Exculpatory Clauses

AuthorJohn D. Mccamus
ProfessionProfessor of Law. Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
Pages749-779
CHAP TER 20
EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
A. INTRODUCTION
The use of exculpatory clauses in w ritten agreements is a pervasive
practice in both commercial and consumer transactions. Exculpatory
clauses are used to limit the potential liability of a part y for breach of
contract. Such clauses m ay completely preclude liability for breaches
of certain stipulated kinds. Others m ay concede liability but impose a
limitation on the extent of li ability, such as return of the purchase price
or a numerical cap on the extent of liabil ity assumed. Other cl auses
may impose strictures on the manner in wh ich losses resulti ng from
breach are to be claimed by imposing, for example, a short period of
notice within which cla ims are to be advanced. Exculpatory clauses
are referred to by a variety of labels, such as discl aimers, limitat ion of
liability clauses and exclusion, exceptions or exemption clauses. When
such clauses are used deliberately by the parties to consciously allo-
cate the risk of certa in kinds of losses to one party or the other, they
perform a valuable function. On the other hand, where they have been
inserted by one part y in a written agreement that, for whatever reason,
is unlikely to be re ad by the other party, the use of such provisions may
surprise that party and lead to what may be considered to be harsh
and unjust consequences. Such problems are most likely to arise, of
course, in the context of transactions involving t he supply of goods
and services to con sumers on the basis of sta ndard forms drafte d by
the supplier. Understandably, then, the courts have attempted to devise
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THE LAW OF CONTR ACTS750
various techniques for effect ing some degree of judicial control over
the use of exculpatory claus es.
In this chapter, we examine t he development of the doctrine of
so-called fundamental breach th at has been the principal, but not the
exclusive means, for achieving thi s objective. Although controversy
continues as to the precise n ature of the doctrine, it is w idely accepted
that it is, for the most part at least, an aspect of the law of contract
interpretation. The basic idea underlyi ng the doctrine of fundamental
breach is that there may be breaches of contract that are so severe that
exclusion clauses, however drafted, should be either narrowly inter-
preted or otherwi se conf‌i ned by the courts in such a way a s to withhold
the protection of the particular clause in such circumsta nces. The doc-
trine of fundamental breach emerged in the middle of the la st century
from a series of decisions by the Engli sh Court of Appeal in which
Lord Denning played a prominent role. Over the next few decade s, an
extended debate between the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords
concerning the nature of and proper role of the doct rine unfolded. The
view advanced by Lord Denning and the Court of Appeal was that the
doctrine held that in circumsta nces of a fundamental breach of con-
tract, an exculpatory c lause would not be permitted to protect the party
in breach from liabilit y on the basis of a “r ule of law” to this ef fect. The
view advanced by the House of Lord s was that the proper approach
to the judicial control of exculpatory clauses is merely one of nar row
construction of the clause s against the interests of those relying upon
them. Unsurpri singly, the views of the House of Lords were to prevail.
The course of the debate, however, reveals a number of the diff‌i culties
involved in fashioning a doctrine of this kind. Accordingly, the leading
English cases w ill be reviewed here before turning to an account of the
Canadian reception of the doctrine. As a preliminary matter, however,
it is useful to identif y and distinguish certai n doctrines w ith which the
doctrine of funda mental breach may be conf used.
B. RELATED DOCTRINES
The doctrine of fundamenta l breach is not the only device dev ised by
the courts to effect control over the effects of exculpatory clause s. As
we have seen,1 the r ules relating to the incorporation of written terms
in agreements have developed in such a way as to reject incorpora-
1 See Chapter 6, sect ion C.

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