Copyright infringement without copying - reflections on the Theberge case.

• Author: Afori, Orit Fischman
• Position: Canada

Cet article sonde le contenu de deux droits fondamentaux dans la palette des droits d'auteur: le droit exclusif de reproduire l'oeuvre (le droit de reproduction) et le droit exclusif de preparer des ?uvres derivees en s'inspirant de l'oeuvre protegee (le droit d'adaptation). Bien

que de nature fondamentale, les parametres precis de ces deux droits et les nuances entre l'un et l'autre sont subtils.

Le catalyseur a utiliser dans le traitement de ces deux questions de base du droit d'auteur est la decision canadienne rendue par la Cour supreme dans l'affaire Theberge c. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc., [2002] CSC 34. En l'espece, une personne avait achete une copie legale et tangible d'une ?uvre protegee, l'avait modifie physiquement, puis l'avait revendue. La question se pose si cette facon de faire constitue une violation du droit d'auteur et quel est le droit applicable. Cette question souleve des enjeux complexes qui exigent une clarification des elements fondamentaux et des doctrines du droit d'auteur, notamment une definition precise de la notion de >, une comprehension de la pleine portee du droit d'adaptation et enfin une determination si l'acte physique de copier est inherent a la violation. De plus, il y a lieu de souligner la relation entre ses deux droits et d'elucider les doctrines de la > et du > dans un tel contexte.

La Cour supreme du Canada, malheureusement, n'a pas saisi cette occasion de resoudre certaines des ambiguites fondamentales en matiere du droit d'auteur. De plus, sa decision reflete une interpretation erronee des droits de reproduction et d'adaptation parce que la Cour a cherche sans raison valable a exclure les doctrines civilistes du droit d'auteur canadien. L'arret Theberge etant lourd de consequences, en particulier dans le debat en cours au sujet des diverses technologies utilisees dans l'environnement numerique et Internet pour l'exploitation et la communication des ?uvres protegees, il est vraiment important de revoir la question afin de corriger les faiblesses et les failles en la matiere.

This article addresses the content of two fundamental rights of the bundle of copyrights: the exclusive right to reproduce a work--the reproduction right--and the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the protected work--the adaptation right. Despite being fundamental, the exact boundaries of these two rights and the difference between them are elusive.

The catalyst for dealing with these basic issues in the law of copyright is the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in the case of Theberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc. [2002] S.C.C. 34. The factual scenario in this case involved a situation in which a person purchased a lawful, tangible copy of a copyrighted work, modified it physically, and then resold it. The question is whether this scenario constitutes copyright infringement, and what the applicable law is. This raises complicated problems that necessitate a clarification of the fundamental elements and doctrines in copyright law, such as what "reproduction" is exactly, what the precise extent of the adaptation right is, and whether the physical act of copying is inherent to their infringement. Moreover, we shall mark the relation between the two rights, and determine the role of the "first-sale" and "implied consent doctrines in such cases.

The Canadian Supreme Court did not, unfortunately, use this opportunity to resolve some of the fundamental ambiguities in copyright law. Moreover, the Court's decision reflects an erroneous interpretation of the reproduction and adaptation rights, motivated by an irrelevant attempt to exclude civiliste doctrines from Canadian copyright law. Since the Theberge holding has far-reaching implications, especially in light of the constant debates concerning different technologies used in the digital and internet environment for exploiting and communicating protected works, it is therefore most important to examine and try to correct its failings and shortcomings.

Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION II. THE THEBERGE CASE III. THE ELUSIVE BOUNDARIES OF THE REPRODUCTION AND ADAPTATION RIGHTS A. The Reproduction Right 1. Defining "Reproduction" 2. Defining "Copy" B. The Adaptation Right--The Right to Prepare Derivative Works 1. The Different Methods for Denning the Adaptation Right 2. The Elusive Boundaries in Historic Perspective IV. THE INDEPENDENT ADAPTATION RIGHT--INFRINGEMENT WITHOUT COPYING A. The Ongoing Debate Over the Independence of the Adaptation Right B. Relevance of First-Sale and Implied Consent Doctrines 1. The First-Sale Doctrine 2. The Implied Consent Doctrine 3. The Implied Consent Doctrine as a Means to Infuse Policy Considerations: Infringement Without Copying C. Integrated Works: Another Example of a Non-Copying Infringing act V. REVIEW OF THE THEBERGE HOLDING A. Misunderstanding as to the Underlying Motivation: Economic Rights not Moral Rights 1. Adaptation Right in Context: Price Discrimination and Moral Rights 2. The Economic Motivation Underlying Theberge's Claim B. Misinterpretation of the Reproduction and Adaptation Rights 1. Misinterpretation of "Reproduction" as Multiplication 2. Non-Compliance with International law Standards 3. Lack of Reference to the Implied Consent Doctrine VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEBERGE CASE VII. SUMMARY I. INTRODUCTION

It is common knowledge that the internet era and technological developments have presented copyright law with new challenges. However, in copyright law some of the most basic questions, which also arose in previous eras, still have no clear answers. (1) These questions require a thorough discussion, which will serve to develop the law, inter alia, by adapting it to the technological age. The aim of this article is to discuss one such basic and, as of yet, unresolved issue in the law of copyright, which is, what constitutes the exact content of two fundamental rights of the bundle of copyrights: the exclusive right to reproduce a work--the reproduction right--and the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the protected work--the adaptation right)? In this article, we shall try to shed some light on the content of these two rights and to understand the difference between them.

As a catalyst for dealing with this basic issue in the law of copyright, let us consider a possible situation: when a person purchases a lawful, tangible copy of a copyrighted work, modifies it physically, and then resells it, what is the applicable law? Does this scenario constitute copyright infringement? Despite its seeming triviality, this situation raises complicated problems that necessitate clear comprehension of the fundamental elements in copyright law. The Supreme Court of Canada recently discussed such a factual scenario in Theberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc. (2) However, as shall be explained, the Court did not use this opportunity to resolve some of the fundamental conflicts in copyright law, but rather interpreted the reproduction and adaptation rights erroneously, motivated by a will to exclude ostensibly civiliste doctrines from Canadian copyright law.

Some of the more complicated problems arising in copyright law stem from the fact that it deals with rights conferred with respect to incorporeal assets. These kinds of problems are typical of all intellectual property laws. This article focuses on the junction of incorporeal property law and corporeal property law. In some cases, the use of a lawful, tangible copy of a work injures the copyright owner's interests. The proprietary interest of the owner of the tangible copy to realize rights with respect to the chattel owned stands in conflict with the copyright holder's interests to have control over actions done with respect to the physical copies of the work. In other words, in the factual scenario discussed here, there is a direct conflict between the chattel owner's interest to realize property rights and the copyright holder's interest to realize intellectual property rights. The legal question is: on what grounds and according to which principles should such conflicts be decided?

Part II of this article begins with a short introduction to Theberge--the trigger for this inquiry into basic concepts of copyright law--in which the Supreme Court of Canada discussed the situation discussed above. In this case, the question was whether the owner of paper copies of paintings, who had used a chemical technique that enabled him to lift the ink from the paper copy, remove it to a canvas substrate, and then sell it at a higher price than the paper copy, had infringed copyright. The legal difficulty stemmed from the fact that such a technique does not consist of an act of "copying," if "copying" is understood as an action of imitation or mimicry.

Four judges laid down the decision, which rejected copyright infringement, and three judges dissented. In our opinion, the majority's decision is wrong, both with respect to the solution preferred in the basic conflict between property rights in a chattel and in copyright, and with respect to drawing the boundaries of the reproduction and adaptation rights in Canadian copyright law. As to the first issue, the Court preferred the interests of the tangible proprietor, while ignoring a wide range of considerations related to the copyright holder's interests, including the contractual context between the actual parties.

Referring to the second issue, the Court drew a narrow definition of both basic rights, which is partly illogical, and also runs counter to Canadian international obligations. It seems that the underlying motive of segregating Canadian copyright law from the civiliste tradition led to an unreasonable interpretation of the law, even when inspected through a common law perspective. Whether right or wrong, the decision might have far-reaching effects on copyright law, above and beyond its specific circumstances, since it touches the...