D. Proprietary Estoppel

AuthorJohn D. McCamus
ProfessionProfessor of Law. Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
Pages287-289

Page 287

Although the orthodox view of the Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence is that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot ground a cause of action, there is a line of authority suggesting that gratuitous promises concerning the creation of interests in land appear to be enforceable in the full sense. In the typical case, an owner of land promises to another that the latter shall have an interest in the land in the expectation that the promisee will rely on that promise. Typically, the reliance involved is that the promisee will then erect a building or make other improvements upon the promisor’s land in the expectation that they will be available for the benefit or the use of the promisee. In such a case, if the promisor refuses to go forward with the promised transfer of an interest, the unjust enrichment of the promisor is quite intense. For a rather long time, then, courts of equity were prepared to require owners in such circumstances to transfer the interest in question.42Inwards v. Baker43provides a modern illustration. A son wished to buy property,

Page 288

which he could ill afford, on which to build a residence. His father encouraged him to build a residence on the father’s land. The son did so and lived there for many years until the father’s death. Some years thereafter, the trustees of the estate sought possession of the land. The Court of Appeal held that the son’s expectation that he could continue to live on the land had been encouraged by his father and could not be defeated by the trustees. Accordingly, he was entitled to continue to occupy the residence as against the trustees.

In the subsequent case of Crabb v. Arun District Council,44 the reliance of the promisee did not involve the making of improvements to the promisor’s land. Crabb’s predecessor in title had transferred an adjacent parcel of land to the defendant council in return, inter alia, for an undertaking from the council that it would build a roadway adjacent to the parcel retained by the predecessor and eventually sold to Crabb. Further, the council agreed that it would erect a fence along the boundary between the two properties and allow access from Crabb’s parcel to the roadway through a gap at point A. Crabb later developed a scheme to subdivide his parcel and sell off the portion that had access to the roadway at point A, provided that the council would be willing to grant him a further access from the parcel he would retain at point B. Crabb spoke...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT