Confessions and Self-Incrimination

• Author: Matthew Gourlay/Brock Jones/Jill D. Makepeace/Glen Crisp/Renee Pomerance
• Pages: 417-480

CHAPTER 10

CONFESSIONS AND SELF-INCRIMINATION

I. Confessions and Admissions of the Accused:Overview ................ 

II. Conceptual Background: The Principle Against Self-Incrimination ....... 

III. The Common Law Confessions Rule ................................ 

A. Overview..................................................... 

B. Scope of Application ........................................... 

1. Who Is a Person in Authority? ................................ 

2. Persons in Authority: Examples ............................... 

3. Persons Not in Authority: Examples ........................... 

C. Voluntariness ................................................. 

1. Threats and Inducements.................................... 

(A) Overview............................................... 

(B) The Nature of Police Interrogation ........................ 

(C) What Counts as a Prohibited Threat or Promise? ............ 

2. Oppressive Circumstances ................................... 

3. Operating Mind ............................................ 

4. Other Police Trickery........................................ 

D. The Role of the Police Caution .................................. 

E. Derived Confessions ........................................... 

F. Corroborated Confessions...................................... 

G. “Mr Big” Confessions........................................... 

1. Overview .................................................. 

2. Admissibility ............................................... 

(A) Scope of Application .................................... 

(B) The Admissibility Determination........................... 

(C) Abuse of Process........................................ 

3. Jury Instructions on “Mr Big” Confessions...................... 

H. Residual Discretion to Exclude .................................. 

I. Jury Instructions Where a Confession Is Admitted.................. 

J. Procedure and Proof........................................... 

1. Waiver of the Voir Dire ...................................... 

2. Mechanics of Proving Voluntariness........................... 

3. Combined or Blended Voir Dires.............................. 

4. Editing Confessions ......................................... 

417

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I. CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS OF THE

ACCUSED:OVERVIEW

In one sense, an accused is like any other party to a court proceeding, civil or crim-

inal: their out-of-court utterances are admissible at the instance of the opposing

party. Whether viewed as an exception to the hearsay rule or a stand-alone basis for

admission,1 out-of-court statements of a party are routinely received into evidence

without any special inquir y into admission. The fact that they are against interest (which

can be presumed if the opposing party wants to tender them) is seen as an adequate

proxy for reliability. This generally holds true in criminal trials where an accused’s out-

of-court statements to civilian witnesses a re concerned.

1 Rv Evans, [1993] 3 SCR 653 at 664, S opinka J.

5. Recording Police Interviews.................................. 

6. Admissibility of Expert Evidence on False Confessions ........... 

7. Appellate Review of Admissibility ............................. 

IV. The Section  Right to Pre-Trial Silence .............................. 

A. Overview..................................................... 

B. Scope and Limits of the Right ................................... 

1. The “Agency” Requirement................................... 

2. The “Elicitation” Requirement ................................ 

C. Continued Questioning in the Face of an AssertedRighttoSilence... 

D. Other Applications of the Right.................................. 

V. Prior Testimony and the Privilege AgainstSelf-Incrimination ............ 

VI. Residual Protections Against Self-Incrimination Under Section  ........ 

A. Overview..................................................... 

B. Derivative Use Immunity........................................ 

C. Protection Against Incriminating Use of Statutorily

Compelled Statements ......................................... 

VII. Youth Statements................................................. 

A. Youth Criminal Justice Act, Section : An Overview .............. 

B. Person in Authority ............................................ 

C. Upon Arrest or Detention, or Where Reasonable Grounds Exist to

BelievetheYoung Person Committed an Offence.................. 

D. What Information Should the Police Convey to a Young Person

onArrestorDetention? ........................................ 

E. Voluntariness ................................................. 

F. Requirements of Section () ................................. 

1. Information ................................................ 

2. Implementation ............................................ 

G. Waiver ....................................................... 

418MODERN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

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Where the state becomes involved in the creation of such evidence, however, the

picture changes dramatically. The prospect of state coercion in the production of

self-incriminating evidence brings about the need for safeguards to protect the truth-

seeking function of the tria l and the individual rights of the accused. Accordingly, where

state power is engaged, out-of-court statements by the accused are accorded special

treatment in Canadian law under a number of partially overlapping rules derived from

both the common law and the Charter.

The common law confessions rule provides that no statement of the accused to a

person in authority is a dmissible at the instance of the Crown unless the Crown proves

on a voir dire, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the stateme nt was voluntary. Although it

historically focused on whether th e accused confessed in response to threats or prom-

ises, the confessions rule is today focused more broadly with the subject’s right “to

make a meaningful choice whether to spea k to state authorities.”2

Charter protections like the s7 right to silence and the s13 right against subse-

quent use of incriminating testimony provide additional potential routes to exclusion.

In this context, however, the burden of proof is on the accused to demon strate both an

infringement and an entitleme nt to a remedy. While these are primari ly rules of consti-

tutional law and criminal procedure, r ather than evidence, they interact with the law of

evidence in both theory an d practice.

II. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND: THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST

SELF-INCRIMINATION

The common law of evidence and the Charter each give rise to a number of doctrin es

that qualify the ability of th e Crown to rely on the accused’s out-of-court statements as

proof of guilt. While each of these has a discrete origi n and rationale, the Supreme Court

has consistently affirmed that the y share a common substrate: the principle against self-

incrimination.3 Understanding the scope and nature of this underlying principle at the

outset should therefore assist in tr acing its various specific manifestations.

The principle against se lf-incrimination is a “genera l organizing principle of the crim-

inal law.” As succinctly formulated by Lamer CJ:

Any state action that coerce s an individual to furnish evid ence against him- or herself in a p ro-

ceeding in which the ind ividual and the state are adver saries violates the princip le against self-

incrimination. Coe rcion, it should be noted, means the de nial of free and informed consent.4

Most obviously and directly, Charter s11(c) entrenches th e ancient common law rule

that an accused cannot be compelled as a witness at their own trial. The organizing

principle against self-incrimination also helps inform the content of specific Charter

rights, like the s10(b) right to counsel and the s13 right against subsequent use of

compelled incriminatory testimony, and also provides residual protection as a principle

of fundamental justice unde r s7. Its purpose is (at least) two-fold: to mitigate the risk of

unreliable confessions and to prevent abuse s of power by the state.5

2 Rv Singh, 2007 SCC 48, [2007] 3 SCR 405 at pa ra 35.

3 Singh, ibid at para 21, Charron J.

4 Rv Jones, [1994] 2 SCR 229 at 249, Lamer CJ.

5 Rv White, [1999] 2 SCR 417, Iacobucci J; ibid at 250-51, Lame r CJ.

Chapter 10 Confessions and Self-Incrimination 419

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