On Behalf of Shareholders: Private Property and Social Wealth

• Author: Allan C. Hutchinson
• Pages: 113-131

113



O Bha  Saehode:

    

e iends of democracy should keep their eyes anxiously xed

[on the rise of manufacturing businesses]; for if ever a perma-

nent inequality of conditions and aristocracy again penetrate the

world, it may be predicated that this is the channel by which they

will enter.

~ Alexis de Tocqueville

T    corporations are major players in the Cana-

dian political, economic, and social system seems to be indisputable;

they exercise enormous power over the lives of ordinary Canadians.

While any accumulation of power must be treated with suspicion and

mistrust in a democracy, there is no necessity to consider it illegiti-

mate by virtue of its aggregation alone. Power is not the problem in

and of itself but the basis for its exercise and legitimacy. Although far

from ideal in its arrangement and accountability, the power of govern-

ment is both immense and, at least in part, legitimate in light of its

democratic origins and organization (see chapter ). e fact that Ca-

nadian governmental practices would benet from a greater commit-

ment to closing t he gap by a more rigorou s revital ization of democra tic

processes does not negate the claim to basic democratic legitimacy.

PART TWO: TAKING S TOCK

114

However, the concentration of power in corporate hands does not

benet from such initial operating assumptions. When it comes to

the pedigree and consequences of corporate power, there is a consider-

able burden on its operatives and apologist s to oer a suit able series of

justications; corporate power seems presumptively undemocratic, if

not actually anti-democratic. Accordingly, a defence of present cor-

porate arrangements must, at a minimum, demonstrate that they are

not inconsistent with the foundational requirements of democratic

governance. On a more demanding standard, the challenge is to show

how corporate power can be transformed and justied to advance the

democratic project of closing the gap.

Despite its many dierent and innovative eorts, traditional theo-

rizing has failed to make a persuasive case for how the modern corpo-

ration can be reconciled with the rhetoric and reality of democratic

governance in contemporary society. Corporate theoreticians have

put forward a plethora of explanations. Blending old and new, their

primary contributions have encompassed the public discipline of the

private market (see chapter ) and the emancipatory force of share-

holder populism (see chapters  and ). In this chapter, I intend to

concentrate on perhaps the two most fundamental and enduring ra-

tionales: the private property and the social wealth defences. Whereas

the former rests on the claim that those who own the corporation

have authority to operate the corporation in their interests and re-

ceive any resulting prots, the latter asserts that any increase in wealth

brought about by corporate operations or prots works to the benet

of everyone in society. However, despite their continued prominence,

these arguments actually highlight the shortcomings of treating the

corporation exclusively or primarily as a private and economic actor in

Canada’s social development. at having been said, mine is not a rant

again st prot-making, produc tivity, or business generally. It would be

both fantasy and folly to suggest that we should abandon the valuable

economic goals of competitiveness and protability. However, from a

democratic perspective, the corporation cannot remain only an eco-

nomic device for accumulating capital and increasing prots for its

privileged owners. Uncoupled from market capitalism and hitched