Judicial Notice

• Author: Matthew Gourlay/Brock Jones/Jill D. Makepeace/Glen Crisp/Renee Pomerance
• Pages: 49-79

CHAPTER 3

JUDICIAL NOTICE

I. Overview ......................................................... 

II. General Principles ................................................. 

A. The Crux of the Problem ........................................ 

B. The Solution ................................................... 

. Who Is “Everybody”? ......................................... 

. The Two Gateways to Judicial Notice .......................... 

(A) Notorious or Generally Accepted Facts...................... 

(B) Facts That Are Ascertainable via Readily Accessible Sources of

IndisputableAccuracy .................................... 

III. Specific Subject Areas .............................................. 

A. Social and Legislative Facts ...................................... 

B. Common Sense Versus Stereotypical Assumptions About

HumanBehaviour .............................................. 

C. Racial and Other Biases ......................................... 

D. Online Sources................................................. 

E. Judicial Notice Based on Precedent ............................... 

F. Dictionary Definitions ........................................... 

G. Geographical Facts ............................................. 

H. Historical Documents and Events................................. 

I. Scientific and Technological Facts ................................ 

J. Court Records ................................................. 

K. Domestic Law ................................................. 

L. Judicial Notice Regarding the Impact of Publication Bans............ 

IV. Post-Trial Proceedings.............................................. 

A. Judicial Notice in Sentencing Proceedings ......................... 

B. Judicial Notice on Appeal ....................................... 

V. Procedural Considerations .......................................... 

49

Copyright © 2022 Emond Montgomery Publications. All Rights Reserved.

I. OVERVIEW

In our judicial system, fact s are found on the basis of proof. Therefore, if a party wants

to establish a fact, it nee ds to lead evidence of that fact.1 The trier of fact ma kes findings

based on the admissible evid ence, not their personal knowledge.2

Judicial notice is a narrow but impor tant exception to this general rule. It allows for

fact-finding without evidence—not based on what the trier of fact ha ppens to know, but

rather on what everyb ody knows.3 In practice, “ever ybody” is understood to refer either

to the educated, well-informed layperson or to the ju diciary generally.

In the leading case of Rv Find,4 the Supreme Cour t of Canada described the test for

judicial notice as “strict,” and held that fac ts can be judicially notice only where they are

1. so notorious or g enerally accepted as not to be the subjec t of debate among reason-

able persons; or

2. c apable of immediate and accurate de monstration by resort to read ily accessible

sources of indisputable accuracy.5

However, the strictness with which these criteria are app lied vary with the nature

and importance of the fac t at issue. Social or legislative facts—those which provi de

background context for a legal or factual is sue—are more readily subject to judicial

notice than adjudicative fact s (the “who, what, when, and why” of the dispute).6 And

facts that are importa nt to or decisive of the result are less susceptible to judicial notice

than those that are more periphera l to the ultimate issue.7

Ordinarily, the parties should be g iven notice of significant facts of which the jud ge

proposes to take judicial notice so that they may have an opp ortunity to raise an objec-

tion. Unfairness can result if the ju dge takes judicial notice of a matter on which the

parties never had the chance to make subm issions.8

II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A. THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM

The doctrine of judicial noti ce can be seen as a sensible compromise bet ween two

untenable extremes. On the on e hand, a sensible decision-making process is i mpos-

sible if every bit of common knowle dge must be established in evide nce. Judges and

1 Or obtain an admissi on from the other side—i n which case the admis sion becomes the und isputed evidence.

2 By contrast, unti l the 19th century, English jurie s were expected to use their per sonal knowledge of the

accused and the wit nesses to inform their adju dication of guilt or innocen ce: Colin Manchester, “Judicial

Notice and Person al Knowledge” (1979) 42:1 Mod L R ev 22 at 22-23.

3 Rv Spence, [200 5] 3 SCR 458, 2005 SCC 71 at para 49, citing Ja mes Thayer, “Judicial Notice and the L aw

of Evidence” (1889-189 0) 3:7 Harv L Rev 285 at 305.

4 [2001] 1 SCR 863, 2001 SCC 32 at p ara 48, McLachlin CJ.

5 This formulat ion originated in the influe ntial article by Edmund M Morga n, “Judicial Notice” (1943-1944)

57:3 Harv L Rev 269.

6 Spence, supra note 3 at paras 56-60.

7 Ibid at para 60.

8 Ibid at para 51.

50 MODERN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

Copyright © 2022 Emond Montgomery Publications. All Rights Reserved.