EXTRA-TERRITORIAL 'FIDUCIARY' OBLIGATIONS AND ENSURING RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

• Author: Trapp, Kimberley N.

Respect for human rights is often understood to be in tension with a robust approach to protecting human security (both within a single state's territory and across territorial boundaries). Principles like those which form the basis of Fox and Criddle's fiduciary theory of sovereignty--such as non-instrumentalization and non-domination--may suggest an approach to balancing these competing interests, but not necessarily with the specificity and detail required of particular legal contexts. This article seeks to explore an alternative route to balancing these competing interests--one which draws on positive international law. The context for this exploration is that of 'asymmetrical self-defence,' taking the quintessential threat to both human rights and human security, in the form of armed conflict, as its case study. Where states provide support to participants in armed conflicts occurring on the territory of other states, they potentially increase the risks to those caught up in the conflict, raising important questions as to the nature, basis and content of the international legal duties associated with their support. It is argued that Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, risk related human rights obligations (like that of non-refoulement) and the Arms Trade Treaty are the positive law basis for obligations Fox and Criddle otherwise characterize as fiduciary. These frameworks provide much more of the detail required for effective regulation, such as obligations to be informed, the permissibility or otherwise of balancing other interests against the risk of IHL breaches, and the differentiated treatment of risks to jus cogens compliance.

Le respect des droits de l'homme est souvent presente comme etant en conflit avec une approche dite robuste dont la visee serait la protection de la securite des personnes (a la fois sur le territoire d'un Etat et au-dela de ses frontieres). Des principes tels que ceux sur lesquels s'appuie la theorie de la souverainete fiduciaire de Fox et Criddle--pensons a la non-instrumentalisation et la non-domination--peuvent suggerer une approche qui equilibrerait ces interets concurrents, mais pas necessairement avec la specificite et les details requis de contextes juridiques particuliers. L'object de cet article est d'explorer une autre piste de reflexion pour parvenir a l'equilibre de ces interets concurrents--une voie qui s'appuie sur le droit international positif. Le contexte de cette exploration est celui de la << legitime defense asymetrique >>, prenant pour exemple la menace par excellence pour les droits de l'homme et la securite humaine qu'est celle du conflit arme. Lorsque les Etats apportent un soutien aux participants a des conflits armes survenant sur des territoires etrangers, leurs gestes peuvent potentiellement accroitre les risques pour ceux qui sont implique dans le conflit, ce qui souleve d'importantes questions quant a la nature, au fondement et au contenu des obligations juridiques internationales associees a leur soutien. L'article 1 des Conventions de Geneve, les obligations en matiere de droits de l'homme (telles que celles de non-refoulement) et le Traite sur le commerce des armes forment un fondement juridique de droit positif pour les obligations que Fox et Criddle caracterisent comme etant fiduciaires. Ces cadres fournissent davantages de details qui sont necessaires pour la reglementation efficace des situations considerees, pensons aux obligations d'information, la possibilite ou non d'etablir un equilibre entre d'autres interets et le risque de violations du DIH, et le traitement differencie des risques pour le respect du jus cogens.

Introduction I. La Problematique and the Inadequacies of the Fiduciary Theory II. Towards Fiduciary Obligations of Intervening States Via the Lex Lata A. Common, Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions 1. The Obligation to Respect and Ensure Respect in General 2. The Obligation of Supporting States to Ensure Respect B. The Non-Encouragement Obligation in Nicaragua C. IHRL Obligation of Non-Rcfoulcment D. The Genend Framework of State Responsibility 1. The Prohibition on Complicity in Breaches of International Law 2. The Obligation to Co-Operate to Bring Serious Breaches of Jus Cogens Nonns to an End E. Obligations Denying from the Anns Trade Treaty Conclusion Introduction

International law is in the midst of a widely proclaimed paradigm shift. On the one hand, the international legal system continues to be understood in "classical" terms--with the state as the principal (if not exclusive) actor and the international legal regime organized around the interests of hermetically-sealed territorial units. (1) These interests are conceptualized in terms of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and nonintervention and lend themselves to a discourse of exclusive and absolute state right or authority over particular territories. The competing--or "new"--paradigm better reflects the realities of modern globalization (including the ease with which people, goods, weapons, and even criminality move across borders), and is significantly more pluralistic in its recognition of relevant actors and "human-centric" in its conception of the international legal order. Within this paradigm, the legal regime is (or at least ought to be) deployed principally in defence of human rights (including, of particular relevance for present purposes, rights to physical integrity) and human security. As a result, sovereignty is increasingly conceptualized in relation to these interests--defined by reference to the obligations associated with international human rights law (IHRL). Professors Criddle and Fox-Decent's conceptualization of this new paradigm in fiduciary terms portrays with much elegance the trends of at least the latter half of the twentieth century. (2)

This is not, however, a straightforward story of one paradigm completely displacing another. As with all in-progress paradigm shifts, the normative pull of each paradigm is not entirely decisive, and even within a single "paradigm" there can be serious tensions. Of interest for present purposes, respect for human rights is often understood to be in tension with a robust approach to protecting human security (both within a single state's territory and across territorial boundaries). International law struggles with managing any real or imagined tension between these potentially competing interests.

Principles like those which form the basis of the fiduciary theory of sovereignty--such as non-instrumentalization and non-domination--may suggest an approach to balancing these competing interests, (3) but perhaps not always with the specificity and detail required of particular legal contexts. The "fiduciary" balance also does not necessarily reflect the lex lata. For instance, Criddle and Fox-Decent argue that a fiduciary approach to sovereignty suggests that a "least harmful means" requirement be incorporated into the "proportionality" calculus of international humanitarian law (IHL), (4) as discussed further below. This argument has also been advanced on more positive law grounds, but is not widely accepted by states. (5) Criddle and Fox-Decent further suggest that states should refrain from using force against non-state actors (NSAs) abroad if such force would pose a disproportionate threat to international peace or security. (6) This understanding of the fiduciary approach to the jus ad bellum is of particular interest insofar as it seems to balance, and treat as equivalent, a state's fiduciary obligations to its own population (in particular to protect that population from armed attacks emanating from foreign territory), and its fiduciary obligations to the international community as a whole (as distinguished from its fiduciary obligations to the individuals within the territorial state from which the armed attacks are emanating and in which it is using defensive force). While this approach to the jus ad, bellum, in its emphasis on a state's fiduciary duties to its own population, reflects the lex lata, (7) its emphasis on other-regarding obligations requires further nuance.

This article seeks to explore an alternative route to balancing these competing interests in a very particular context (set out in Part I below)-one which draws on positive international law. The approach adopted in this article resonates with the fiduciary theory of sovereignty insofar as the theory is interpretive, but looks to positive law to do the prescriptive heavy lifting with a view to (at least some) specificity and effectiveness in defining states' obligations when their conduct affects competing interests.

1. La Problematique and the Inadequacies of the Fiduciary Theory

   This article explores some of the tensions within (and across) international law paradigms--taking the quintessential threat to both human rights and human security, in the form of armed conflict, as its case study. The outbreak of an internal armed conflict (or non-international armed conflict (NIAC)) creates new risks for the local population, (8) but also for the populations of third-party states--most particularly by undermining civic order and giving armed actors the physical space and opportunity to launch armed attacks against the populations of third-party states. The NIAC, however, often significantly impairs the territorial state's capacity to discharge its "fiduciary" duties to its own population and to the broader international community. Understood in terms of the fiduciary model, this increasing mismatch between what is required of the territorial "fiduciary" and its ability to comply with its obligations highlights the importance of the "fiduciary responsibilities" of third-party states.

   This article will focus on states which provide arms, funding, or other support to those engaged in a foreign NIAC (9)--in cases where the intervening state's support is in professed discharge of the human rights...