Bedford et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), (2013) 312 O.A.C. 53 (SCC)

• Judge: McLachlin, C.J.C., LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner, JJ.
• Court: Supreme Court (Canada)
• Case Date: June 13, 2013
• Jurisdiction: Canada (Federal)
• Citations: (2013), 312 O.A.C. 53 (SCC);2013 SCC 72

Bedford v. Can. (A.G.) (2013), 312 O.A.C. 53 (SCC)

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

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Temp. Cite: [2013] O.A.C. TBEd. DE.026

Attorney General of Canada (appellant/respondent on cross-appeal) v. Terri Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovitch and Valerie Scott (respondents/appellants on cross-appeal)

Attorney General of Ontario (appellant/respondent on cross-appeal) v. Terri Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovitch and Valerie Scott (respondents/appellants on cross-appeal) and Attorney General of Quebec, Pivot Legal Society, Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, PACE Society, Secretariat of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, British Columbia Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, Canadian Association of Sexual Assault Centres, Native Women's Association of Canada, Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, Action ontarienne contre la violence faite aux femmes, Concertation des luttes contre l'exploitation sexuelle, Regroupement québécois des Centres d'aide et de lutte contre les agressions à caractère sexuel, Vancouver Rape Relief Society, Christian Legal Fellowship, Catholic Civil Rights League, REAL Women of Canada, David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights, Simone de Beauvoir Institute, AWCEP Asian Women for Equality Society, operating as Asian Women Coalition Ending Prostitution and Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc. (interveners)

(34788; 2013 SCC 72; 2013 CSC 72)

Indexed As: Bedford et al. v. Canada (Attorney General)

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin, C.J.C., LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner, JJ.

December 20, 2013.

Summary:

The applicants challenged the following three Criminal Code provisions that indirectly restricted the practice of prostitution by criminalizing various related activities. Section 210, which prohibited the operation of common bawdy-houses, prevented prostitutes from offering their services out of fixed indoor locations such as brothels, or even their own homes. Section 212(1)(j), which prohibited living on the avails of prostitution, prevented anyone, including but not limited to pimps, from profiting from another's prostitution. Section 213(1)(c), which prohibited communicating for the purpose of prostitution in public, prevented prostitutes from offering their services in public, and particularly on the streets.

The Ontario Superior Court, in a decision reported at [2010] O.T.C. Uned. 4264, held that the provisions were unconstitutional and had to be struck down because they did not accord with the principles of fundamental justice enshrined in s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The court reasoned that the challenged laws exacerbated the harm that prostitutes already faced by preventing them from taking steps that could enhance their safety. Those steps included: working indoors, alone or with other prostitutes (prohibited by s. 210); paying security staff (prohibited by s. 212(1)(j)); and screening customers encountered on the street to assess the risk of violence (prohibited by s. 213(1)(c)). The court also held that s. 213(1)(c) was unconstitutional and had to be struck down because, inter alia, it constituted a prima facie infringement of s. 2(b) of the Charter and could not be saved by s. 1. The court issued supplementary reasons respecting a stay of the judgment and costs. See [2010] O.T.C. Uned. 5712. The Attorney Generals of Canada and Ontario appealed the decision on the merits.

The Ontario Court of Appeal, in a decision reported at 290 O.A.C. 236, allowed the appeal in part. The court agreed that the prohibition on common bawdy-houses for the purpose of prostitution was unconstitutional and had to be struck down. However, it suspended the declaration of invalidity for 12 months to give Parliament an opportunity to redraft a Charter-compliant provision. The court also held that the prohibition on living on the avails of prostitution infringed s. 7 of the Charter to the extent that it criminalized non-exploitative commercial relationships between prostitutes and other people. However, the court did not strike down the prohibition, but read in words of limitation so that the prohibition applied only to those who lived on the avails of prostitution in circumstances of exploitation. The court, MacPherson and Cronk, JJ.A., dissenting on this point, overturned the application judge's conclusion that the ban on communicating in public for the purpose of prostitution was unconstitutional. The court extended the stay on the application judge's decision for a further 30 days so that all parties could consider their positions. The Attorneys General appealed from the declaration that ss. 210 and 212(1)(j) were unconstitutional. The applicants cross-appealed on the issue of the constitutionality of s. 213(1)(c), and in respect of the Court of Appeal's remedy to resolve the unconstitutionality of s. 210.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal. The court made a suspended declaration of invalidity regarding the impugned sections for one year, and returned the question of how to deal with prostitution to Parliament.

Civil Rights - Topic 8344

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Application - Exceptions - Principles of fundamental justice (Charter, s. 7) - Three applicants, all current or former prostitutes, sought declarations that three Criminal Code provisions that criminalized various activities related to prostitution were unconstitutional - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions affected prostitutes' security of the person (Charter, s. 7) - The court discussed the principles of fundamental justice - The court stated that "In this case, we are concerned with the basic values against arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality" - The court stated that "All three principles ... compare the rights infringement caused by the law with the objective of the law, not with the law's effectiveness. That is, they do not look to how well the law achieves its object, or to how much of the population the law benefits. They do not consider ancillary benefits to the general population. Furthermore, none of the principles measure the percentage of the population that is negatively impacted. The analysis is qualitative, not quantitative. The question under s. 7 is whether anyone's life, liberty or security of the person has been denied by a law that is inherently bad; a grossly disproportionate, overbroad, or arbitrary effect on one person is sufficient to establish a breach of s. 7." - See paragraphs 93 to 123.

Civil Rights - Topic 8344

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Application - Exceptions - Principles of fundamental justice (Charter, s. 7) - The Supreme Court of Canada discussed the differences between an analysis of the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter and an analysis of whether a law was justified under s. 1 of the Charter - The court stated that "In brief, although the concepts under s. 7 and s. 1 are rooted in similar concerns, they are analytically distinct. It has been said that a law that violates s. 7 is unlikely to be justified under s. 1 of the Charter ... . The significance of the fundamental rights protected by s. 7 supports this observation. Nevertheless, the jurisprudence has also recognized that there may be some cases where s. 1 has a role to play ... . Depending on the importance of the legislative goal and the nature of the s. 7 infringement in a particular case, the possibility that the government could establish that a s. 7 violation is justified under s. 1 of the Charter cannot be discounted." - See paragraphs 124 to 129.

Civil Rights - Topic 8344

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Application - Exceptions - Principles of fundamental justice (Charter, s. 7) - It was not a crime in Canada to sell sex for money - However, it was a crime to keep a bawdy-house, live on the avails of prostitution or communicate in public with respect to a proposed act of prostitution (Criminal Code, ss. 210, 212(1)(j), 213(1)(c)) - Three applicants, all current or former prostitutes, argued that these restrictions put the safety and lives of prostitutes at risk, and were therefore unconstitutional - The Supreme Court of Canada held that all three provisions violated s. 7 of the Charter by negatively affecting prostitutes' security of the person - The objectives of the bawdy-house provision were to combat neighbourhood disruption or disorder and to safeguard public health and safety - The harms were grossly disproportionate to the law's object - Parliament had the power to regulate against nuisances, but not at the cost of prostitutes' health, safety and lives - The purpose of the living on the avails provision was to target pimps and the parasitic, exploitative conduct in which they engaged - The provision was overbroad - The law punished everyone who lived on the avails of prostitution without distinguishing between those who exploited prostitutes (e.g., controlling and abusive pimps) and those who could increase their safety and security (e.g., legitimate drivers, managers, or bodyguards) - It also included anyone involved in business with a prostitute, such as accountants or receptionists - In these ways, the law included some conduct that bore no relation to its purpose of preventing the exploitation of prostitutes - The purpose of the communicating provision was not to eliminate street prostitution for its own sake, but to take prostitution "off the streets and out of public view" in order to prevent the nuisances that street prostitution could cause - The provision's negative impact on the safety and lives of street prostitutes was a grossly disproportionate response to the possibility of nuisance caused by street prostitution - The provisions were not saved under s. 1 - Regarding the living on the avails provision, the law was not minimally impairing - Nor was its effect of preventing prostitutes from taking measures that would increase their safety, and possibly save their lives, outweighed by its positive effect of protecting prostitutes from exploitative relationships - No other arguments had been raised that were distinct from those already considered under s. 7 - See paragraphs 130 to 159 and 161 to 163.

Civil Rights - Topic 8348

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Application - Exceptions - Reasonable limits prescribed by law (Charter, s. 1) - [See third Civil Rights - Topic 8344 ].

Civil Rights - Topic 8380.2

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Denial of rights - Remedies - Declaration of statute invalidity - It was not a crime in Canada to sell sex for money - However, it was a crime to keep a bawdy-house, live on the avails of prostitution or communicate in public with respect to a proposed act of prostitution (Criminal Code, ss. 210, 212(1)(j), 213(1)(c)) - Three applicants, all current or former prostitutes, argued that these restrictions put the safety and lives of prostitutes at risk, and were therefore unconstitutional - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions violated s. 7 of the Charter and declared them invalid - However, the court suspended the declaration of statute invalidity for a year - The court considered that immediate invalidity would leave prostitution totally unregulated while Parliament grappled with the complex and sensitive problem of how to deal with it - How prostitution was regulated was a matter of great public concern, and few countries left it entirely unregulated - Whether immediate invalidity would pose a danger to the public or imperil the rule of law might be debatable, but moving abruptly from a situation where prostitution was regulated to a situation where it was entirely unregulated would be of great concern to many Canadians - On the other hand, leaving the prohibitions in place in their present form left prostitutes at increased risk for the time of the suspension, risks which violated their constitutional right to security of the person - See paragraphs 164 to 169.

Civil Rights - Topic 8546

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Interpretation - Life, liberty and security of the person - Three applicants, all current or former prostitutes, sought declarations that three Criminal Code provisions that criminalized various activities related to prostitution were unconstitutional - The provisions were primarily concerned with preventing public nuisance, as well as the exploitation of prostitutes - Section 210 made it an offence to be an inmate of a bawdy-house, to be found in a bawdy-house without lawful excuse, or to be an owner, landlord, lessor, tenant, or occupier of a place who knowingly permitted it to be used as a bawdy-house - Section 212(1)(j) made it an offence to live on the avails of another's prostitution - Section 213(1)(c) made it an offence to either stop or attempt to stop, or communicate or attempt to communicate with, someone in a public place for the purpose of engaging in prostitution or hiring a prostitute - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the prohibitions did not merely impose conditions on how prostitutes operated - They went a critical step further, by imposing dangerous conditions on prostitution; they prevented people engaged in a risky, but legal, activity from taking steps to protect themselves from the risks, negatively impacting security of the person and engaging s. 7 of the Charter - See paragraphs 58 to 72.

Civil Rights - Topic 8546

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Interpretation - Life, liberty and security of the person - Three applicants, all current or former prostitutes, sought declarations that three Criminal Code provisions that criminalized various activities related to prostitution were unconstitutional - The Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario contended that the prostitutes' security of the person interest under s. 7 of the Charter was not engaged because, inter alia, there was an insufficient causal connection between the laws and the risks faced by prostitutes - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "Three possible standards for causation are raised for our consideration: (1) 'sufficient causal connection', adopted by the application judge ...; (2) a general 'impact' approach, adopted by the Court of Appeal ...; and (3) 'active, foreseeable and direct' causal connection, urged by the appellant Attorneys General ..." - The court concluded that the "sufficient causal connection" standard should prevail - This standard did not require that the impugned government action or law be the only or the dominant cause of the prejudice suffered by the claimant; it was satisfied by a reasonable inference, drawn on a balance of probabilities - It was a flexible standard, which allowed the circumstances of each particular case to be taken into account - See paragraphs 74 to 78.

Civil Rights - Topic 8546

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Interpretation - Life, liberty and security of the person - It was not a crime in Canada to sell sex for money - However, it was a crime to keep a bawdy-house, live on the avails of prostitution or communicate in public with respect to a proposed act of prostitution (Criminal Code, ss. 210, 212(1)(j), 213(1)(c)) - Three applicants, all current or former prostitutes, argued that these restrictions put the safety and lives of prostitutes at risk, and were therefore unconstitutional - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions affected prostitutes' security of the person (Charter, s. 7) - The court rejected the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario's argument that it was not the law, but rather prostitutes' choice and third parties that caused these risks - Many prostitutes had no meaningful choice but to engage in the risky economic activity of prostitution - Even accepting that some freely chose to engage in prostitution, prostitution (i.e., the exchange of sex for money) was not illegal - The causal question was whether the impugned laws made this lawful activity more dangerous - Nor were the applicants making a veiled assertion of a positive right to vocational safety - They were not asking the government to put into place measures making prostitution safe - Rather, they were asking the court to strike down legislative provisions that aggravated the risk of disease, violence and death - It made no difference that the conduct of pimps and johns was the immediate source of the harms suffered by prostitutes - The impugned laws deprived people engaged in a risky, but legal, activity of the means to protect themselves against those risks - A john's violence did not diminish the state's role in making a prostitute more vulnerable to that violence - See paragraphs 79 to 92.

Civil Rights - Topic 8547

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Interpretation - Particular words and phrases - Principles of fundamental justice - [See all Civil Rights - Topic 8344 ].

Courts - Topic 19

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - Constitutional issues - [See Courts - Topic 127 ].

Courts - Topic 127

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - Courts of superior jurisdiction - Supreme Court of Canada ruling respecting similar statute - It was not a crime in Canada to sell sex for money - However, it was a crime to keep a bawdy-house, live on the avails of prostitution or communicate in public with respect to a proposed act of prostitution (Criminal Code, ss. 210, 212(1)(j), 213(1)(c)) - Three applicants, all current or former prostitutes, argued that these restrictions put the safety and lives of prostitutes at risk, and were therefore unconstitutional - The Supreme Court of Canada determined a preliminary matter respecting whether its 1990 decision in the Prostitution Reference, which had upheld the bawdy-house and communication prohibitions, was binding on trial judges and the court itself - The court held that "a trial judge can consider and decide arguments based on Charter provisions that were not raised in the earlier case; this constitutes a new legal issue. Similarly, the matter may be revisited if new legal issues are raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law, or if there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate." - The question of whether the court should depart from its previous decision was a balancing exercise, in which the court had to weigh correctness against certainty - However, in this case it was not necessary to determine whether the court could depart from its previous conclusion in the Prostitution Reference, since it was possible to resolve the case on different grounds - See paragraphs 38 to 47.

Criminal Law - Topic 766

Sexual offences, public morals and disorderly conduct - Living on the avails of prostitution - General - [See third Civil Rights - Topic 8344 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 787

Sexual offences, public morals and disorderly conduct - Soliciting - Communications to obtain prostitute's services - [See third Civil Rights - Topic 8344 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 871

Disorderly houses - Bawdy-houses - General - [See third Civil Rights - Topic 8344 ].

Practice - Topic 8800

Appeals - General principles - Duty of appellate court regarding findings of fact - The Supreme Court of Canada rejected a no-deference standard of appellate review for social and legislative facts - The court held that the standard of review for findings of fact, whether adjudicative, social, or legislative, remained palpable and overriding error - See paragraphs 48 to 56.

Cases Noticed:

Reference Re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123; 109 N.R. 81; 68 Man.R.(2d) 1, refd to. [para. 17].

PHS Community Services Society et al. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2011), 421 N.R. 1; 310 B.C.A.C. 1; 526 W.A.C. 1; 2011 SCC 44, refd to. [para. 29].

R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30; 82 N.R. 1; 26 O.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 45].

Canada v. Craig - see Minister of National Revenue v. Craig.

Minister of National Revenue v. Craig, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 489; 433 N.R. 111; 2012 SCC 43, refd to. [para. 47].

Housen v. Nikolaisen et al., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235; 286 N.R. 1; 219 Sask.R. 1; 272 W.A.C. 1; 2002 SCC 33, refd to. [para. 48].

RJR-MacDonald Inc. et Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Canada (Procureur général), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; 187 N.R. 1, refd to. [para. 53].

R. v. Malmo-Levine (D.) et al. (2003), 314 N.R. 1; 191 B.C.A.C. 1; 314 W.A.C. 1; 2003 SCC 74, refd to. [para. 53].

R. v. Spence (S.A.), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458; 342 N.R. 126; 206 O.A.C. 150; 2005 SCC 71, refd to. [para. 53].

R. v. Abbey (W.N.) (2009), 254 O.A.C. 9; 97 O.R.(3d) 330; 2009 ONCA 624, refd to. [para. 53].

H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General) et al., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401; 333 N.R. 1; 262 Sask.R. 1; 347 W.A.C. 1; 2005 SCC 25, refd to. [para. 55].

R. v. Pierce and Golloher (1982), 37 O.R.(2d) 721 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 61].

R. v. Worthington (1972), 10 C.C.C.(2d) 311 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [para. 61].

R. v. Downey and Reynolds, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10; 136 N.R. 266; 125 A.R. 342; 14 W.A.C. 342, refd to. [para. 66].

R. v. Grilo (1991), 44 O.A.C. 284; 2 O.R.(3d) 514 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 66].

R. v. Barrow (2001), 146 O.AC. 363; 54 O.R.(3d) 417 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 66].

R. v. Head (1987), 59 C.R.(3d) 80 (B.C.C.A.), refd to. [para. 68].

Blencoe v. Human Rights Commission (B.C.) et al. (2000), 260 N.R. 1; 141 B.C.A.C. 161; 231 W.A.C. 161; 2000 SCC 44, refd to. [para. 75].

United States of America v. Burns and Rafay, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; 265 N.R. 212; 148 B.C.A.C. 1; 243 W.A.C. 1; 2001 SCC 7, refd to. [para. 75].

Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3; 281 N.R. 1; 2002 SCC 1, refd to. [para. 75].

Khadr v. Prime Minister (Can.) et al., [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44; 397 N.R. 294; 2010 SCC 3, refd to. [para. 76].

Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) et al., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519; 158 N.R. 1; 34 B.C.A.C. 1; 56 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 77].

New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. J.G. and D.V., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46; 244 N.R. 276; 216 N.B.R.(2d) 25; 552 A.P.R. 25, refd to. [para. 91].

Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; 63 N.R. 266, refd to. [para. 94].

Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791; 335 N.R. 25; 2005 SCC 35, refd to. [para. 98].

R. v. Demers (R.) (2004), 323 N.R. 201; 2004 SCC 46, refd to. [para. 102].

R. v. Khawaja (M.M.), [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555; 437 N.R. 42; 301 O.A.C. 200; 2012 SCC 69, refd to. [para. 106].

R. v. Clay (C.J.) (2003), 313 N.R. 252; 181 O.A.C. 350; 2003 SCC 75, refd to. [para. 115].

R. v. Rockert, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 704; 19 N.R. 308, refd to. [para. 130].

R. v. Zundel (No. 2), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731; 140 N.R. 1; 56 O.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 132].

Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 220 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 142].

Schachter v. Canada et al., [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679; 139 N.R. 1, refd to. [para. 167].

Statutes Noticed:

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 210, sect. 212(1)(j), sect. 213(1)(c) [para. 16].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Canada, House of Commons, Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, The Challenge of Change: A Study of Canada's Criminal Prostitution Laws (2006), generally [para. 155].

Coke, Edward, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning High Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown and Criminal Causes (1817, first published 1644), pp. 205, 206 [para. 130].

Goudge Report - see Ontario, Report of Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario: Policy and Recommendations.

Hogg, Peter, The Brilliant Career of Section 7 of the Charter (2012), 58 S.C.L.R.(2d) 195, p. 209 [para. 107].

Ontario, Report of Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario: Policy and Recommendations (Goudge Report) (2008), vol. 3 [para. 53].

Rubin, Gerald, The Nature, Use and Effect of Reference Cases in Canadian Constitutional Law (1960), 6 McGill L.J. 168, p. 175 [para. 40].

Counsel:

Michael H. Morris, Nancy Dennison and Gail Sinclair, for the appellant/respondent on cross-appeal, the Attorney General of Canada;

Jamie C. Klukach, Christine Bartlett-Hughes and Megan Stephens, for the appellant/respondent on cross-appeal, the Attorney General of Ontario;

Alan N. Young, Marlys A. Edwardh and Daniel Sheppard, for the respondents/appellants on cross-appeal;

Sylvain Leboeuf and Julie Dassylva, for the intervener, the Attorney General of Quebec;

Katrina E. Pacey, Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C., Elin R.S. Sigurdson, Lisa C. Glowacki and M. Kathleen Kinch, for the interveners, the Pivot Legal Society, the Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society and the PACE Society;

Written submissions only by Michael A. Feder and Tammy Shoranick, for the intervener, the Secretariat of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS;

Brent B. Olthuis, Megan Vis-Dunbar and Michael Sobkin, for the intervener, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association;

Georgialee A. Lang and Donald Hutchinson, for the intervener, the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada;

Jonathan A. Shime, Megan Schwartzentruber and Renée Lang, for the interveners, the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, the British Columbia Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS and the HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario;

Janine Benedet and Fay Faraday, for the interveners, the Canadian Association of Sexual Assault Centres, the Native Women's Association of Canada, the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, Action ontarienne contre la violence faite aux femmes, Concertation des luttes contre l'exploitation sexuelle, Regroupement québécois des Centres d'aide et de lutte contre les agressions à caractère sexuel and the Vancouver Rape Relief Society;

Robert W. Staley, Ranjan K. Agarwal and Amanda C. McLachlan, for the interveners, the Christian Legal Fellowship, the Catholic Civil Rights League and REAL Women of Canada;

Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C., and Cheryl Milne, for the intervener, the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights;

Walid Hijazi, for the intervener, the Simone de Beauvoir Institute;

Gwendoline Allison, for the intervener, the AWCEP Asian Women for Equality Society, operating as Asian Women Coalition Ending Prostitution;

Christa Big Canoe and Emily R. Hill, for the intervener, Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.

Solicitors of Record:

Attorney General of Canada, Toronto, Ontario, for the appellant/respondent on cross-appeal, the Attorney General of Canada;

Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, for the appellant/respondent on cross-appeal, the Attorney General of Ontario;

Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, Ontario; Sack Goldblatt Mitchell, Toronto, Ontario, for the respondents/appellants on cross-appeal;

Attorney General of Quebec, Quebec, Quebec, for the intervener, the Attorney General of Quebec;

Pivot Legal Society, Vancouver, British Columbia; Arvay Finlay, Vancouver, British Columbia; Janes Freedman Kyle Law Corporation, Vancouver, British Columbia; Ratcliff & Company, North Vancouver, British Columbia; Harper Grey, Vancouver, British Columbia, for the interveners, the Pivot Legal Society, the Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society and the PACE Society;

McCarthy Tétrault, Vancouver, British Columbia, for the intervener, the Secretariat of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS;

Hunter Litigation Chambers, Vancouver, British Columbia, for the intervener, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association;

Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, for the intervener, the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada;

Cooper & Sandler, Toronto, Ontario; HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, for the interveners, the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, the British Columbia Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS and the HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario;

University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia; Fay Faraday, Toronto, Ontario, for the interveners, the Canadian Association of Sexual Assault Centres, the Native Women's Association of Canada, the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, Action ontarienne contre la violence faite aux femmes, Concertation des luttes contre l'exploitation sexuelle, Regroupement québécois des Centres d'aide et de lutte contre les agressions à caractère sexuel and the Vancouver Rape Relief Society;

Bennett Jones, Toronto, Ontario, for the interveners, the Christian Legal Fellowship, the Catholic Civil Rights League and REAL Women of Canada;

Arvay Finlay, Vancouver, British Columbia; David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervener, the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights;

Desrosiers, Joncas, Massicotte, Montreal, Quebec, for the intervener, the Simone de Beauvoir Institute;

Foy Allison Law Group, West Vancouver, British Columbia, for the intervener, the AWCEP Asian Women for Equality Society, operating as Asian Women Coalition Ending Prostitution;

Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc., Toronto, Ontario, for the intervener, Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.

These appeals and cross-appeal were heard on June 13, 2013, by McLachlin, C.J.C., LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada. McLachlin, C.J.C., delivered the following decision for the court in both official languages on December 20, 2013.