R. v. Khawaja (M.M.), (2012) 301 O.A.C. 200 (SCC)

JudgeMcLachlin, C.J.C., LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell and Karakatsanis, JJ.
CourtSupreme Court (Canada)
Case DateDecember 14, 2012
JurisdictionCanada (Federal)
Citations(2012), 301 O.A.C. 200 (SCC);2012 SCC 69

R. v. Khawaja (M.M.) (2012), 301 O.A.C. 200 (SCC)

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

.........................

Temp. Cite: [2012] O.A.C. TBEd. DE.056

Mohammad Momin Khawaja (appellant) v. Her Majesty the Queen (respondent) and Attorney General of Ontario, Groupe d'étude en droits et libertés de la Faculté de droit de l'Université Laval, Canadian Civil Liberties Association and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (intervenors)

(34103; 2012 SCC 69; 2012 CSC 69)

Indexed As: R. v. Khawaja (M.M.)

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin, C.J.C., LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell and Karakatsanis, JJ.

December 14, 2012.

Summary:

The accused was allegedly associated with a "terrorist group" in England that was engaged in "terrorist activity". He was convicted of five terrorism offences: (1) knowingly participating in or contributing to the activity of a terrorist group by receiving training for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the terrorist group to facilitate or carry out terrorist activity (Criminal Code, s. 83.18(1)); (2) knowingly instructing a person to carry out financial activity for the benefit of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the terrorist group to facilitate or carry out terrorist activity (s. 83.21(1)); (3) providing and making available property and financial services to persons, intending or knowing that they would be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out terrorist activity (s. 83.03(a)); (4) knowingly participating in or contributing to an activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity, by participating in dialogue, meetings or exchanges of information relating to the development of an explosive device intended to endanger life or cause serious damage to property (s. 83.18); and (5) knowingly facilitating a terrorist activity (s. 83.19). The accused was acquitted of two other terrorism offences, but convicted of the lesser included offences of (1) developing a device with intent to cause an explosion likely to cause serious bodily harm or death and (2) making an explosive substance with intent to enable another person to endanger life. The accused, after credit for five years' pre-trial custody, was sentenced to a total of 10.5 years' imprisonment. The accused appealed his convictions, submitting that: (1) the trial judge erred in severing the "motive clause" in s. 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A) of the definition of "terrorist activity", thereby registering convictions unknown to law; (2) the trial judge erred in convicting the accused on a different case than that set out in the Crown's opening statement at trial; (3) the trial judge erred in finding that the "armed conflict exception" in the definition of "terrorist activity" (s. 83.01(1)(b)(ii)) did not apply; (4) the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of the geo-political situation in Afghanistan and of international law; and (5) the convictions were unreasonable. The accused also sought leave to appeal the sentences imposed. The Crown cross-appealed the sentences.

The Ontario Court of Appeal, in a judgment reported (2010), 271 O.A.C. 238, dismissed the conviction appeal. The Crown's cross-appeal against sentence was allowed and the accused was sentenced to life imprisonment on the explosions count and a total of 24 years' imprisonment (consecutive to each other but concurrent to the life sentence) on the five terrorism offence counts. The accused appealed on the grounds summarized by the court as: "(1) that the provisions in Part II.1 of the Criminal Code under which he was convicted violate s. 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and are unconstitutional; (2) that the provisions were misapplied or misinterpreted, resulting in an unfair trial or an unreasonable verdict; and (3) that the Ontario Court of Appeal erred in imposing his sentence."

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. The court also dealt with the issue of whether s. 83.18 was unconstitutional because of overbreadth (Charter, s. 7).

Civil Rights - Topic 1854.2

Freedom of speech or expression - Limitations on - Terrorism offences - [See Criminal Law - Topic 1183 ].

Civil Rights - Topic 2063

Freedom of thought, belief or opinion - Denial of - Anti-terrorism efforts and legislation - [See Criminal Law - Topic 1183 ].

Civil Rights - Topic 3107.2

Trials - Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings - General principles and definitions - Overbreadth principle - Section 83.18 of the Criminal Code prohibited participation in "terrorist activity" as defined by s. 83.01(1) - It was argued that the combination of the two sections "results in overbreadth, by criminalizing conduct that creates no risk of harm and is only tenuously connected to Parliament's objective of preventing terrorist activity" (i.e., law grossly disproportionate to the objective it sought to achieve) - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "the appellants conflate overbreadth and gross disproportionality" - However, the court stated that it need not decide whether the two interrelated constitutional doctrines were distinct - The court stated that "they may simply offer different lenses through which to consider a single breach of the principles of fundamental justice. Overbreadth occurs when the means selected by the legislator are broader than necessary to achieve the state objective, and gross disproportionality occurs when state actions or legislative responses to a problem are 'so extreme as to be disproportionate to any legitimate government interest'" - See paragraphs 37 to 40.

Civil Rights - Topic 3107.2

Trials - Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings - General principles and definitions - Overbreadth principle - Section 83.18 of the Criminal Code provided that "every one who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence" - It was argued that the combination of s. 83.18 and s. 83.01(1) (defining "terrorist activity") "results in overbreadth, by criminalizing conduct that creates no risk of harm and is only tenuously connected to Parliament's objective of preventing terrorist activity" - The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 83.18 was not overly broad contrary to s. 7 of the Charter - The court stated that "a purposive interpretation of the actus reus and mens rea requirements of s. 83.18 excludes convictions (i) for innocent or socially useful conduct that is undertaken absent any intent to enhance the abilities of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity, and (ii) conduct that a reasonable person would not view as capable of materially enhancing the abilities of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity. ... the objective of the terrorism provisions is to prosecute and prevent terrorism. ... it is legitimate for the state to prevent terrorist acts from taking place. ... The appellants argue that, in relation to its objective, s. 83.18 is broader than necessary and has a grossly disproportionate impact because it criminalizes acts: (1) which do not disclose a risk of harm; (2) which are not connected to a real or contemplated terrorist act; and (3) which are preliminary to the commission of an inchoate offence. The first two arguments are answered by the limited scope of s. 83.18. ... conviction under s. 83.18 entails: (1) an actus reus that excludes conduct that a reasonable person would not view as capable of materially enhancing the abilities of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity, and (2) a high mens rea (specific intent to enhance the abilities of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity). ... Conduct that meets both these requirements disclose a non-negligible risk of harm and is sufficiently connected to real or contemplated terrorist activity. ... When the tailored reach of the section is weighed against the objective, it cannot be said that the selected means are broader than necessary or that the impact of the section is disproportionate. ... The breadth of the impugned provisions reflects Parliament's determination that 'there is substantive harm inherent in all aspects of preparation for a terrorist act because of the great harm that flows from the completion of terrorist acts' ... it is appropriate to exhibit due deference to this determination." - See paragraphs 34 to 64.

Criminal Law - Topic 1182

Offences against public order - Terrorism offences - Intention - [See Criminal Law - Topic 1183 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 1183

Offences against public order - Terrorism offences - "Terrorist activity" defined - Part II.1 of the Criminal Code provided for terrorist-related offences for certain acts or omissions involving "terrorist activity" - Part of the definition of "terrorist activity" (s. 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A)) required proof that the accused's act or omission was committed wholly or partly for a "political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause" ("motive clause") - The trial judge held that the "chilling effect" of the "motive clause" violated the Charter rights of persons who merely shared some or all of the political, religious or ideological beliefs associated with those who actually engaged in "terrorist activity" - The judge severed the offending "motive clause" from the definition - On appeal, the accused argued that the judge should have struck the entire "terrorist activity" definition, which would have rendered all of the terrorist offences in Part II.1 to be of no force and effect - The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the "motive clause" did not violate s. 2(b) - The purpose of the legislation was to protect persons from physical harm flowing from conduct meeting the "terrorist activity" definition, not to limit expression - None of the conduct falling under the "terrorist activity" definition was protected by s. 2(b) because (1) some, if not all, of the conduct involved the use of violence to convey a meaning and (2) to the extent that some conduct did not involve the conveying of meaning through violence, it involved conveying meaning in a manner contrary to and destructive of the principles underlying the right to freedom of expression - The judge's "chilling effect" finding was speculative in the absence of any evidence - It was wrong to find a "chilling effect" self-evident and beyond question - The "motive clause" was constitutional and should not have been severed - The Supreme Court of Canada held that threats of violence fell outside the s. 2(b) guarantee of freedom expression and most of the conduct caught by the terrorism provisions in Part II.1 concerned acts of violence or threats of violence - Further, "counselling, conspiracy or being an accessory after the fact to conduct enumerated in ss. 83.01(1)(b)(ii)(A), (B), (C) and (D) can find no protection under s. 2(b)" - Section 83.01(1)(b)(ii)(E) defined "terrorist activity" as catching "an act or omission ... that ... causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of the clauses (A) to (C)" - The court held that "I am not persuaded on the submissions before us that the activities targetted by s. 83.01(1)(b)(ii)(E) fall within the protected zone of free expression. This said, I would not rule out the possibility that s. 83.01(1)(b)(ii)(E) might in some future case be found to capture protected activity. In such a case, the issue would be whether the incursion on free expression is justified under s. 1 of the Charter" - The purpose of the terrorism provisions did not infringe freedom of expression - It was impossible to infer, without evidence, that the "motive clause" would have a "chilling effect" on the exercise of s. 2 freedoms - In any event, a "chilling effect" resulting from a patently incorrect understanding of the terrorism provisions could not ground a finding of unconstitutionality - The court stated that "I agree ... that the appellants have not established that the motive clause has a chilling effect on the exercise of s. 2 liberties and results in an infringement of s. 2 of the Charter. The motive clause is constitutional and need not be excised from the law" - The deletion and reinsertion of the "motive clause" on appeal did not render the trial and convictions unfair, as the trial judge expressly found that motive had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt in any event (i.e., no prejudice suffered by accused) - See paragraphs 65 to 94.

Criminal Law - Topic 1184

Offences against public order - Terrorism offences - "Armed conflict" exception - Part II.1 of the Criminal Code provided for terrorist-related offences for certain acts or omissions involving "terrorist activity" - Section 83.01(1)(b)(b)(ii) excluded from "terrorist activity" conduct that was "an act or omission that is committed during an armed conflict and that, at the time and in the place of its commission, is in accordance with customary international law or conventional international law applicable to the conflict" - The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed that the "armed conflict" exception precluded criminal liability for combatants in an armed conflict who acted in accordance with international law - The exception operated as a traditional defence to be left with the jury if it passed the "air of reality" test - The court stated that "the relevant inquiry in respect of the exception was whether there was anything in the evidence to suggest that the [accused's] activities: (1) were undertaken while an armed conflict was in progress, and (2) were in accordance with the rules of war established by international law applicable to that armed conflict" - The court rejected the submission that the exception applied only where the accused actually participated in the theatre of war where the relevant armed conflict was underway - That narrow interpretation was inappropriate - The court stated that "the availability of the exception does not require proof of an accused's physical presence in an area of armed conflict. Nor does it contemplate that an accused's impugned acts or omissions must be carried out within the territorial limits of an area of armed conflict. ... all that is required to trigger the exception is some evidence that: (1) an accused's acts or omissions were committed 'during' an armed conflict; and (2) those acts or omissions, at the time and at the place of their commission, accorded with international law applicable to the armed conflict at issue" - On the trial judge's findings, there was no "air of reality" to the armed conflict exception - The Supreme Court of Canada agreed - The "armed conflict" exception operated as an exception, requiring the accused to make a prima facie case that it applied - There was simply no air of reality to the claim that the exception applied - The court below did not err in taking judicial notice of the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the counter-insurgency acts in that country which, subject to the armed conflict exception, met the definition of terrorist activity - The accused knew the terrorist activities extended beyond Afghanistan and there was overwhelming evidence that the accused's activities were not part of an armed conflict governed by international law - See paragraphs 95 to 103.

Criminal Law - Topic 5804

Sentencing - General - Consecutive sentences - Reduced total term (totality principle) - Section 83.26 of the Criminal Code provided that where an accused was convicted for offences involving terrorist activity under ss. 83.02 to 83.04 and 83.18 to 83.23, all sentences (except life sentences) were to be served consecutively - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "the only restriction imposed by the totality principle is that the sentence not exceed the overall culpability of the offender. While the practice in Canadian courts is not to impose sentences of between 15 and 20 years if a life sentence is not appropriate, this practice is not binding and is not part of the totality principle ... The fact that sentences of over 20 years may be imposed more often in terrorism cases is not inconsistent with the totality principle. It merely attests to the particular gravity of terrorist offences and the moral culpability of those who commit them" - See paragraph 126.

Criminal Law - Topic 5832

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Rehabilitation - The accused was convicted of terrorism offences under Part II.1 of the Criminal Code - The trial judge failed to treat the absence of evidence of the accused's rehabilitative prospects as an important sentencing factor - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "the absence of information on the likelihood of the appellant re-offending was relevant to sentencing ... The absence of evidence on the appellant's likelihood of re-offending gave the trial judge no assurance that he was no longer committed to violent jihad and terrorism, or that there was any chance that, over time, he could change and be released from state control without undue risk of harm to the population. The lack of information on a person's probability of re-offending, in the face of compelling evidence of dangerousness, is sufficient to justify a stiffer sentence. I cannot accept the broad proposition that 'the import of rehabilitation as a mitigating circumstance is significantly reduced in [the] context [of terrorism] given the unique nature of the crime and the grave and far-reaching threat that it poses to the foundations of our democratic society' ... The terrorism provisions catch a wide variety of conduct, suggesting that the weight to be given to rehabilitation in a given case is best left to the reasoned discretion of trial judges on a case-by-case basis" - See paragraphs 122 to 124.

Criminal Law - Topic 5833.9

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Offences involving terrorism - [See Criminal Law - Topic 5982 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5940

Sentence - Explosives (incl. causing injury with intent) - [See Criminal Law - Topic 5982 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5982

Sentence - Terrorism offences - The 31 year old accused was associated with a "terrorist group" in England that was engaged in "terrorist activity" - He was convicted of five terrorism offences: (1) knowingly participating in or contributing to the activity of a terrorist group by receiving training for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the terrorist group to facilitate or carry out terrorist activity (Criminal Code, s. 83.18(1)); (2) knowingly instructing a person to carry out financial activity for the benefit of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the terrorist group to facilitate or carry out terrorist activity (s. 83.21(1)); (3) providing and making available property and financial services to persons, intending or knowing that they would be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out terrorist activity (s. 83.03(a)); (4) knowingly participating in or contributing to an activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity, by participating in dialogue, meetings or exchanges of information relating to the development of an explosive device intended to endanger life or cause serious damage to property (s. 83.18); and (5) knowingly facilitating a terrorist activity (s. 83.19) and one non-terrorism offence (intending to cause an explosion with an explosive device (s. 81(1)) - After credit for five years' pre-trial custody, the trial judge sentenced the accused to a total of 10.5 years' imprisonment - The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, substituting a sentence of life imprisonment on the explosives count and a total of 24 years' imprisonment (consecutive to each other but concurrent to the life imprisonment sentence) on the remaining five terrorism offence counts - The judge erred in assessing the accused's level of determination and commitment to violent jihad, failed to treat the absence of any evidence of rehabilitative prospects as a critical factor in assessing future dangerousness, and misinterpreted s. 83.26 (re consecutive sentences) - The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal from sentence - The court agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeal, except for the conclusion that the totality principle was inconsistent with mandatory consecutive sentences for terrorism offences - The court stated that "the only restriction imposed by the totality principle is that the sentence not exceed the overall culpability of the offender. While the practice in Canadian courts is not to impose sentences of between 15 and 20 years if a life sentence is not appropriate, this practice is not binding and is not part of the totality principle ... The fact that sentences of over 20 years may be imposed more often in terrorism cases is not inconsistent with the totality principle. It merely attests to the particular gravity of terrorist offences and the moral culpability of those who commit them" - The court held that the Court of Appeal did not err in substituting the sentence that it did - See paragraphs 106 to 131.

Cases Noticed:

United States of America et al. v. Nadarajah (2012), 437 N.R. 107; 2012 SCC 70, refd to. [para. 2].

Sriskandarajah v. United States of America - see United States of America et al. v. Nadarajah.

R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729; 1 N.R. 322, refd to. [para. 12].

Application Under Section 83.28 of the Criminal Code, Re, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248; 322 N.R. 205; 199 B.C.A.C. 45; 326 W.A.C. 45; 2004 SCC 42, refd to. [para. 21].

R. v. Heywood (R.L.), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761; 174 N.R. 81; 50 B.C.A.C. 161; 82 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 37].

R. v. Malmo-Levine (D.) et al., [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571; 314 N.R. 1; 191 B.C.A.C. 1; 314 W.A.C. 1; 2003 SCC 74, refd to. [para. 38].

R. v. Clay (C.J.), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735; 313 N.R. 252; 181 O.A.C. 350; 2003 SCC 75, refd to. [para. 38].

PHS Community Services Society et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134; 421 N.R. 1; 310 B.C.A.C. 1; 526 W.A.C. 1; 2011 SCC 44, refd to. [para. 39].

Canada (Attorney General) v. Nadarajah et al. (2010), 275 O.A.C. 121; 109 O.R.(3d) 680; 2010 ONCA 857, refd to. [para. 41].

Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031; 183 N.R. 325; 82 O.A.C. 243, refd to. [para. 43].

R. v. Déry (J.), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 669; 354 N.R. 335; 2006 SCC 53, dist. [para. 59].

R. v. Ahmad (2009), 257 C.C.C.(3d) 199 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 63].

Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Procureur général), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; 94 N.R. 167; 24 Q.A.C. 2, refd to. [para. 67].

Canadian Federation of Students (B.C.) et al. v. Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority et al., [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295; 389 N.R. 98; 272 B.C.A.C. 29; 459 W.A.C. 29; 2009 SCC 31, refd to. [para. 70].

Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3; 281 N.R. 1, refd to. [para. 70].

Dolphin Delivery Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580, Peterson and Alexander, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573; 71 N.R. 83, refd to. [para. 70].

R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; 117 N.R. 1; 114 A.R. 81, refd to. [para. 70].

R. v. Downey (T.), [2010] O.T.C. Uned. 1531; 2010 ONSC 1531, refd to. [para. 122].

R. v. C.A.M., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; 194 N.R. 321; 73 B.C.A.C. 81; 120 W.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 126].

Statutes Noticed:

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 83.01(1), sect. 83.01(1.1), sect. 83.18, sect. 83.26, sect. 718.2(a)(v), sect. 719(1), sect. 719(3) [Appendix].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vol. 137, No. 95 (1st Sess, 37th Parl.) (Oct. 16, 2001), p. 6165 [para. 52].

Davis, Kevin E., "Cutting off the Flow of Funds to Terrorists: Whose Funds? Which Funds? Who Decides?", in The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), p. 301 [para. 52].

Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada (5th Ed.), vol. 2 (2011 loose-leaf update, release 1), pp. 47 to 58 [para. 39].

Parent, Hugues, and Desrosiers, Julie, Traité de droit criminel (2012), vol 3, pp. 76 to 78 [para. 130].

Roach, Kent, Terrorism Offences and the Charter: A Comment on R. v. Khawaja (2007), 11 Can. Crim. L.R. 271, p. 285 [paras. 45, 47].

Roach, Kent, "The New Terrorism Offences and the Criminal Law", in The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), p. 161 [para. 42].

Counsel:

Lawrence Greenspon and Eric Granger, for the appellant;

Croft Michaelson and Ian Bell, for the respondent;

Michael Bernstein, for the intervenor, the Attorney General of Ontario;

Yan Paquette and Louis-Philippe Lampron, for the intervenor, Groupe d'étude en droits et libertés de la Faculté de droit de l'Université Laval;

Anil K. Kapoor and Lindsay L. Daviau, for the intervenor, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association;

Kent Roach and Michael Fenrick, for the intervenor, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.

Solicitors of Record:

Greenspon, Brown & Associates, Ottawa, Ontario, for the appellant;

Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Toronto, Ontario, for the respondent;

Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervenor, the Attorney General of Ontario;

Langlois Kronström Desjardins, Quebec, Quebec, for the intervenor, Groupe d'étude en droits et libertés de la Faculté de droit de l'Université Laval;

Kapoor Barristers, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervenor, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association;

Paliare, Roland, Rosenberg, Rothstein, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervenor, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.

This appeal was heard on June 11, 2012, before McLachlin, C.J.C., LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell and Karakatsanis, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada.

On December 14, 2012, McLachlin, C.J.C., delivered the following judgment orally in both official languages for the Court.

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    • Mondaq Canada
    • April 23, 2019
    ...1, Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7 and ss. 15, R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69 CIVIL DECISIONS College of Optometrists of Ontario v. Essilor Group Inc., 2019 ONCA 265 [Juriansz, Brown and Huscroft JJ.A.] Counsel: J. Lisu......
47 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
    • Canada
    • Irwin Books Archive The Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Fifth Edition
    • August 29, 2013
    ...(3d) 1 ....................... 1, 51, 59, 61, 77, 8 4, 160, 170, 171, 172, 192, 309 The CharTer of righTs and freedoms 468 R v Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69 ........................................... 107, 159, 169, 246, 247, 281 R v Kokesch, [1990] 3 SCR 3, 61 CCC (3d) 207 ...............................
  • The Prohibited Act, or Actus Reus
    • Canada
    • Irwin Books Criminal Law. Eighth edition
    • September 1, 2022
    ...into the actus reus of dangerous driving. The 48 Above note 2 at para 21. 49 [2006] 2 SCR 49 [ Boulanger ]. 50 Ibid at para 67. 51 2012 SCC 69 at para 50. 52 R v Beatty , 2008 SCC 5 at para 45 [ Beatty ]. Chief Justice McLachlin (Binnie and LeBel JJ concurring) dissented on this point and h......
  • Endnotes
    • Canada
    • Irwin Books False Security. The Radicalization of Canadian Anti-Terrorism
    • June 21, 2015
    ...Approach to Intelligence and Evidence” undated powerpoint presentation. Access to Information Request A-2014-224. 23 R v Khawaja , 2012 SCC 69. 24 Re Section 83.28 of the Criminal Code , 2004 SCC 42 at para 39. CHAP TER T WO: HISTORY 1 Ontario Provincial Police, “Independent Investigation i......
  • Table of Cases
    • Canada
    • Irwin Books Archive Criminal Law. Seventh Edition
    • August 4, 2018
    ...v Kerster (2003), 175 CCC (3d) 29, [2003] BCJ No 999 (CA) ........................ 155 R v Khawaja, 2010 ONCA 862, aff’d [2012] 3 SCR 555, 2012 SCC 69 ................. 74, 158, 196, 210, 505, 506, 508, 516, 559 R v Kienapple (1974), [1975] 1 SCR 729, 15 CCC (2d) 524, 26 CRNS 1 ..................
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