EXPANDING THE PARAMETERS OF PARTICIPATORY PUBLIC LAW: A DEMOCRATIC RIGHT TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND THE STATE'S DUTY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION.

• Author: Liston, Mary

This article examines the potential for an improved and expanded democratic relationship between the state and its legal subjects in public law. In Part I, I synthesize several of the compatible features of liberal, civic republican, and deliberative democratic theories in order to advance a new framework for public law in Canada that grounds a right to public participation, and the state's public consultation duties. The framework illustrates how liberalism, civic republicanism and deliberative democracy possess mutually beneficial effects for public law. This type of democratically-informed common law juridical relationship has not yet been achieved--the topic of Part II--but, in Part III, I employ two typical Canadian public law cases to highlight the nature of current limitations as a springboard to suggest that expanded participation rights are both immanent and possible in Canada. In Part IV, I argue that along with the framework from Part I, jurisprudential pieces are already in place to expand the parameters of participatory public law. Drawing on insights from other jurisdictions, current limitations and anxieties about this expansion can be mitigated or overcome. I then briefly consider two criticisms concerning the effect that more robust public participation requirements may have on courts and governments. Drawing on the theoretical framework presented in Part I, I conclude that an individual right to public participation combined with a general duty of public consultation is an essential legal requirement in modern rights-respecting democracies, such as Canada's, which aspire to be deliberative, fair, and participatory.

Cet article envisage la possibilite d'une relation democratique plus riche et approfondie en droit public entre l'Etat et ses sujets juridiques. La premiere partie synthetise plusieurs elements compatibles issus des theories du Uberalisme, du republicanisme craque et de la democratie deliberative dans le but de proposer une nouvelle structure pour le droit public canadien. Celle-ci etablira un droit a la participation publique et les devoirs de consultation publique de l'Etat. Cette structure illustre a quel point le liberalisme, le republicanisme civique et la democratie deliberative ont des effets mutuellement benefiques pour le droit public. La deuxieme partie confirme que ce type de relation juridique democratique de common law n'a pas encore ete adequatement developpe. La troisieme partie analyse deux arrets en droit public canadien qui sont representatifs de cette idee pour mettre en lumiere la nature des obstacles a cette relation et suggerer que des droits participatife plus etendus sont a la fois possibles et immanents au Canada. La quatrieme partie argumente qu'aux cotes de la structure suggeree par la premiere partie, les elements jurisprudentiels necessaires a l'expansion du droit public participatif sont deja presents. En s'appuyant sur les enseignements d'autres juridictions, les limites et les craintes liees a cette expansion peuvent etre attenuees ou depassees. L'on considere brievement deux critiques concernant l'effet que des exigences de participation plus robustes pourraient avoir sur les tribunaux et les gouvernements. S'appuyant sur le cadre theorique presente dans la premiere partie, l'article conclui que la combinaison d'un droit de participation individuel et d'un devoir general de consultation publique constitue une exigence juridique essentielle dans les democraties modernes qui respectent les droits individueis, tel le Canada, et qui aspirent a etre deliberatives, justes et partitipatives.

Introduction 377 I. A New Framework for Participatory Public Law A. Political Tenets 1. liberalism, the Norm of Substantive Equality, and the Right to Democracy 2. Civic Republicanism, the Norm of Non-Domination, and Participation 3. Deliberation, die Norm of Inclusion, and Collective Decision-Making B. Legal Entailments 1. Sharing a Commitment to the Rule of Law Principle and its Procedural Norms 2. Aspiring to Non-Arbitrariness in Public Decision- Making 3. Attending to the Separation of Powers Principle and the Role of die Courts 4. Contributory and Contestatory Participatory Procedures: Reinforcing roles II. The Current State of Participatory Public Law III. Two Commonplace, Common Law Examples A. "VAPORizing" the Right to Adequate Public Consultation and Participation B. A CAN[N]Y Judgment C. Putting the Extra into the Ordinary' IV. Expanding the Parameters of Participatory Public Law Conclusion Introduction

This article examines the potential for an improved and expanded democratic relationship between the state and its legal subjects in public law. In Part I, I synthesize several of the compatible features of liberal, civic republican, and deliberative democratic theories in order to advance a new framework for public law in Canada that grounds a right to public participation and the state's public consultation duties. The framework illustrates how liberalism, civic republicanism, and deliberative democracy possess mutually beneficial effects for public law. This type of democratically-informed common law juridical relationship has not yet been achieved--the topic of Part II--but, in Part III, I employ two typical Canadian public law cases to highlight the nature of current limitations as well as a springboard to suggest that expanded participation rights are both immanent and possible in Canada. In Part IV, I argue that along with the framework from Part I, jurisprudential pieces are already in place to expand the parameters of participatory public law. Drawing on insights from other jurisdictions, current limitations and anxieties about this expansion can be mitigated or overcome. I then briefly consider two criticisms concerning the effect that more robust public participation requirements may have on courts and governments. Drawing on the theoretical framework presented in Part I, I conclude that an individual right to public participation combined with a general duty of public consultation is an essential legal requirement in modern rights-respecting democracies, such as Canada's, which aspire to be deliberative, fair, and participatory.

1. A New Framework for Participatory Public Law

   In order to prepare the ground for the discussion concerning the possibilities for improvement in Part II, as well as the analysis of the deficiencies in the cases selected for Part III, I will first set out my conception of participatory public law in a nutshell. This framework draws on three theoretical traditions: liberalism, civic republicanism, and deliberative democracy. While salient differences amongst these theories exist, I will draw on a synthesis of their components that can be considered complementary, mutually supportive, and ultimately providing a harmonious base for a robust understanding of the democratic rights and duties that could inform Canadian public law. (1) In subpart 1(a), I will set out the political tenets that I employ from each tradition. In subpart 1(b), the legal entailments of these tenets will be presented.

   1. Political Tenets

      What this subsection aims to illustrate is that significant overlap exists amongst liberal, civic republican, and deliberative democratic theories concerning the relationship between procedural norms and substantive equality in modern states (i.e., states that are commonly labeled representative liberal democracies). (2) The main takeaway is that the reciprocal relationship takes the following form: the moral import of substantive equality can be used to secure fair procedures for all members of a polity so that they may engage in, or contest, collective decision-making, while fundamental procedural norms, in turn, are the norms that are used to define and effectuate substantive equality in public decision-making. (3)

      1. liberalism, the Norm of Substantive Equality, and the Right to Democracy

         Modern theories of democracy acknowledge liberalism's significant contribution to the development of the idea of the rule of law and its promotion and protection of fundamental individual rights and basic civil liberties. Liberalism's emphasis on individual rights and civil liberties, however, means that democratic rights appear less central in this philosophical tradition. In Lockean social contract theory, for example, democratic rights are not considered fundamental, while in the Rawlsian tradition they are subsumed within his conception of equal fundamental liberty for all in a well-ordered society committed to particular scheme of distributive justice. This is why I turn to two other traditions--civic republicanism and deliberative democracy--in order to emphasize the basic right to democracy and its commitment to equal participation in deliberation over, and contestation of, public decision-making.

         In the framework that I construct here, these three theories inform and supplement each other. For example, democratic equality can be seen to comport with substantive liberal equality--not unlike or incompatible with Rawlsian equality. (4) The conception of equality in both theories therefore requires the right to participate on equal terms with others in society in the collective establishment of laws that regulate our lives. (5) As Richard Arneson argues, this liberal-democratic understanding of the importance of substantive equality moves the right to democracy into the very core of liberal equality rights so that "the right to democracy can appear to be the right of rights, the crown jewel of individual rights." (6) The equal moral worth of individuals at the heart of liberalism, then, can be seen also to lie at the heart of democratic rule. (7) This shared commitment to substantive equality forms the starting point of my analysis: liberalism's contemporary ability to recognize the right to democracy as a fundamental, constitutive, and complementary right that assists in the realization of every person's equal...