Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 2003 SCC 63, 2003 SCC 63 (2003)
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Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 2003 SCC 63, 2003 SCC 63 (2003)
Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77,
2003 SCC 63Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79 Appellant v.City of Toronto and Douglas C. Stanley Respondents andAttorney General of Ontario IntervenerIndexed as: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79Neutral citation: 2003 SCC 63.File No.: 28840.2003: February 13; 2003: November 6.Present: McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps JJ.on appeal from the court of appeal for ontarioLabour law - Arbitration - Dismissal without just cause - Evidence - Recreation instructor dismissed after being convicted of sexual assault - Conviction upheld on appeal - Arbitrator ruling that instructor had been dismissed without just cause - Whether union entitled to relitigate issue decided against employee in criminal proceedings - Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, s. 22.1 - Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sch. A, s. 48.Judicial review - Standard of review - Labour arbitration - Recreation instructor dismissed after being convicted of sexual assault - Arbitrator ruling that instructor had been dismissed without just cause - Whether arbitrator entitled to revisit conviction - Whether correctness is appropriate standard of review - Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, s. 22.1 - Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sch. A, s. 48.O worked as a recreation instructor for the respondent City. He was charged with sexually assaulting a boy under his supervision. He pleaded not guilty. At trial before a judge alone, he testified and was cross-examined. The trial judge found that the complainant was credible and that O was not. He entered a conviction, which was affirmed on appeal. The City fired O a few days after his conviction. O grieved the dismissal. At the arbitration hearing, the City submitted the complainant's testimony from the criminal trial and the notes of O's supervisor, who had spoken to the complainant at the time. The complainant was not called to testify. O testified, claiming that he had never sexually assaulted the boy. The arbitrator ruled that the criminal conviction was admissible evidence, but that it was not conclusive as to whether O had sexually assaulted the boy. No fresh evidence was introduced. The arbitrator held that the presumption raised by the criminal conviction had been rebutted, and that O had been dismissed without just cause. The Divisional Court quashed the arbitrator's ruling. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision.Held: The appeal should be dismissed.Per McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie and Arbour JJ.: When asked to decide whether a criminal conviction, prima facie admissible in a proceeding under s. 22.1 of the Ontario Evidence Act, ought to be rebutted or taken as conclusive, courts will turn to the doctrine of abuse of process to ascertain whether relitigation would be detrimental to the adjudicative process. The doctrine engages the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It has been applied to preclude relitigation in circumstances where the strict requirements of issue estoppel are not met, but where allowing litigation to proceed would nonetheless violate such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice. The motive of the party who seeks to relitigate, and the capacity in which he or she does so, cannot be decisive factors in the application of the bar against relitigation. What is improper is to attempt to impeach a judicial finding by the impermissible route of relitigation in a different forum. A proper focus on the process, rather than on the interests of a party, will reveal why relitigation should not be permitted. From the system's point of view, relitigation carries serious detrimental effects and should be avoided unless the circumstances dictate that relitigation is necessary to enhance the credibility and the effectiveness of the adjudicative process as a whole. Casting doubt over the validity of a criminal conviction is a very serious matter. Collateral attacks and relitigation are not appropriate methods of redress since they inordinately tax the adjudicative process while doing nothing to ensure a more trustworthy result. The common law doctrines of issue estoppel, collateral attack and abuse of process adequately capture the concerns that arise when finality in litigation must be balanced against fairness to a particular litigant. There is no need to endorse a self-standing and independent "principle of finality" as either a separate doctrine or as an independent test to preclude relitigation.The appellant union was not entitled, either at common law or under statute, to relitigate the issue decided against the grievor in the criminal proceedings. The facts in this appeal point to the blatant abuse of process that results when relitiga...See the full content of this document
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