Feminist Anthropology and Copyright: Gauging the Application and Limitations of Oppositions Models

• Author: B Courtney Doagoo
• Pages: 187-205

187

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Feminist Anthropology and Copyright:

Gauging the Application and Limitations

ofOppositions Models1

  

 : The purpose of this brief chapter is to explore the applica-

tion of interdisciplinarity to intellectual property law, specically copyright

law, through the lens of feminist critiques. The paper attempts to demon-

strate how the application and limitation of the two oppositions models

oered by feminist anthropology intersect with copyright law. Specically,

drawing on examples from what is considered to be traditionally feminine

areas of creativity, the paper broadly examines the values we associate with

women, what they create, and how it is perceived and valued before the law.

: Le but de ce court chapitre est d’explorer l’application de l’in-

terdisciplinarité au droit de la propriété intellectuelle, plus particulièrement

au droit d’auteur, d’un angle critique féministe. Cet article essaie de dé-

montrer comment les applications et les limites de deux modèles opposés

oerts par l’anthropologie féministe s’entrecroisent avec le droit d’auteur.

Plus spécialement, en se basant sur des exemples de ce que l’on considère

comme des domaines traditionnels de créativité féminine, cet article exa-

1 I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Intellectual Property Workshop Com-

mittee (Professor Mistrale Goudreau, Professor Teresa Scassa, and Executive Director of

the Centre for Law, Technology and Society, Madelaine Saginur) for encouraging me to

participate in this tremendous project, and also for all of their help, patience, and guid-

ance. I would also like to thank the participants at the conference for their feedback, the

two peer reviewers, the student editors, and committee editor for all of their hard work,

dedication, and assistance.

188 •   

mine globalement les valeurs associées à la femme, la façon dont elle crée

et comment cette création est perçue et évaluée par le droit.

A. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, scholars have revealed an interest in unravelling the inher-

ently patriarchal underpinnings of copyright law.2 Why certain kinds of

art, culture, and knowledge receive mainstream economic and legal pro-

tection while others do not is an important question that has far ranging

implications beyond law.3 Copyright protection — or the lack thereof — for

creativity traditionally considered “feminine” such as decorative crafts,

needlework, and clothing4 is illustrative.5

While examining intellectual property, specically copyright, from a

traditional legal approach might yield a justication based on Lockean, He-

gelian, or utilitarian theories,6 an inquiry through the lens of interdisciplin-

arity allows for an alternate approach to understanding the origins of the

2 See, generally, Ann Bartow, “Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copy-

right Law” (2006) 14:3 Am U J Gender Soc Pol’y & L 551; Shelley Wright, “A Feminist

Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art” (1994) 7 CJWL 59; Debora Halbert, “Feminist

Interpretations of Intellectual Property” (2006) 14:3 Am U J Gender Soc Pol’y & L 431;

Carys J Craig, “Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for Copyright

Law” (2007) 15 Am U J Gender Soc Pol’y & L 207; Dan L Burk, “Feminism and Dualism in

Intellectual Property” (2006) 15 Am U J Gender Soc Pol’y & L 183; Rebecca Tushnet, “My

Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright” (2007) 15:2 Am U J Gender Soc Pol’y

& L 273.

3 Wright, above note 2, states that “[t]he apparent gender neutrality of copyright is there-

fore questionable because of its association with the public world of the marketplace

which has, in European history, consistently marginalized or excluded women” at 70;

Tushnet, above note 2, asserts that “[c]opyright’s economic focus and the expense of liti-

gation will systematically lead to case law undervaluing non-market production, includ-

ing historically female creative practices” at 304; Tushnet also contends that although

seemingly neutral, the law is “entangled in ideas about gender and sexuality” at 304.

4 While clothing was produced by men and women, both prior to and after the eighteenth

century, these roles were not recorded with accuracy: see, generally, Madeleine Ginsburg,

“The Tailoring and Dressmaking Trades, 1700–1850” (1972) 6:1 Costume 64. “In 1859,

there are 23,517 London tailors. There is no eighteenth century estimate of professional

needlewomen or dressmakers but a high proportion of the women mentioned in the

Old Bailey Sessions Papers, a good cross section of London artisan life, so describe their

occupation” at 64.

5 Tushnet, above note 2, suggests that there is a tendency to compensate masculine activ-

ities whereas traditionally feminine activities such as "fashion, cooking, and sewing," do

not garner the same level of economic security at 303–4.

6 See, generally, Daniel J Gervais & Elizabeth F Judge, Intellectual Property: The Law in Cana-

da, 2d ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at 34.