Canada's financial system: international contexts

AuthorRobert Hubbard; Daniel Murphy; Fergus O'Donnell; Peter De Freitas
Pages225-251
CANADA'S
FINANCIAL
SYSTEM:
INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXTS
A.
Introduction
In
order
to
conform
to its
international obligations, Canada
has
enacted leg-
islation
requiring
the
mandatory
reporting
of
suspicious transactions.
Consis-
tent with this obligation, Canada
has
also created
a
financial
intelligence unit,
the
Financial Transactions
and
Reports Analysis Centre
(FINTRAC).
In
order
to
appreciate
how
Canada's mandatory reporting system
and
FIN-
TRAC
evolved, this chapter examines
the
international background
to
these
events,
including similar reporting legislation
in
several other countries.
Chapter
5
reviews Canada's laws requiring
the
reporting
of
suspicious
and
prescribed
financial
transactions,
as
well
as
FINTRAC.
Ideally, this chapter
should
be
read
in
conjunction with Chapter
5.
This
chapter reviews Cana-
da's
domestic legislation regarding mandatory financial record keeping
and
the
reporting
of
suspicious transactions. However, Chapter
4 can
also
be
read
alone
as a
historical backdrop
to
Canada's introduction
of the new
Proceeds
of
Crime
(Money
Laundering)
and
Terrorist
Financing
Act}
The
complexity
of the
world's financial system constitutes
a
roadblock
to
many
proceeds-of-crime
investigations.
The
financial
community
and
state
governments slowly began
to
understand that
a
more
efficient
and
co-opera-
tive
means
to
investigate
the
criminal money trail
was
required. (See Chapter
i.)
As a
result, through concerted
efforts
and
co-operation,
the
international
community overcame some obvious impediments
to a
successful
criminal
investigation
of
proceeds
of
crime.
One
impediment
in
Canada
was
that
there
was no
framework
for
seizure
and
automatic
forfeiture
of a
criminal's
property
or
proceeds
of
crime.2
This impediment
was
addressed
in
1989
when
the
Criminal
Code
was
amended
to add
Part
XII.2,3
which created
a
1
Proceeds
of
Crime
(Money
Laundering)
and
Terrorist
Financing
Act, S.C.
2000,
c.
17,
as am.
S.C.
2001,
cs.12,
27, 32, and
41,
(accessible
at
time
of
writing
at <
http://canada.gc.ca/gazette/part2/pdf/
g2-i36i2.pdf>).
The Act
received
royal
assent
on
29
June
2000.
Subs.i-4,
38,
40-44,45(1),
46-53,
para.54(fe)-(,
subss.55(i),
(2)-(6),
55.56-61,
66-82,
84, 85, 90, and
91
came
into
force
on 5
July
2000
(see
51/2000-55).
Ss_5,
7, 8,
10,
and
n,
the
portion
of
5.54
before
para.(fc),
subss.55(3)—(5.1)
and
(7),
and
5.89
came
into
force on 28
October
2001
(see
SI/2OOI-88).
85.9.1,
55.1,
56.1,60.1,
60.2,
and
para.55(5.1)
came
into
force
on 24
December
2001
(see
81/2002-16).
8.7.1
of the Act
also
came
into
force
on
12
June
2002
(see
SI/2OO2-86).
2
Forfeiture
had
been
abolished
in the
Criminal
Code,
S.C.
1892,
c.29
by
5.964.
The
current
iteration
of
that
provision
is
found
in the
Criminal
Code,
R.S.C.
1985
(ist
Supp),
c.
C-46,
s. 8.
3
Proceeds
of
Crime
Act, S.C.
1988,
0.51.
CHAPTER
FOUR
[225]
FOUR: CANADA'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS
new
money-laundering
offence,
provisions
to
seize
or
restrain proceeds
of
crime,
and
post-conviction criminal
forfeiture
provisions. (See Chapter
2.)
Part
XII.2
of the
Code
gave
the
state essential provisions
to
attack
the
profits
from
crime. Still,
the
state
can
only
forfeit
assets
that
it can
identify
and
locate. From
a
practical perspective, forfeiture
of
proceeds
of
crime will very
often
be
dependent
on
investigators' ability
to
find
and
follow
a
money
or
property trail. This
led to the
realization that banking
and
other financial
institutions' co-operation
was
essential
to
curb money laundering
and
proceeds
of
crime.
B.
Record
Keeping Obligations
The
development
of
Part
XII.2
of the
Criminal
Code
did not
occur
in a
vacuum. Experience demonstrated that
the
ability
of the
state
to
take control
over property obtained
by
crime, particularly so-called intangible property,
was
not
easy.4
The
addition
of new
proceeds-of-crime
procedures
in the
Criminal
Code
addressed
the
most obvious requirement that
the
state
have
the
authority
to
take control
of
targeted
assets
as an
investigation continued.
However,
two
related problems remained: Canada
had to
provide
the
ability
to
track money
and
other suspicious transactions
and
Canadian legislation
had
to
satisfy
international standards.
An
essential solution
to
both
problems
was
the
implementation
of
mandatory national
financial
record-keeping
and
reporting obligations.
The
Canadian Bank
Acf
was
regularly updated
but was
silent
on
customer
record-keeping obligations;
the
nature
or
scope
of
customer records
and
identification
requirements
are not
included
in the
Act.6
In
addition, until
the
recent enactment
of the
Personal
Information
Protection
and
Electronic
Docu-
ments
Act,1
it was
difficult
to
find
any
statutory bank secrecy provision; that
obligation
was
found
in the
common
law.8
In
light
of the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada's decision
in R. v.
Plant,9
the
ability
of a
bank
to
provide
its
cus-
tomer's information
to law
enforcement
is
open
to
significant doubt. Indeed,
in R. v.
Desai,10
the
judge went
as far as to
conclude that
a
defrauded bank
4
The
decision
of the
Quebec Court
of
Appeal
in R. v.
Banque
Royale
du
Canada
(1985),
18
C.C.C.
(3d)
98
illustrated
that
the
seizure
provisions
of
the
Criminal
Code,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
C-46,
s. 487 did
not
adequately cover bank accounts.
5
BankAct,S.C.
1991,046,
ss.238(2)(c).
6
M.H. Ogilvie,
Canadian
Banking
Law,
2d ed
(Toronto,
ON:
Carswell,
1998)
at
203—20,
describes
obligations under
the
Bank
Act,
ibid.,
to
keep records
in
Canada.
7
Personal
Information
Protection
and
Electronic
Documents
Act, S.C. 2000,
05.
8
See
Tournierv.
National
Provincial
&
Union
Bank
of
England,
[1924]
i
K.B.
461
(C.A.).
See
also
Stan-
dard
Investments
Ltd.
v.
Canadian
Imperial
Bank
of
Commerce
(1985),
22
D.L.R. (4th)
410
(Ont.
C.A.).
9
(1993),
84
C.C.C.
(3d)
203
(S.C.C.).
10
[2001]
O.J.
No.
2914
(S.C.J).
[226]

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