Intentional Torts

• Author: Philip H. Osborne
• Profession: Faculty of Law. The University of Manitoba
• Pages: 234-323

CHAP TER 4

INTENTIONAL TORTS

A. I NTRODUC TION

The tort of negligence is complemented by a number of independent,

named (nominate) torts that deal with the intent ional i nterference with

the person, property (land and chattels), and economic interest s. The

tort of negligence and the intentional torts are, however, divided by

more than the degree of culpability of the defendant’s conduct. There

are signif‌icant di fferences in form, s ubsta nce, and policy between these

two regimes of tortious responsibility. Identif‌ication of some of these

differences will enhance an understanding of the nature and function

of the intentional torts.

The tort of negligence is a modern tort. It is essentially a product

of the twentieth century. The basic structure of some of the nominate

intentional torts is centur ies old. While there was some modif‌ication

of them in the twentieth century, the general outlines of liability have

been clear for a long time.

The tort of negligence is a tort of broad and general application.

It focuses primar ily on the quality of the defendant’s conduct and is,

consequent ly, inherently ubiquitous in its ra nge of applicat ion. Most of

the intentional torts are quite narrow in scope. They are restricted to

closely def‌ined fact patterns and particular categories of damage. This

ref‌lects the cautious and incremental development of the early com-

mon law, which focused on discrete categories of wrongs with clearly

identif‌iable boundarie s.

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Intentional Torts 235

The tort of negligence is characterized by general principles and

the use of highly discretionary concepts such as reasonableness and

foreseeability. The nominate intentional torts are def‌ined by rules t hat

tend to be more precise, narrow, and rigid than t he negligence prin-

ciples. Indeed, some seem to have been elevated to a status akin to

statutory provisions.

The tort of negligence underwent a transition in the twentieth cen-

tury from a limited number of duties of care arising from discrete cat-

egories of relationships to an unlim ited number of duties arising from

a general conception of relationships based on the reasonable foresee-

ability of harm to others. This process has not occurred in the inten-

tional torts. The courts h ave been slow in generalizing and integrating

the discrete intentional tort s into a more coherent and cohesive system

of general principles.1

The tort of negligence is dynamic, expa nsionary, and largely re-

f‌lective of current public attitudes and policies. It displays a vitality

and capacity for vigorous growth th at is not mirrored in the inten-

tional torts. The intentional tort s tend to be static and are, in the main,

characterized by convention, orthodoxy, and conservatism. The courts

have been slow to discard histor ical technicalitie s, and there has been

a reluctance to recognize new intere sts deserving of protection from in-

tentional interference such as the interest s in privacy, equality, peace of

mi nd, di gnit y, a nd fa ir ma rket pr actic es. Th is ha s promp ted so me leg is-

latures to f‌ill t he void with pr ivacy legislation, human rights codes, and

legislat ion policing t he marketplace.

Liability in surance and loss distribution policies are centr al to the

development, operation, and expansion of the tort of negligence. As a

rule, liability in surance does not cover intentional damage. Consequent-

ly, the intentional torts operate more as a conventional loss-shifti ng

system emphasizing corrective justice and allocating responsibility

between the individual litigants. This enhances the punitive, deter-

rent, and educational functions of the intentional torts and encourages

a greater emphasis on the accountability of individual defendant s for

culpable wrongdoing. The downside of the absence of liabilit y insur-

ance is that the victi ms of intentional wrongdoing are much less likely

to receive adequate compensation for their losses. Consequently, the

victims of intentional w rongdoing are forced to place much more reli-

ance on their own f‌irst-part y (loss) insurance and on governmental

1 The only exception is t he nascent tort of intention al interference with econom ic

interests by u nlawful means, whic h may lead to an integration of va rious busi-

ness torts w ithin a general principle.

THE LAW OF TORTS236

compensation schemes. The availability of these alternative mea ns of

compensation depends greatly on the kind of damage that is suffered.

Persons suffering physical injury often have no f‌irst-party disability in-

surance and they therefore need to rely greatly on the no-fault criminal

injury compensation schemes or on the social welfare system. Those

who suffer intentional property loss or damage will often have f‌irst-

party insurance and generally will have little need to rely on tort law.

Some economic losses suffered by commercial entities may be covered

by busines s interruption insur ance. In the business aren a, however,

defendants who cause economic loss are more likely to be capable of

paying damages.

All these cha racteristics of the intentional torts have a subtle but

signif‌icant effect on the amount of litigat ion arising from i ntentiona l

conduct, on the practical signif‌icance of the intentional torts as com-

pensatory vehicles, and on the general v itality of this area of tort law.

B. THE MEA NING OF INTENTION

In tort law the culpabilit y of the defendant’s conduct is def‌ined with

reference to t he consequences of th at conduct. Negl igence is conduct

that gives rise to a foreseeable and substantial risk of its consequences.

As the likelihood of the consequences increases, the conduct of the

defendant may be descr ibed f‌irst as grossly negligent and then as reck-

less.2 Conduct is not, however, intentional unle ss the defendant either

desires the consequences of his conduct or the consequences are sub-

stantially cer tain to result f rom the conduct.

The f‌irst def‌inition of intentional conduct is intuitive. Intent com-

monly connotes a subjective desire to cause the consequences of one’s

actions. When one person stabs another he want s to injure him. The

injury is said to be caused with actual intent. Conduct is also inten-

tional if the consequences, while not desired, are substanti ally certain

to result from the defendant’s conduct. Imagine, for example, a defend-

ant who shot into a crowd of people, hitting and injuring B. He can not

avoid liability for the intentional inf‌lict ion of harm to B by claiming

that he meant to hit C. It was substantially certain that he would injure

someone and that is suff‌icient to make the act i ntentional. To excuse

2 These concepts play no s ignif‌icant role in tort law. At common law t hey are

drawn wit hin the umbrella concept of neglige nce. There are, however, some

legislative prov isions that require t he proof of gross negligence or reckle ssness

in order to establ ish a statutory cause of act ion.