Federalism, Subnational Constitutions, and Minority Rights.

• Author: Leclair, Jean
• Position: Book review

G. Alan Tarr, Robert F. Williams, and Josef Marko, eds., Federalism, Subnational Constitutions, and Minority Rights (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004). Pp. viii, 247.

A book devoted to an analysis of "how federalism and subnational constitutions have served to safeguard the rights of minorities ... [and] of the conditions under which they are likely to do so" (vii-viii) is a rarity deserving of attention. Professor Tarr and his collaborators have produced a book well worth reading.

Part I provides an overview of some "horizontal" issues involved in subnational constitutionalism in federal states. The next three parts are devoted to case studies of countries, divided between "mature federal systems": Austria, Germany, and the United States of America (Part II); "regional systems in transformation": Italy and Spain (Part III); and "multinational federations": Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, India, and Switzerland (Part IV).

To examine all twelve essays in detail is not possible here. And so, after pointing to some of the deficiencies of this work, my aim will be to emphasize some of the ideas it contains that are particularly worthy of attention for a Canadian audience, especially for those scholars interested in Aboriginal legal issues.

Professors Williams and Tarr's introductory essay (Robert E Williams & G Alan Tarr, "Subnational Constitutional Space: A View from the States, Provinces, Regions, Lander, and Cantons" 3) examines, from a comparative law perspective, the question of how subnational entities are recognized (or tolerated) in national constitutions or constitutional space. They first rightfully underline that a subnational perspective allows for a study of constitutional federalism that is not obsessed by the sole examination of the national constitution's provisions nor by the univocal perspective of the national government. It also enables one to envisage "the relationship of national and subnational constitutions in federal systems as interdependent [rather than hierarchical]" (4). With that in mind, the authors then analyze issues such as: "the amount of subnational constitutional space, competency, or autonomy that the component units are allotted within the federal system" (6); the policing of the outer limits of subnational constitution making (whether the federal constitution invests the central government with some control over the content of subnational constitutions, whether such control should be exercised by a constitutional court, or whether the national constitution should prescribe the contents of subnational constitutions); the manner in which different subnational entities have exercised their constitutional powers and the reasons for the differences among...