchy captures the reality of the Crown in Canada. Such assumptions are incorrect. The Crown matters a great deal. (2) This point can be shown in a variety of ways. One can emphasize how the Crown equalizes relations between the federal state and the provinces. (3) Or one can discuss how treaties shape government obligations toward certain First Nations. (4) These are important topics. Yet if one wants to convince Canadians that the Crown really matters, that it merits far more attention and study, we might be better off focusing on an issue that stirs passions - at least amongst those interested in politics: the power of the prime minister.

The executive's dominance in Parliament, the preeminence of the prime minister in Cabinet, and the ability of prime ministers to centralize control of the government in their office are grounded in his or her authority to exercise the Crown's power. Indeed, as David E. Smith has shown, when the power that this office draws from the Crown is appreciated, it is evident that the primacy of the prime minister in government and the executive's command of the House of Commons are not accidental; to a significant extent, they reflect the Crown's continuing importance in the Canadian Constitution. (5)

This article elaborates on the relationship between the Crown and prime ministerial power through the lenses of the confidence convention and royal prerogatives. The article highlights how the prime minister's status as the Crown's first councilor complicates the operation of the confidence convention, the means which the House ultimately determines who heads the governing ministry. The article then outlines how the prime minister's discretionary authority to exercise key royal prerogatives serves as the foundation of the centralization of government around the first minister. Rather than seeing the centralization of power in the prime minister as a form of 'presidentialisation', the article argues that it is more accurately understood as a form of 'regalisation', owing to its source in royal authority.

The Crown, the Prime Minister and the Confidence Convention

Canada is a parliamentary democracy. The lower house of Parliament, the House of Commons, is composed of popularly elected members. As the elected house, the Commons plays unique roles. Chief among these is the constitutional convention that most members of Cabinet--the group of ministers headed by the prime minister who run the executive --must be drawn from the lower, elected house. Equally important, Cabinet is expected to command, or potentially have, the confidence of the Commons when exercising executive power. The 'confidence convention' ensures that the elected house ultimately controls who governs. By electing those who sit in the Commons, Canadians therefore have an indirect say in who forms the executive. (6)

Based on this description of the relationship between the Commons and Cabinet, it stands to reason that the former is the master of the latter. The democratic legitimacy of the government rests with the confidence of the Commons, and the House decides who governs. When Canada is said to have a system of responsible government, we can take this to mean that the Cabinet is responsible to the Commons for the affairs of government, and that the House is the central actor in government formation. Certainly, if we want to get to the crux of the matter, this is how we would describe responsible government and executive-legislative relations in Canada.

Unfortunately, relying on this rendering alone sows confusion, particularly when we observe that the prime minister and Cabinet control the Commons much of the time. To address this confusion we must take political parties into account. Canada's strong party discipline means that a Cabinet is assured the confidence of the Commons if its party members are a majority. Because political parties elect their leader in conventions, party caucuses are loath to force prime ministers from office by ousting them as their party leader, as has happened in Australia lately. Party dynamics are necessarily part...