R. v. Lyons (T.P.), (1987) 80 N.R. 161 (SCC)

• Judge: Dickson, C.J.C., Estey, McIntyre, Lamer, Wilson, Le Dain and La Forest, JJ.
• Court: Supreme Court (Canada)
• Case Date: October 15, 1987
• Jurisdiction: Canada (Federal)
• Citations: (1987), 80 N.R. 161 (SCC);[1987] 2 SCR 309;1987 CanLII 25 (SCC);44 DLR (4th) 193;37 CCC (3d) 1;61 CR (3d) 1;80 NR 161;[1987] CarswellNS 41;AZ-87111063;JE 87-1123;[1987] SCJ No 62 (QL);207 APR 271;32 CRR 41;3 WCB (2d) 62;82 NSR (2d) 271

R. v. Lyons (T.P.) (1987), 80 N.R. 161 (SCC)

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

.........................

Thomas Patrick Lyons v. Her Majesty The Queen and The Attorney General of Canada, The Attorney General for Ontario, The Attorney General of British Columbia

(19125)

Indexed As: R. v. Lyons (T.P.)

Supreme Court of Canada

Dickson, C.J.C., Estey, McIntyre, Lamer, Wilson, Le Dain and La Forest, JJ.

October 15, 1987.

Summary:

The Crown applied under Part XXI (ss. 687-695) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, to have the accused declared a dangerous offender and sentenced for an indeterminate period. The accused challenged the validity of Part XXI under ss. 7, 9, 11 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Nova Scotia County Court, in a decision reported (1984), 62 N.S.R.(2d) 383; 136 A.P.R. 383, granted the application, holding that Part XXI was not contrary to the Charter. The accused appealed.

The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, in a decision reported 65 N.S.R.(2d) 29; 147 A.P.R. 29, dismissed the appeal. The accused appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada, Lamer and Wilson, JJ., dissenting in part, dismissed the appeal. The court held that Part XXI did not violate the liberty rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter either in the objectives of Part XXI nor in its effects. Specifically the court held that an accused who was the subject of a dangerous offender application was not entitled to a jury under s. 7; that the standard of proof on a Part XXI application and the use of psychiatric evidence were not contrary to s. 7; and the lack of notice of the dangerous offender application before plea were not contrary to s. 7. The court held that Part XXI did not create an arbitrary detention or imprisonment contrary to s. 9 of the Charter, nor did it constitute cruel and unusual punishment or treatment contrary to s. 12. The court held also that an accused who is the subject of a dangerous offender application is not "charged with an offence" within the meaning of s. 11 of the Charter and is therefore not entitled to the rights guaranteed by s. 11 (e.g. s. 11(f) - right to trial by jury). In the result the declaration that the accused was a dangerous offender and the indeterminate sentence were affirmed.

Lamer, J., would have held that s. 11 rights did apply to an accused subject to a dangerous offender application and therefore the accused would have for example the right to a jury as guaranteed by s. 11(f). Thus s. 689(2) which denied that right would be inoperative. Lamer, J., would have allowed the appeal on this basis, but otherwise agreed substantially with the reasons of the majority.

Wilson, J., agreed that Part XXI was not contrary to ss. 9 and 12 of the Charter. She chose to leave open the question of whether an accused subject to a dangerous offender application was charged with an offence within the meaning of s. 11 and entitled to s. 11 rights, where the accused was protected by the more general provision of s. 7. Wilson, J., held that the fact that the accused was not given notice of the dangerous offender application before his guilty plea was contrary to the principles of fundamental justice (Charter, s. 7), and would have allowed the appeal because of the s. 7 violation.

Civil Rights - Topic 646

Liberty - Limitations on - Prisoners and imprisonment - Indeterminate sentence - The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, permitted the court to declare an accused to be a dangerous offender and impose a sentence of indeterminate detention - The Supreme Court of Canada, per La Forest, J., stated that "I do not think that it could seriously be argued that the pennological objectives embodied in Part XXI themselves violate s. 7 of the Charter" - See paragraphs 23 to 36.

Civil Rights - Topic 681

Liberty - Limitations on - Principles of fundamental justice - General - The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, permitted a court on application by the Crown to declare an accused to be a dangerous offender and sentence him for an indeterminate period - The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 7 of the Charter (principles of fundamental justice) did not require that a dangerous offender application be held before a jury - The court held further that the hearing procedures in Part XXI otherwise met the standard of fairness in s. 7 - See paragraphs 75 to 90.

Civil Rights - Topic 681

Liberty - Limitations on - Principles of fundamental justice - General - The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, permitted a court on application by the Crown to declare an accused to be a dangerous offender - A dangerous offender argued that the failure by the Crown to give notice prior to his election and guilty plea that it intended to bring a dangerous offender application violated his rights under s. 7 of the Charter - The Supreme Court of Canada, Wilson, J., dissenting, rejected this argument - See paragraphs 101 to 107, 120 to 125.

Civil Rights - Topic 681

Liberty - Limitations on - Principles of fundamental justice - General - The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, s. 688, permitted a court to declare an accused to be a dangerous offender where, inter alia, there is proof that the offender constitutes a threat to life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons, or where there is a likelihood of the offender causing injury or evil to other persons ... - A dangerous offender argued that the standard of proof was fundamentally unfair because it was lower than that traditionally required in the criminal law process - The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this argument - See paragraphs 91 to 100.

Civil Rights - Topic 681

Liberty - Limitations on - Principles of fundamental justice - General - The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, permitted a court to declare an accused to be a dangerous offender - S. 690 of the Code required that psychiatric evidence be tendered on a Part XXI application - A dangerous of fender argued that s. 690 was fundamentally unfair to the extent that such evidence is an unreliable predictor of future conduct - The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this argument - See paragraphs 91 to 100.

Civil Rights - Topic 726

Liberty - Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Denial of liberty - What constitutes - [See Civil Rights - Topic 646 above].

Civil Rights - Topic 3138

Trials - Due process - Fundamental justice and fair hearings - Criminal proceedings - Right to jury - Dangerous offender application - The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, permitted a court on application by the Crown, to declare an accused to be a dangerous offender and sentence him for an indeterminate period - A dangerous offender argued that s. 11(f) of the Charter required that a Part XXI hearing be held before a jury - Section 11(f) provided that persons charged with serious offences had the right to trial by jury - The Supreme Court of Canada, Lamer, J., dissenting, held that a dangerous offender application did not constitute "charging the accused with an offence" within the meaning of s. 11 and therefore such an accused had no right to a jury under s. 11(f) - See paragraphs 68 to 74; 109 to 113 - The court held further that there was no constitutional requirement under s. 7 of the Charter (principles of fundamental justice) that the determination of dangerousness be made by a jury - See paragraphs 75 to 90.

Civil Rights - Topic 3603

Detention and imprisonment - Arbitrary detention - What constitutes - The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, permitted the court to declare an accused to be a dangerous offender and sentence him to imprisonment for an indeterminate period - A dangerous offender sentenced for an indeterminate period argued that he was arbitrarily detained or imprisoned contrary to s. 9 of the Charter - The Supreme Court of Canada held that this was not an appropriate case to pronounce on the meaning of the words "arbitrary detention or imprisonment" - The court held however, that "even assuming s. 9 were given its broadest possible interpretation, [the dangerous offender's] submissions in this regard must fail" - See paragraphs 59 to 67.

Civil Rights - Topic 3821

Cruel and unusual punishment - What constitutes - General - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that s. 12 of the Charter (the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment) will be violated where a sentence is so unfit as to be grossly disproportionate - The court set out how to determine if a punishment is grossly disproportionate - See paragraph 40.

Civil Rights - Topic 3826

Cruel and unusual punishment - What constitutes - Indeterminate detention - The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, permitted the sentencing of dangerous offenders for an indeterminate period - The Supreme Court of Canada held that Part XXI did not violate the right of an accused under s. 12 of the Charter not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment - The court opined that the parole process saved the legislation from being contrary to s. 12, because it ensures that incarceration is imposed for only as long as the circumstances of the individual require - See paragraphs 37 to 58.

Civil Rights - Topic 8461

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Interpretation - General - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "the rights and freedoms protected by the Charter are not insular and discrete ... Rather, the Charter protects a complex of interacting values, each more or less fundamental to the free and democratic society that is Canada ... and the particularization of rights and freedoms contained in the Charter thus represents a somewhat artificial, if necessary and intrinsically worthwhile attempt to structure and focus the judicial exposition of such rights and freedoms. The necessity of structuring the discussion should not however lead us to overlook the importance of appreciating the manner in which the amplification of the content of each enunciated right and freedom imbues and informs our understanding of the value structure sought to be protected by the Charter as a whole and, in particular, of the content of the other specific rights and freedoms it embodies" - See paragraph 21.

Civil Rights - Topic 8467

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Interpretation - Interrelationship among Charter rights - S. 7 v. s. 11 - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "s. 11 [of the Charter] does not limit s. 7 but merely served to illustrate and, perhaps amplify its potential applications" - See paragraph 75.

Civil Rights - Topic 8545

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Interpretation - Particular phrases - Charged with an offence - Charter, s. 11 - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that the phrase "any person charged with an offence" in the opening words of s. 11 of the Charter must be given a constant meaning harmonious with the various paragraphs of the section - See paragraph 74.

Civil Rights - Topic 8545

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Interpretation - Particular phrases - Charged with an offence - Charter, s. 11 - The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, permitted a court on application by the Crown to declare an accused to be a dangerous offender and to be sentenced for an indeterminate period - The Supreme Court of Canada, Lamer, J., dissenting held that an accused who is declared to be a dangerous offender is not a person "charged with an offence" within the meaning of s. 11 and thus not entitled to the rights set out therein - Wilson, J., expressed no opinion on this question - See paragraphs 68 to 74; 109 to 114, 120.

Criminal Law - Topic 6501

Dangerous offenders - Detention - General - The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the history of the dangerous offender provisions of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, ss. 687-695 - See paragraphs 12 to 20.

Criminal Law - Topic 6501

Dangerous offenders - Detention - General - The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, ss. 687-695, permitted a court on application by the Crown to declare an accused to be a dangerous offender and sentence him for an indeterminate period - The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that Part XXI was not contrary to s. 7 of the Charter (right not to be deprived of liberty except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice), s. 9 (arbitrary detention), s. 11(f) (right to trial by jury), or s. 12 (cruel and unusual punishment).

Criminal Law - Topic 6506

Dangerous offenders - Detention - Application - Notice - [See second Civil Rights - Topic 681 above].

Criminal Law - Topic 6512

Dangerous offenders - Detention - Evidence and proof - [See third Civil Rights - Topic 681 above].

Criminal Law - Topic 6512

Dangerous offenders - Detention - Evidence and proof - [See fourth Civil Rights - Topic 681 above].

Cases Noticed:

R. v. Hatchwell, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 39; 3 N.R. 571, refd to. [para. 15].

R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588; 75 N.R. 81, refd to. [para. 21].

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; 65 N.R. 87; 14 O.A.C. 335; 26 D.L.R.(4th) 200; 50 C.R.(3d) 1; 24 C.C.C.(3d) 321, refd to. [paras. 21, 116].

Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; 63 N.R. 266; [1986] 1 W.W.R. 481; 23 C.C.C.(3d) 289; 48 C.R.(3d) 289; 69 B.C.L.R. 145; 36 M.V.R. 240; 18 C.R.R. 30; 24 D.L.R.(4th) 536, refd to. [paras. 23, 75].

Moore and the Queen, Re (1984), 10 C.C.C.(3d) 306, consd. [paras. 26, 38, 62, 65, 90, 98].

R. v. Hill (1974), 15 C.C.C.(2d) 145 (Ont. C.A.), consd. [paras. 29, 30].

R. v. Kempton (1980), 21 A.R. 212; 53 C.C.C.(2d) 176, refd to. [para. 29].

R. v. Crosby (1982), 1 C.C.C.(3d) 233, refd to. [para. 30].

R. v. Hodgson (1967), 52 Cr. App. R. 113, refd to. [para. 32].

U.S. v. Davis (1983), 710 F. 2d 104 (3rd Cir.), refd to. [para. 34].

U.S. v. Stewart (1975), 531 F. 2d 326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 426 U.S. 922, refd to. [para. 34].

U.S. v. Neary (1977), 552 F. 2d 1184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 424 U.S. 864, refd to. [para. 34].

U.S. v. Cox (1983), 719 F. 2d 285 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 929, refd to. [para. 34].

Spencer v. Texas (1967), 87 S. Ct. 648, refd to. [para. 35].

Rummel v. Estelle (1980), 100 S. Ct. 1133, refd to. [para. 35].

Solem v. Helm (1983), 100 S.Ct. 3001, refd to. [paras. 35, 55].

R. v. Langevin (1984), 3 O.A.C. 110; 39 C.R.(3d) 333 (Ont. C.A.), consd. [paras. 38, 90, 98, 113].

Ex Parte Matticks, [1973] S.C.R. vi; 15 C.C.C.(2d) 213n, refd to. [para. 38].

R. v. Smith (E.D.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045; 75 N.R. 321, refd to. [paras. 39, 40, 56 and 65].

R. v. Konechny (1983), 38 C.R.(3d) 69, refd to. [para. 6l].

Mitchell v. A.G. Ont. et al. (1983), 35 C.R.(3d) 225 (Ont. H.C.), refd to. [para. 6l].

Brusch v. R., [1953] 1 S.C.R. 373, consd. [paras. 71, 85, 89, and 113].

R. v. Hunter, [1921] 1 K.B. 555, refd to. [para. 71].

Wilband v. R., [1967] S.C.R. 14, consd. [paras. 73, 113].

Schmidt v. Canada et al., [l987] 1 S.C.R. 500; 76 N.R. 12, consd. [paras. 74, 114].

Specht v. Patterson et al., 386 U.S. 605, consd. [paras. 77, 78, 79, 82 and 83].

U.S. v. Maroney (1966), 355 F. 2d 302, consd. [paras. 79, 80, 86].

Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, refd to. [para. 80].

Duncan v. State of Louisiana (1968), 391 U.S. 145, refd to. [para. 81].

U.S. v. Inendino (1978), 463 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ill.), affd. (1979), 604 F. 2d 458 (7th Cir.) cert. denied (1979) 444 U.S. 932, consd. [para. 82].

U.S. v. Schell (1982), 692 F. 2d 672, refd to. [para. 83].

Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177; 58 N.R. 1, refd to. [para. 85].

R. v. Knight (1975), 27 C.C.C.(2d) 343, refd to. [para. 94].

People v. Henderson (1980), 107 Cal. App. 3d 475, refd to. [para. 98].

People v. Murtishaw, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738, refd to. [para. 99].

Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, refd to. [paras. 78, 79, 82, 104].

Lamoureux v. R. (1984), 40 C.R.(3d) 369 (Que. C.A.), refd to. [para. 108].

Antoine v. R. (1984), 40 C.R.(3d) 375 (Que. C.A.), refd to. [para. 107].

R. v. Simon (No. 2) (1982), 38 A.R. 390; 69 C.C.C.(2d) 478 (N.W.T.C.S.), refd to. [para. 113].

R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613; 40 Sask. 122; 59 N.R. 122; 18 C.C.C.(3d) 481; 45 C.R.(3d) 97; 18 D.L.R.(4th) 655; [l985] 4 W.W.R. 286; 32 M.V.R. 153, refd to. [para. 113].

R. v. Jackson (1981), 46 N.S.R.(2d) 92; 89 A.P.R. 92; 61 C.C.C.(2d) 540 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 114].

R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd., [l985] 1 S.C.R. 295; [1985] 3 W.W.R. 481; 58 N.R. 81; 60 A.R. 161; 18 C.C.C.(3d) 385; 18 D.L.R.(4th) 321; 37 Alta. L.R.(2d) 97; 85 C.L.L.C. 14,023; 13 C.R.R. 64, refd to. [para. 116].

Statutes Noticed:

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, sect. 1 [paras. 39, 41]; sect. 7 [paras. 23-26, 75-107, 109-119, 120-125]; sect. 9 [paras. 59-67, 109, 120]; sect. 11 [paras. 74, 109-119, 120]; sect. 11(d) [para. 74]; sect. 11(e) [paras. 74, 114]; sect. 11(f) [paras. 68-74, 109-119]; sect. 12 [paras. 37-58, 109, 120]; sect. 24(1) [paras. 117, 123].

Criminal Code Amendment Act, S.C. 1948, c. 39, sect. 43 [para. 14].

Criminal Code Amendment Act, S.C. 1947, c. 55, sect. 18 [para. 14].

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, Part XXI, sect. 687, sect. 688, sect. 689, sect. 690, sect. 691, sect. 692, sect. 693, sect. 694, sect. 695.

Criminal Justice Act 1967, 1967 (U.K.), c. 80 [para. 31].

Parole Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-2, sect. 10(1)(a) [paras. 50, 51, 54].

Prevention of Crime Act, 1908 (U.K.), c. 59, sect. 10, sect. 11, sect. 12, sect. 13, sect. 14, sect. 15, sect. 16 [para. 12].

United States Code, Title 18, sect. 3575 [para. 34].

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment [paras. 79, 80, 8l].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Canada, Committee on Corrections, Report of the Committee on Corrections: Toward Unity, Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ouimet Report) (1969), generally [para. 15]; pp. 262, 263 [para. 90].

Canada, Law Reform Commission, Working Paper No. 15: Criminal Procedure-Control of the Process (1975), pp. 39-60 [para. 103].

Canada, Royal Commission to Investigate the Penal System of Canada, Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Penal System of Canada (Archambault Commission) (1938), pp. 220, 223 [para. 13].

Floud, Jean and Warren Young, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice (1981), pp. 48, 49 [para. 100]; 102, 103 [para. 33].

Fox, Sir Lenard Wray, The Modern English Prison (1934), p. 168 [para. 12].

Grant, Isabel, Dangerous Offenders (1985), 9 Dal. L.J. 347, p. 360 [para. 93].

Menzies, Webster and Sepejak, The Dimensions of Dangerousness (1985), 9 Law and Human Behaviour No. 1 [para. 97].

Morris, Norval, The Habitual Criminal (1967), 13 McGill L.J. 534, p. 536 [para. 33].

Thomas, D.A., Principles of Sentencing (2nd Ed. 1979), p. 37 [para. 32].

United Kingdom, Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (Butler Commission) (1974), p. 60 [para. 100].

Counsel:

Duncan R. Beveridge and Barbara Beach, for the appellant;

Dana Giovannetti and Robert E. Lutes, for the respondent;

Ivan Whitehall, Q.C., and James Bissell, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada;

Ian MacDonnell, for the intervener the Attorney General for Ontario;

Joseph Arvay, for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia.

Solicitors of Record:

Burke, Beveridge & Jordon, Halifax, for the appellant;

Attorney General of Nova Scotia, Halifax, for the respondent;

Deputy Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada;

Attorney General for Ontario, Toronto, for the intervener the Attorney General for Ontario;

Attorney General of British Columbia, Victoria, for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia.

This appeal was heard before Dickson, C.J.C., Estey, McIntyre, Lamer, Wilson, Le Dain and La Forest, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada, on January 28 and 29, 1987. The judgment was rendered in both official languages on October 15, 1987, including the following opinions:

La Forest, J. (Dickson, C.J.C., Estey, McIntyre and Le Dain, JJ., concurring) - see paragraphs 1 to 108;

Lamer, J., dissenting in part - see paragraphs 109 to 119;

Wilson, J., dissenting in part - see paragraphs 120 to 125.