R. v. Seymour (J.), (1996) 197 N.R. 81 (SCC)

• Judge: Iacobucci and Major, JJ.
• Court: Supreme Court of Canada
• Case Date: Thursday May 30, 1996
• Jurisdiction: Canada (Federal)
• Citations: (1996), 197 N.R. 81 (SCC);76 BCAC 1;197 NR 81;[1996] SCJ No 64 (QL);106 CCC (3d) 520;[1996] 2 SCR 252;1996 CanLII 201 (SCC);135 DLR (4th) 225;49 CR (4th) 190

R. v. Seymour (J.) (1996), 197 N.R. 81 (SCC)

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

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John Seymour (appellant) v. Her Majesty The Queen (respondent)

(24642)

Indexed As: R. v. Seymour (J.)

Supreme Court of Canada

La Forest, Sopinka, Cory,

Iacobucci and Major, JJ.

May 30, 1996.

Summary:

The accused was convicted by a jury of the second degree murder of his wife. He appealed against conviction on the ground that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the effect of drunkenness on his ability to form the requisite intent for murder.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal, Lambert, J.A., dissenting, in a judgment reported 56 B.C.A.C. 173; 92 W.A.C. 173, dismissed the appeal. The accused appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. The trial judge erred when, in recharging the jury following questions respecting intent and drunkenness, he failed to properly direct them on drunkenness as it related to the requisite intent for murder. The trial judge also erred in failing to link the evidence of intoxication with the instruction on the common sense inference that a sane and sober person intended the natural conse­quences of his actions. Further, this was a case where the two-step charge on drunken­ness (as set out in R. v. Robinson) would have been appropriate.

Criminal Law - Topic 1265

Murder - Jury charge - [See second Crim­inal Law - Topic 1299].

Criminal Law - Topic 1299

Murder - Defences - Jury charge (re intent and drunkenness) - The Supreme Court of Canada restated that "once a judge is satisfied that the intoxication threshold is met (that is to say it is a live issue), instructions must be given to the jury that the issue before them is whether the Crown has satisfied them beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the required intent to commit the offence." - Generally the one step approach was pre­ferable (i.e., only issue for jury is whether accused had requisite intent) - The two step approach involved first determining whether the accused was capable of form­ing the requisite intent - The court stated that "in certain cases, because of the par­ticular facts or the expert evidence called, it might be appropriate to charge both with regard to the capacity to form the requisite intent and with regard to the need to de­termine, in all the circumstances, whether the requisite intent was in fact formed by the accused. ... It will not automatically constitute reversible error if a trial judge makes references to 'capacity' or 'capabili­ty', even in those cases where it would have been preferable for the trial judge to have followed the one-step Canute-type charge. If a charge is challenged on that basis, an appellate court will be required to review the charge and determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the jury may have been misled into believing that a determination of capacity was the only relevant inquiry." - See paragraphs 14 to 18.

Criminal Law - Topic 1299

Murder - Defences - Jury charge (re intent and drunkenness) - The accused was charged with murder - The jury requested further clarification on intent and drunkenness - The trial judge instructed the jury respecting the accused's "ability" to know his act would be likely to cause death and failed to remind them to deter­mine whether the accused actually knew that his actions would be likely to cause death - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge erred - This was an appropriate case for the two-step charge on drunkenness and intent - An expert witness testified in terms of the accused's capacity - The accused's defence was that he had a profound inability to function adequately and was unable to understand the consequences of his actions because of alcohol consumption - The jury should have been instructed that the first issue was to determine if the accused had the capacity to form the required intent - If so, the issue was then to determine, on all of the evidence (including intoxication), whether the accused had the requisite intent - See paragraphs 25 to 31.

Criminal Law - Topic 4391

Procedure - Jury charge - Redirection or further direction - The Supreme Court of Canada restated that "if an error is made [in recharging a jury], then as a general rule, the correctness of the original charge cannot be used to excuse the subsequent error on the very issue upon which the jury seeks clarification. It would be irra­tional to conclude that although the trial judge has erred on a recharge on the very point on which the jury had been confused or forgetful, the mistake is of little conse­quence because some time ago a correct charge was given. ... When the jury sub­mits a question it must be assumed that the jurors have forgotten the original instruc­tions or are in a state of confusion on the issue. Their subsequent deliberations will be based on the answer given to their question. That is why the recharge must be correct and why a faultless original charge cannot as a rule rectify a significant mis­take made on the recharge." - See para­graph 30.

Evidence - Topic 2405

Presumptions - Specific presumptions - Conduct - Natural consequences of - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "when charging with respect to an offence which requires proof of a specific intent it will always be necessary to explain that, in determining the accused's state of mind at the time the offence was committed, jurors may draw the inference that sane and sober persons intend the natural and prob­able consequences of their actions." - The court stated that where there is evidence that the accused was intoxicated "the jury must be instructed to take into account the evidence of the accused's consumption of alcohol or drugs, along with all the other evidence which is relevant to the accused's intent, in determining whether, in all the circumstances, it would be appropriate to draw the permissible inference that the accused intended the natural consequences of his actions. ... A trial judge is obliged to ensure that the jury understands two im­portant conditions: (1) the reasonable common sense inference may be drawn only after an assessment of all of the evidence, including the evidence of intoxi­cation; and (2) the inference cannot be applied if the jury is left with a reasonable doubt about the accused's intention." - See paragraphs 19 to 23.

Cases Noticed:

R. v. Robinson (D.) (1996), 194 N.R. 181; 72 B.C.A.C. 161; 119 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.), appld. [para. 1].

R. v. McMaster (R.A.) et al. (1996), 194 N.R. 278; 181 A.R. 199; 116 W.A.C. 199 (S.C.C.), consd. [para. 1].

R. v. Lemky (T.R.) (1996), 194 N.R. 1; 73 B.C.A.C. 1; 120 W.A.C. 1 (S.C.C.), consd. [para. 1].

R. v. Canute (S.F.) (1993), 25 B.C.A.C. 277; 43 W.A.C. 277; 80 C.C.C.(3d) 403 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 7].

R. v. MacKinlay (1986), 15 O.A.C. 241; 28 C.C.C.(3d) 306 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 11].

R. v. MacAskill, [1931] S.C.R. 330, overruled [para. 14].

Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, [1920] A.C. 479 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 14].

R. v. Giannotti (1956), 115 C.C.C. 203 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [para. 20].

R. v. Mulligan, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 612; 9 N.R. 27, refd to. [para. 20].

R. v. W.D.S., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 521; 171 N.R. 360; 157 A.R. 321; 77 W.A.C. 321, refd to. [para. 30].

R. v. Naglik, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122; 157 N.R. 161; 65 O.A.C. 161; 105 D.L.R.(4th) 712, refd to. [para. 30].

R. v. Pétel (C.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3; 162 N.R. 137; 59 Q.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 30].

Statutes Noticed:

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 229(a) [para. 12].

Counsel:

B. Rory B. Morahan, for the appellant;

William F. Ehrcke, for the respondent.

Solicitors of Record:

Morahan & Aujla, Victoria, B.C., for the appellant;

Ministry of the Attorney General, Vancouver, B.C., for the respondent.

This appeal was heard on February 22, 1996, before La Forest, Sopinka, Cory, Iacobucci and Major, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada.

On May 30, 1996, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada was delivered in both official languages by Cory, J.