R. v. Malmo-Levine (D.) et al., (2003) 314 N.R. 1 (SCC)

• Judge: McLachlin, C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps, JJ.
• Court: Supreme Court (Canada)
• Case Date: December 23, 2003
• Jurisdiction: Canada (Federal)
• Citations: (2003), 314 N.R. 1 (SCC);2003 SCC 74

R. v. Malmo-Levine (D.) (2003), 314 N.R. 1 (SCC)

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

....................

Temp. Cite: [2003] N.R. TBEd. DE.050

David Malmo-Levine (appellant) v. Her Majesty The Queen (respondent) and Attorney General of Ontario, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and Canadian Civil Liberties Association (intervenors)

(28026)

Victor Eugene Caine (appellant) v. Her Majesty The Queen (respondent) and Attorney General of Ontario, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and Canadian Civil Liberties Association (intervenors)

(28148; 2003 SCC 74; 2003 CSC 74)

Indexed As: R. v. Malmo-Levine (D.) et al.

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin, C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps, JJ.

December 23, 2003.

Summary:

An accused (Malmo-Levine) charged with possession of marihuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking challenged the constitutionality of criminalizing possession. The British Columbia Supreme Court, in a decision reported at [1998] B.C.T.C. Uned. 961, held that the provisions of the Act did not infringe Malmo-Levine's s. 7 Charter liberty rights. Malmo-Levine was convicted of both offences. Another accused (Caine) charged with possession of marihuana also challenged the constitutionality of the pos­session provisions of the Act. The British Columbia Provincial Court ruled that it was bound by the decision in Malmo-Levine that the provisions did not infringe s. 7 of the Charter. Caine was also convicted. Both accused appealed and the appeals were heard together.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal, Prowse, J.A., dissenting, in a judgment reported (2000), 138 B.C.A.C. 218; 226 W.A.C. 218, dismissed the appeals. The deprivation of liberty resulting from the availability of imprisonment accorded with the "harm principle" and did not violate s. 7 as it was not contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. Both accused appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps, JJ., dissenting in Caine's appeal and dissenting in part in Malmo-Levine's appeal, dismissed the ap­peals. The criminal prohibition against simple possession of marihuana and pos­session for the purpose of trafficking were constitutionally valid under the federal crimi­nal law power (Constitution Act, s. 91). Although the availability of imprisonment for simple possession triggered liberty rights, such deprivation was not contrary to the prin­ciples of fundamental justice.

Civil Rights - Topic 660.1

Liberty - Limitations on - Possession of a narcotic - Marihuana - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "a conviction for the possession of marihuana for personal use carries no mandatory minimum sentence. In practice, most first offenders are given a conditional discharge. Imprisonment is generally reserved for situations that also involve trafficking or hard drugs. Except in very exceptional circumstances, imprison­ment for simple possession of marihuana would constitute a demonstrably unfit sentence and, if imposed, would rightly be set aside on appeal. ... The mere fact of the availability of imprisonment in a statute dealing with a variety of prohibited drugs does not, in our view, make the crimi­nalization of possession of a psychoactive drug like marihuana contrary to the prin­ciples of fundamental justice." - See para­graph 4.

Civil Rights - Topic 684

Liberty - Principles of fundamental justice - Harm principle - An accused submitted that where marihuana use was not harmful "to others", the criminalization of pos­session of marihuana violated liberty rights in a manner not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice (Charter, s. 7) - The Supreme Court of Canada dis­agreed - The "harm principle" was not a principle of fundamental justice - The court stated that "for a rule or principle to constitute a principle of fundamental jus­tice for the purposes of s. 7, it must be a legal principle about which there is signifi­cant societal consensus that it is fundamen­tal to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate, and it must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person." - The harm prin­ciple required harm that was not de mini­mis or not insignificant or trivial - The harm need not be serious and substantial - Criminalization of marihuana possession was neither irrational nor arbitrary - It was rationally connected to a reasonable appre­hension of harm - Imprisonment was not restricted to being a sanction for criminal conduct that was potentially harmful to others - There was no general prohibition against criminalizing conduct harmful only to oneself - Even if punishment was rel­evant to a s. 7 analysis (rather than s. 12), the constitutional standard was the same (i.e. gross disproportionality) - Even if imprisonment for simple possession was imposed and violated the standard of gross disproportionality, the remedy would address the range of available penalties and not the decriminalization of the underlying conduct of possession - See paragraphs 102 to 162.

Civil Rights - Topic 725

Liberty - Charter of Rights and Freedoms -Liberty defined - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that liberty was broader than freedom from physical restraint - It in­cluded "the right to an irreducible sphere of personal autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently private choices free from state interference. ... This is true only to the extent that such matters 'can proper­ly be characterized as fundamentally or inherently personal such that, by their very nature, they implicate basic choices going to the core of what it means to enjoy indi­vidual dignity and independence' ... the Constitution cannot be stretched to afford protection to whatever activity an individ­ual chooses to define as central to his or her lifestyle [eg. smoking marihuana, obsessive interest in golf, eating fatty foods]. ... Lifestyle choices of this order are not, we think, 'basic choices going to the core of what it means to enjoy individ­ual dignity and independence' ... [the accused's] desire to build a lifestyle around the recreational use of marihuana does not attract Charter protection. There is no free-standing constitutional right to smoke 'pot' for recreational purposes." - See para­graphs 85 to 87.

Civil Rights - Topic 5645.1

Equality and protection of the law - Par­ticular cases - Drug offences - An accused submitted that the criminalization of mari­huana possession violated his s. 15 Charter equality rights, because he had a "sub­stance orientation" which was a personal characteristic analogous to other s. 15 grounds such as sexual orientation - The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the sub­mission - A lifestyle choice such as "smok­ing pot" was not a "personal charac­teristic" in the sense required to trigger s. 15 pro­tection - See paragraphs 184 to 185.

Civil Rights - Topic 8547

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Interpretation - Particular words and phrases - Principles of fundamental justice - An accused submitted that the criminali­zation of simple marihuana pos­session violated his s. 7 Charter liberty right in a manner contrary to the principles of funda­mental justice - The accused argued that "societal interests" were rel­evant to a s. 1 analysis, but had nothing to do with the principles of fundamental justice - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "de­spite certain similarities between the bal­anc­ing of interests in ss. 7 and 1, there are important differences. Firstly, the issue under s. 7 is the delinea­tion of the bound­aries of the rights and principles in ques­tion whereas under s. 1 the question is whether an infringement may be justified. ... Secondly, it was affirmed that under s. 7 it is the claimant who bears the onus of proof throughout. It is only if an infringe­ment of s. 7 is estab­lished that the onus switches to the Crown to justify the in­fringement under s. 1. Thirdly, the range of interests to be taken into account under s. 1 is much broader than those relevant to s. 7. ... The balanc­ing of individual and societal interests within s. 7 is only rel­evant when elucidat­ing a particular prin­ciple of fundamental justice. ... The delin­eation of the principles of fundamental justice must inevitably take into account the social nature of our col­lective exist­ence. To that limited extent, societal values play a role in the delinea­tion of the bound­aries of the rights and principles in ques­tion." - See paragraphs 94 to 99.

Constitutional Law - Topic 25

General - Raising constitutional issues - Proof required - Legislative facts versus adjudicative facts - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "while the courts apply the requirements of judicial notice less stringently to the admission of legislative fact than to adjudicative fact ... courts should nevertheless proceed cautiously to take judicial notice even as 'legislative facts' of matters that are reasonably open to dispute, particularly where they relate to an issue that could be dispositive" - See paragraph 28.

Constitutional Law - Topic 4604

Peace, order and good government clause -General principles - Scope of the power - The Supreme Court of Canada referred to the three instances in which the federal residual power (peace, order and good government) applied: "(i) the existence of a national emergency; (ii) with respect to a subject matter which did not exist at the time of Confederation and is clearly not in a class of matters of a merely local or private nature; (iii) where the subject matter 'goes beyond local or provincial concern and must, from its inherent nature, be the concern of the Dominion as a whole'" - The court stated that since the criminalization of marihuana possession was authorized under the federal criminal law power, it was unnecessary to decide whether it was supportable under the peace, order and good government clause -See paragraphs 63 to 72.

Constitutional Law - Topic 4712

Peace, order and good government clause -Particular legislative purposes - Public health and safety - [See Constitutional Law - Topic 4604 ].

Constitutional Law - Topic 6441

Federal jurisdiction (s. 91) - Criminal law -General - Criminal law defined - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "for a law to be classified as a criminal law, it must possess three prerequisites: a valid criminal law purpose backed by a prohi­bition and a penalty. ... The criminal law power extends to those laws that are designed to promote public peace, safety, order, health or other legitimate public purpose. ... some legitimate public purpose must underlie the prohibition." - See para­graph 74.

Constitutional Law - Topic 6450

Federal jurisdiction (s. 91) - Criminal law -General - Elements of a criminal law statute - General - [See Constitutional Law - Topic 6441 ].

Constitutional Law - Topic 6509

Federal jurisdiction (s. 91) - Criminal law -Respecting particular matters - Drug legis­lation - An accused submitted that Parlia­ment had no power to criminalize the possession of marihuana for personal use under the federal criminal law power - The Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed previous decisions upholding the constitu­tionality of the Narcotic Control Act under the criminal law power - The purpose of the Act fit within the criminal law power, which included the protection of vulnerable groups from self-inflicted harms - The protection of chronic users and adolescents who had not yet become chronic users was a valid criminal law objective - The court stated that "the control of a 'psychoactive drug' that 'causes alteration of mental function' clearly raises issues of public health and safety, both for the user as well as for those in the broader society affected by his or her conduct. The use of mari­huana is therefore a proper subject matter for the exercise of the criminal law power." - See paragraphs 73 to 80.

Criminal Law - Topic 5801.1

Sentencing - General - Proportionality - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "We agree ... that imprisonment would ordinarily be an unfit sentence for a con­viction for simple possession of marihuana. We disagree, however, that this observa­tion gives rise to a finding of unconstitu­tionality. Rather, it gives rise, in appropri­ate circumstances, to an ordinary sentence appeal. ... where there is no minimum mandatory sentence, the mere availability of imprisonment on a charge of marihuana possession does not violate the s. 7 prin­ciple against gross disproportionality. There are circumstances, as noted, where imprisonment would constitute a fit sen­tence." - See paragraphs 167 to 183.

Criminal Law - Topic 5878

Sentence - Possession, cultivation or pro­duction of a narcotic or a controlled drug or substance - [See Civil Rights - Topic 660.1 ].

Evidence - Topic 2205

Special modes of proof - Judicial notice -General principles - Constitutional cases - [See Constitutional Law - Topic 25 ].

Narcotic Control - Topic 574

Offences - Possession - General - [See Civil Rights - Topic 660.1 and Civil Rights - Topic 684 ].

Cases Noticed:

Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086; 112 N.R. 362; 41 O.A.C. 250, refd to. [para. 28].

R. v. Find (K.), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863; 269 N.R. 149; 146 O.A.C. 236, refd to. [para. 28].

Public School Boards Association (Alta.) et al. v. Alberta (Attorney General) et al., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 44; 251 N.R. 1; 250 A.R. 314; 213 W.A.C. 314, refd to. [para. 28].

R. v. Forbes (1937), 69 C.C.C. 140 (B.C. Co. Ct.), refd to. [para. 35].

R. v. Clay (C.J.) (2003), 313 N.R. 252 (S.C.C.), affing. (2000), 135 O.A.C. 66; 49 O.R.(3d) 577 (C.A.), affing. (1997), 39 O.T.C. 81; 9 C.R.(5th) 349 (Gen. Div.), refd to. [paras. 39, 189].

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; 58 N.R. 81; 60 A.R. 161, refd to. [paras. 64, 203].

R. v. Hauser, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984; 26 N.R. 541; 16 A.R. 91, refd to. [paras. 67, 205].

Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. R., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 273, refd to. [para. 67].

Canadian National Transportation Ltd. and Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Attor­ney General); Canadian Pacific Transport Co. and Paulley v. Canada (Attorney General), [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206; 49 N.R. 241; 49 A.R. 39, refd to. [para. 68].

R. v. Wetmore et al., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 284; 49 N.R. 286, refd to. [para. 68].

R. v. Sheldon S., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254; 110 N.R. 321; 41 O.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 68].

Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General) and Quebec (Attorney General), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914; 30 N.R. 496, refd to. [paras. 69, 216].

R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401; 84 N.R. 1, refd to. [para. 72].

Reference Re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1, affd. [1951] A.C. 179 (P.C.), refd to. [paras. 73, 202].

Margarine Reference - see Reference Re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act.

Reference Re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783; 254 N.R. 201; 261 A.R. 201; 225 W.A.C. 201, refd to. [paras. 74, 206].

RJR-MacDonald Inc. et Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Canada (Procureur général), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; 187 N.R. 1, refd to. [paras. 74, 206].

Scowby et al. v. Glendinning et al., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 226; 70 N.R. 241; 51 Sask.R. 208, refd to. [paras. 74, 206].

Dufresne v. R. (1912), 5 D.L.R. 501 (Que. K.B.), refd to. [para. 75].

Wakabayashi, Re, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 226 (B.C.S.C.), refd to. [para. 75].

Schneider v. British Columbia et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112; 43 N.R. 91, refd to. [para. 75].

Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) et al., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519; 158 N.R. 1; 34 B.C.A.C. 1; 56 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [paras. 76, 224, 291].

R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30; 82 N.R. 1; 26 O.A.C. 1, refd to. [paras. 76, 257].

R. v. Sharpe (J.R.), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45; 264 N.R. 201; 146 B.C.A.C. 161; 239 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [paras. 76, 247].

R. v. Butler and McCord, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; 134 N.R. 81; 78 Man.R.(2d) 1; 16 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [paras. 76, 241, 286].

R. v. Keegstra (J.), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 381; 180 N.R. 120; 169 A.R. 50; 97 W.A.C. 50, refd to. [paras. 76, 257].

R. v. Murdock (K.P.) (2003), 173 O.A.C. 171; 11 C.R.(6th) 43 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 77, 240].

R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213; 217 N.R. 241, refd to. [paras. 77, 206].

Berryland Canning Co. v. R., [1974] 1 F.C. 91 (T.D.), refd to. [para. 77].

Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee (1933), 60 C.C.C. 265 (B.C.C.A.), addendum (1934), 61 C.C.C. 95 (B.C.C.A.), refd to. [para. 77].

Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; 63 N.R. 266, refd to. [paras. 84, 190].

Sheena B., Re, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315; 176 N.R. 161; 78 O.A.C. 1, refd to. [paras. 85, 221].

R.B. v. Children's Aid Society of Metro­poli­tan Toronto - see Sheena B., Re.

Godbout v. Longueuil (Ville), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844; 219 N.R. 1, refd to. [paras. 85, 221, 279].

Blencoe v. Human Rights Commission (B.C.) et al., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307; 260 N.R. 1; 141 B.C.A.C. 161; 231 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 85].

Buhlers v. Superintendent of Motor Vehicles (B.C.) et al. (1999), 119 B.C.A.C. 207; 194 W.A.C. 207; 170 D.L.R.(4th) 344 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 85].

Horsefield v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles (Ont.) (1999), 118 O.A.C. 291; 44 O.R.(3d) 73 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 85].

Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143; 151 N.R. 161; 62 O.A.C. 243, refd to. [paras. 95, 248].

Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act et al., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425; 106 N.R. 161; 39 O.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 95].

R. v. Mills (B.J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668; 248 N.R. 101; 244 A.R. 201; 209 W.A.C. 201, refd to. [paras. 97, 269, 278].

R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933; 125 N.R. 1; 47 O.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 98].

R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714; 128 N.R. 321; 49 O.A.C. 83, refd to. [para. 118].

R. v. R.P.F. et al. (1996), 149 N.S.R.(2d) 91; 432 A.P.R. 91; 105 C.C.C.(3d) 435 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 118].

New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. J.G. and D.V., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46; 244 N.R. 276; 216 N.B.R.(2d) 25; 552 A.P.R. 25, refd to. [paras. 132, 257].

R. v. Arkell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 695; 112 N.R. 175, refd to. [paras. 135, 232, 291].

R. v. Hamon (R.) (1993), 58 Q.A.C. 241; 85 C.C.C.(3d) 490 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 135].

Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3; 281 N.R. 1, refd to. [paras. 142, 270, 279].

United States of America v. Burns and Rafay, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; 265 N.R. 212; 148 B.C.A.C. 1; 243 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [paras. 142, 270].

R. v. Fleming (1992), 10 B.C.A.C. 79; 21 W.A.C. 79 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 154].

R. v. Culley (1977), 36 C.C.C.(2d) 433 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [para. 154].

R. v. Dauphinee (1984), 62 N.S.R.(2d) 156; 136 A.P.R. 156 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 156].

R. v. Witter, [1997] O.J. No. 2248 (Gen. Div.), refd to. [para. 156].

R. v. Coady (R.D.) (1994), 122 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 331; 379 A.P.R. 331; 24 W.C.B.(2d) 459 (Nfld. T.D.), refd to. [para. 156].

R. v. Richards (1989), 88 N.S.R.(2d) 425; 225 A.P.R. 425 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 156].

R. v. Morrisey (M.L.) (No. 2), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90; 259 N.R. 95; 187 N.S.R.(2d) 1; 585 A.P.R. 1, refd to. [para. 159].

R. v. Smith (E.D.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045; 75 N.R. 321, refd to. [paras. 159, 203].

Steele v. Mountain Institution, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385; 121 N.R. 198, refd to. [para. 159].

R. v. Latimer (R.W.), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3; 264 N.R. 99; 203 Sask.R. 1; 240 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 159].

R. v. Proulx (J.K.D.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61; 249 N.R. 201; 142 Man.R.(2d) 161; 212 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [paras. 163, 234].

R. v. Wust (L.W.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455; 252 N.R. 332; 134 B.C.A.C. 236; 219 W.A.C. 236, refd to. [paras. 163, 234].

R. v. C.A.M., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; 194 N.R. 321; 73 B.C.A.C. 81; 120 W.A.C. 81, refd to. [paras. 163, 234].

R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151; 110 N.R. 1, refd to. [para. 169].

Reference Re Sections 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123; 109 N.R. 81; 68 Man.R.(2d) 1, refd to. [para. 173].

Vriend et al. v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493; 224 N.R. 1; 212 A.R. 237; 168 W.A.C. 237, refd to. [para. 184].

Andrews v. Law Society of British Colum­bia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; 91 N.R. 255, refd to. [para. 185].

Egan and Nesbit v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; 182 N.R. 161, refd to. [para. 185].

Law v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497; 236 N.R. 1, refd to. [para. 185].

R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636; 81 N.R. 115; 10 Q.A.C. 161; 68 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 281; 209 A.P.R. 281, refd to. [para. 202].

R. v. Parker (T.) (2000), 135 O.A.C. 1; 146 C.C.C.(3d) 193 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 208].

R. v. Hinchey (M.F.) and Hinchey (B.A.), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1128; 205 N.R. 161; 147 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1; 459 A.P.R. 1, refd to. [para. 210].

R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. and Chedore, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154; 130 N.R. 1; 49 O.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 217].

R. v. White (J.K.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417; 240 N.R. 1; 123 B.C.A.C. 161; 201 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 219].

R. v. Heywood (R.L.), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761; 174 N.R. 81; 50 B.C.A.C. 161; 82 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [paras. 220, 291].

R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3; 157 N.R. 1; 65 O.A.C. 321, refd to. [para. 226].

Fowler v. Padget (1798), 7 T.R. 509; 101 E.R. 1103 (K.B.), refd to. [para. 227].

R. v. Nette (D.M.), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 488; 277 N.R. 301; 158 B.C.A.C. 98; 258 W.A.C. 98, refd to. [para. 227].

R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633; 112 N.R. 83; 109 A.R. 321, refd to. [para. 228].

R. v. DeSousa, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944; 142 N.R. 1; 56 O.A.C. 109, refd to. [para. 230].

R. v. Williams (H.L.) (2003), 308 N.R. 235; 231 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1; 686 A.P.R. 1 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 233].

R. v. Pan (R.W.) (1999), 120 O.A.C. 1; 134 C.C.C.(3d) 1 (C.A.), affd. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344; 270 N.R. 317; 147 O.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 248].

R. v. C.M. (1995), 82 O.A.C. 68; 30 C.R.R.(2d) 112 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 257].

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; 65 N.R. 87; 14 O.A.C. 335, refd to. [para. 270].

R. v. Zingre, Wuest and Reiser, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392; 38 N.R. 272; 10 Man.R.(2d) 62, refd to. [para. 271].

R. v. Seaboyer and Gayme, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577; 128 N.R. 81; 48 O.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 279].

Statutes Noticed:

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, sect. 7 [para. 12].

Constitution Act, 1867, sect. 91(27) [para. 12].

Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1, sect. 3 [para. 12].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Alldridge, Peter, Dealing with Drug Deal­ing, in Simester, A.P., and Smith, A.T.H., Harm and Culpabil­ity (1996), p. 239 [para. 268].

Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vol. 1, 1st Sess., 32nd Parl. (April 14, 1980), p. 5 [para. 21].

Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vol. 6, 4th Sess., 24th Parl. (June 7, 1961), p. 5981 [para. 33].

Canada, House of Commons, An Act to amend the Contraventions Act and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Bill C-38, 2nd Sess., 37th Parl. (May 27, 2003), generally [paras. 22, 59].

Canada, Interim Report of the Special Committee on Non-Medical Use of Drugs, Policy for the New Millennium: Working Together to Redefine Canada's Drug Strategy (December 2002), p. 144 [para. 58].

Canada, Law Commission, What is a Crime? Challenges and Alter­natives (2003), p. 17 [paras. 125, 166].

Canada, Law Reform Commission, The Criminal Law in Canadian Society (1982), p. 45 [para. 122].

Canada, Pre­liminary Report of the Com­mis­sion of Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs, Cannabis (Le Dain Com­mis­sion Report) (1972), gen­erally [para. 21]; pp. 265-310 [para. 195]; 268 [para. 44].

Canada, Report of the Canadian Commit­tee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Crimi­nal Justice and Corrections (Ouimet Report) (1969), pp. 11 [para. 287]; 12 [para. 291].

Canada, Report of the Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs, Cannabis: Our Position for a Canadian Public Pol­icy (September 2002), vol. 1, pp. 151 [para. 57]; 165 [paras. 3, 55]; 166 [paras. 3, 56]; 167 [para. 56]; vol. 2, pp. 256-258 [para. 31]; 264 [para. 32]; 286 [para. 34].

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Counsel:

David Malmo-Levine, on his own behalf;

John W. Conroy, Q.C., for the appellant, Victor Eugene Caine;

S. David Frankel, Q.C., W. Paul Riley and Kevin Wilson, for the respondent;

Milan Rupic, for the intervenor, Attorney General of Ontario;

Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C., and Matthew Pol­lard, for the intervenor, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association;

Andrew K. Lokan and Andrew C. Lewis, for the intervenor, Canadian Civil Lib­erties Association.

Solicitors of Record:

Conroy & Co., Abbotsford, B.C., for the appellants;

Attorney General of Canada, Vancouver, B.C., for the respondent;

Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervenor, Attorney General of Ontario;

Arvay Finlay, Victoria, B.C., for the intervenor, British Columbia Civil Lib­erties Association;

Paliare, Roland, Rosenberg, Rothstein, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervenor, Canadian Civil Liberties Association.

These appeals were heard on May 6, 2003, before McLachlin, C.J.C., Gonthier, Iaco­bucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada was delivered in both official lan­guages on December 23, 2003, when the following opinions were filed:

Gonthier and Binnie, JJ. (McLachlin, C.J.C., Iacobucci, Major and Basta­rache, JJ., concurring) - see paragraphs 1 to 188;

Arbour, J., dissenting in part in Malmo-Levine and dissenting in Caine - see paragraphs 189 to 276;

LeBel, J., dissenting in part in Malmo-Levine and dissenting in Caine - see paragraphs 277 to 280;

Deschamps, J., dissenting in part in Malmo-Levine and dissenting in Caine - see paragraphs 281 to 304.