National Security

• Author: Alan Borovoy
• Pages: 203-251

• 203 •

chapter ten

National Security

Emergency Powers

In October 1970, the political landscape in Canada was sudden-

ly — and perhaps irrevocably — transformed. After a decade of sporadic

and mostly futile bombings, the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ)

pulled off a political kidnapping. One of its cells seized the British trade

commissioner, James Cross, and hid him somewhere in the province of

Quebec. In order to relinquish him, the FLQ demanded that the author-

ities perform certain political handstands including: the release from

jail of all FLQ members who had been involved in those previous terror-

ist bombings and the broadcasting over the CBC of the FLQ manifesto.

It appeared that the idea was to humiliate the governments of Can-

ada and Quebec. Such humiliation would undermine their authority

with the people under their respective jurisdictions. That, in turn, would

set the stage for an FLQ takeover of the province of Quebec. The FLQ

object was to drive Quebec out of Confederation and establish there a

government responsive to the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism

The then prime minister of Canada, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, owed

his election, in large part, to the leadership he had provided against the

forces of Quebec nationalism. In particular, he was hostile to any sug-

gestion of Quebec’s separation from the rest of Canada. Not surprisingly,

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“at the barricades”

therefore, he refused to implement the demands of the FLQ or even to

engage in any negotiations with them.

As the entire country awaited a coherent response from the Quebec

government of Robert Bourassa, the FLQ struck again. Within only a

few days of the James Cross kidnapping, another cell of the FLQ seized

Quebec’s labour minister, Pierre Laporte. The brazenness of the FLQ

action shocked Canadians from coast to coast; FLQ operatives grabbed

Laporte in the middle of a touch football game in which he had been

playing with members of his family. At this point, the FLQ appeared to

have acquired the upper hand. The noose tightened around the political

throat of the Quebec government.

A new group of players soon surfaced. A coalition of Quebec com-

munity leaders convened a press conference at Montreal’s downtown

Holiday Inn. This coalition included Quebec’s democratic separatist

leader, René Lévesque, Le Devoir publisher, Claude Ryan, and the pres-

idents of Quebec’s three leading labour federations: the FTQ, the CNTU,

and the Quebec teachers’ union. The coalition called upon the govern-

ment of Quebec to effectively break ranks with the federal government;

they urged the Bourassa government to negotiate with the FLQ kidnap-

pers. And, as a further politically protective measure, the coalition called

for a government of national unity — which would include coalition

members — to replace the Quebec government during the course of

this crisis.

The ensuing political tensions could almost be cut with a knife. All

over Quebec, people were echoing the message of the coalition: “Ne-

gotiate with the FLQ.” Large street demonstrations were planned for

downtown Montreal. There were widespread fears that the impending

demonstrations would be accompanied by severe violence. (Just months

before, Montreal had witnessed a number of violent demonstrations in

connection with a taxi dispute.) Moreover, many people feared that the

FLQ would soon strike again.

Into the midst of this confusion, the federal government dispatched

a number of combat units from the Canadian military. Armed soldiers

began to patrol the streets of Montreal. On the steps of the House of

Commons in Ottawa, a group of reporters encircled Prime Minister

Trudeau as he was about to enter the chamber. They began to question

him about the presence of armed soldiers in Montreal. His replies were

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Chapter Ten: National Security

typically testy Trudeau. He warned that law and order were more im-

portant than the feelings of some “bleeding hearts.” When the reporters

asked what he was going to do next, Trudeau replied, “Just watch me.”

Indeed, the combination of tensions in Quebec and prime min-

isterial bravado provided the perfect backdrop for the next major de-

velopment. In the wee hours of Friday morning, October 16th (about 3

a.m.), the federal government invoked the War Measures Act. (This was

a stand-by emergency powers law, f‌irst enacted during World War I and

last invoked during the Second World War.)

The operative regulation adopted under the Act proclaimed the exist-

ence of an “apprehended insurrection.” With that, a new crime was cre-

ated: membership in the FLQ. Those found guilty of this crime could

be jailed for up to f‌ive years. But, even without being found guilty, they

could be held on mere suspicion for up to twenty-one days, without bail

and without even being charged. Moreover, the police were equipped

with additional powers of search, seizure, arrest, and detention. Almost

immediately following this invocation, police in the province of Quebec

began to round up and detain many people suspected of radical and

separatist proclivities. By the time of sunrise on October 16th, some two

hundred new prisoners were being held in Quebec jails.

In a special broadcast to the country, Prime Minister Trudeau ex-

plained that this action had become necessary because of the terrorist

activities of the FLQ. By way of additional explanation, he pointed to

what he called the state of confusion in Quebec and the fact that the

Quebec government had explicitly requested him to take this action.

One consequence of the invocation that became immediately obvious

was the virtually instant relaxation of the tensions throughout Quebec.

When the bottom fell out of Canada’s political tranquility in this way,

I had been general counsel of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association

(CCLA) for approximately eighteen months. A year and a half’s experi-

ence was hardly a suff‌icient background for me to draw on in order

to grapple with the civil liberties implications of this unprecedented

crisis. Indeed, I remember muttering something monumentally incon-

sequential when the press woke me on the morning of the sixteenth to

tell me what Trudeau had done. But, as soon as I was able to gather my

wits, I telephoned CCLA vice-president, Syd Midanik, and board chair,

Eamon Park. The crisis situation demanded a crisis response: the three