Governments as Interpreters and Shapers of Human Rights
Author | Gwen Brodsky |
Profession | Equality rights and human rights litigator, and a founder and Director of the Poverty and Human Rights Centre in Vancouver |
Pages | 55-86 |
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GOVERNMENTS AS INTERPRETERS AND
SHAPERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Gwen Brodsky1
A. INTRODUCTION
Human right s legislat ion in every jur isdict ion in Canada i s intended
to apply to services cu stomari ly provided to the publ ic.2 In this t ime
of neo-liberalism, governments have been attempting increa singly to
privatize re sponsibilit ies for the provis ion of public services. Howeve r,
it remains t he case that governments a re primary providers of ser vices,
from child we lfare services to education. Suc h services should conform
to the norm of equal ity. However, increasingly, when confronted wit h a
formal al legation of discrimi nation regarding a socia l program, govern-
ments are arg uing, in eec t, that human r ights legislat ion does not apply
to them.
My claim is a si mple one. Canada has com mitted itself to the norm
of equalit y. Therefore, governments s hould not be campaig ning in t he
courts to und ermine t he capacity of huma n rights leg islation to dea l
with al legations of governmental disc rimi nation. It is contra ry to
the commitment to equalit y, and it has insid ious eects on the publ ic
trust. Usu ally we talk about the int erpretation of leg islation as the task
of courts and t ribunals. And there is a d iscourse about the interpret ive
obligations th at attend judgi ng. For example, it has be en argued that
1 Gwen Brodsky is an equal ity rights a nd human right s litigator, and a
founder and D irector of the Pover ty and Human R ights Centre i n Vancouver.
2 There are minor vari ations in the word ing of various hum an rights
statutes, b ut all provide protec tion agains t discrimi nation with rega rd to
services t hat are provided t o the public.
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adjudicators and jud ges have an obligation to take Ca nada’s internat ion-
al human r ights obligations seriously when int erpretin g domestic law.3
What I want to ad dress is dierent but related . I believe it is time to tal k
about the role and obligat ions of government s, and by necessa ry impli-
cation, legal repres entatives of government, as i nterpreters and shapers
of human righ ts law, when they are engaged in lit igation.
This is a subject I have writ ten about previously, with regard to the
problematic role and det rimental inuence of gover nments as interpret-
ers and shapers of t he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 (Charter)
equalit y rights t hrough position s advanced in Charter litigation and
through cont rol of fundi ng for access to the cour ts.5 In this paper, I
wish to focu s on the role of government s in statutor y human r ights
litigation. I rem ain stead fast in my bel ief that it is cr ucial to hold gov-
ernments to accou nt for interpreting a nd shaping Charter ju risprude nce.
In that regard, my perspect ive has not cha nged. However, my sense of
the import ance of human rights leg islation as a means of g iving eect to
Canada’s equalit y commitments has int ensied. The cancellat ion of the
Court Cha llenges Program, combined w ith drastic cuts to civ il legal aid
in places like Br itish Columbia , have greatly reduced opportun ities for
access to Charter l itigation by everyone e xcept governments, t he wealthy,
and crim inal ly accused.6 Fur thermore, sel f-exempting arg uments th at
3 Armand de Mestra l & Evan Fox-Decent, “Reth inking t he Relationship
Between In ternational a nd Domestic Law” (2008) 53 McGil l LJ 573; Bruce
Porter, “Judgi ng Poverty: Using I nternationa l Human Rights L aw to Rede-
ne the Scope of Ch arter Right s” (2000) 15 J L & Soc Pol’y 117; The Poverty
and Human R ights Centre, “T he Role of Internation al Social and E conomic
Rights in t he Interpretat ion of Domestic Law in Ca nada” (2008), online:
The Povert y and Human Rig hts Centre http://povertya ndhuman rig hts.
org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/domesticlaw_v6-1.pdf.
4 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to t he Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
5 Gwen Brodsky, “The Subversion of Hu man Rights by G overnments in
Canada” in Ma rgot Young et al, eds, Pove rty: Rights, Soc ial Citizenship, and
Legal Activi sm (Vancouver: UBC Press, 200 7) 355.
6 Some j urisdiction s, British Columbia a mong them, have al so experienced
cuts in cr iminal lega l aid. However, the cut s to civil legal a id are even more
extreme. See L eonard T Doust, QC , Foundation for Change: Repor t of the Pub-
lic Commission on Legal Ai d in British Columbia (Vancouver: Public Comm is-
sion on Legal Aid , 2011), online: Canad ian Bar Associ ation www.cba.org/
bc/Practice_Resources/PDF/pcla_report_03_08_11.pdf. Additional reports
may be viewed on line: Canadia n Bar Associat ion www.cba.org/bc/publ ic_
media/legal_aid/research.as px.
Government s as Interpreters and Sh apers of Human Rights
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governments h ave long been maki ng in the Char ter equal ity liti gation
context have leaked i nto statutory huma n rights litigat ion.
The rst par t of this chapter h ighlights a nd exposes some of the rhet-
orical manoe uvres that governments ma ke, throug h their law yers in
human rig hts litigation, to attemp t to immunize govern ments and their
services f rom scrutiny for compliance w ith human right s legislation.
In the second par t of the chapter, I develop my t hesis that gove rn-
ments should not be ma king argument s in the courts inte nded to dimin-
ish the capacit y of human right s legislation to provide e ective remedies
for governmental discrimination.
B. THE SELFIMM UNIZING ARGUMENTS THAT
GOVERNMENTS MAKE
1) Arguments Routinely Made by Governments
There are some sel f-immunizin g argument s that govern ments have
been maki ng repeatedly i n statutor y human rights litigation. One is
about “services.” Eorts h ave been made repeated ly to exempt socia l
programs f rom the ambit of what count s as a serv ice under human
rights legi slation. Another is t he attempt to impose a “comparator group”
requirement on a ri ghts claimant , the eect of which can be to pre-em pt
a discri mination analysis. T hese manoeuvres, which govern ments rst
utiliz ed in section 15 Charter equal ity cases,7 tend to be interrelated.
7 Courts have come under int ense scholarly cr iticism for forma listic compar-
ator group ana lysis in sect ion 15 Charter equalit y cases: Sophia Reib etanz
Moreau, “Equa lity Rights a nd the Relevance of Compa rator Groups” (2006)
5 JL & Equal ity 81; Daphne Gilber t & Diana Majur y, “Critical Compar i-
sons: The Supreme Cour t of Canada Dooms S ection 15” (2006) 24 Windsor
YB Access Just 11 1; Beverley Baines , “Equality, Compar ison, Discri mina-
tion, Statu s” in Fay Faraday, Margare t Denike, & M Kate Ste phenson, eds,
Making Equality Rights R eal: Securing Substantive Equalit y under the Charter
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) 73; Dia nne Pothier, “Equa lity as a Compar ative
Concept: Mirr or, Mirror, on the Wall, W hat’s the Fairest of The m All?” in
Sheila McInt yre & Sanda Rod gers, eds, Diminishing Ret urns: Inequality and
the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms (Mark ham, ON: LexisNe xis
Butterwor ths, 2006) [McInty re & Rodgers] 135. See also Dia nne Pothier,
“Connecti ng Grounds of Discr imination to Re al People’s Real Experienc es”
(2001) 13 CJWL 37; Bruce Ryder, Cid alia C Faria, & E mily Lawrence, “ What’s
Law Good For? An Em pirical Over view of Charter Equ ality Right s Deci-
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