Are good intentions enough? The limits of the new world of international justice.

• Position: Hate, Genocide and Human Rights Fifty Years Later: What Have We Learned? What Must We Do ? - Transcript

Drawing on his background as a journalist in such troubled areas as Bosnia and Rwanda, the speaker begins with a strong statement--only the use of force, or the credible threat of force, will deter genocides. In contrast, legal arrangements, no matter how well-meaning, will serve only to punish people after the fact. Taking a pragmatic approach, the speaker explores the disturbing implications of this conclusion. In particular, he stresses the disinclination of the great powers to engage in international policing, as well as their reluctance to delegate the job to the United Nations. The speaker maintains that this unwillingness is understandable because of what humanitarian war-making would entail. In addition to vast difficulties surrounding budgetary and procurement questions, he suggests there are moral questions relating to the casualties an international police force would eventually suffer. Thus radical legal and moral steps have engendered a sense of false expectation, because practically speaking, there is neither the ability nor the willingness to enforce them. The speaker concludes by restating his belief that good intentions and good laws must be backed up with force if they are to make a difference.

En se basant sur son experience en tant que journaliste dans des regions aux prises avec des troubles civils, tels la Bosnie et le Rwanda, l'auteur affirme que seule l'utilisation de la force, ou la menace credible de son utilisation, peuvent avoir un effet dissuasif a l'egard du genocide. Les dispositions legales, aussi bonnes puissent etre les intentions qui les sous-tendent, ne peuvent servir qu'a punir les coupables apres le fait. Une approche pragmatique permet de tirer les inquietantes consequences de cette conclusion, en particulier le peu d'inclination des grandes puissances a prendre en charge le maintien de l'ordre au niveau international ou a confier cette tache aux Nations Unies. Ce manque de volonte est comprehensible lorsque l'on prend en consideration le fardeau important qu'imposent de telles operations, autant aux points de vue logistique et budgetaire que moral, alors que beaucoup s'interrogent sur la justification des pertes humaines eventuelles qu'une force de police internationale serait amenee a subir. En consequence, les mesures legales et morales radicales qui ont ete prises ont donne lieu a des esperances demesurees alors qu'en pratique, la capacite et la volonte de les mettre en application sont absentes. L'auteur conclut que les bonnes intentions et le droit, pour etre salutaires et faire une difference sur le terrain, doivent etre supportes par la force.

As most of you know, I am not a lawyer. The experience of the world that has marked me most has been as a writer in Bosnia during the siege of Sarajevo, in Rwanda and Eastern Zaire in the killing time, in Tajikistan, in south Sudan, and in some other, similar places. What this means is that I have lived far too long among people for whom the only law they believed in was the law of the Kalashnikov rifle. And what I have to admit is that, in an important sense, they have convinced me that they're right. What I mean by this is that I...