Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

• Author: Ruth Sullivan
• Pages: 29-48

29

CHA PTER 2

INTRODUCTION

TO STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION

A. WH AT IS INVOLVED IN INTERPRETATION

When judges or other off‌icials (for example, customs off‌icers or labour

relations boards) interpret legislation, they pur port to discover its

meaning by reading the language of the text in light of the r ules of

statutory interpretation. This st andard description of the inter pretive

task is mislead ing in a number of respects. First, t he term “discov-

er” implies that interpreters a re archaeologists rather th an artists, th at

their goal is to locate meani ngs f‌ixed in the past rather than create

new meanings. This may be so in theory, but in practice interpretation

involves both archaeology and art. Interpreters must work with a text

whose wording was f‌ixed in the pa st, but in reconstruct ing its meaning

they must draw on current knowledge and their ow n understanding,

experience, and skills.

The term “meaning” is al so misleading insofa r as it brings to mind

thesauri, dictionaries, and formal def‌initions. What interests interpret-

ers is not the abstract meaning of a text but its meaning in relation to

particular facts. Dictionary def‌initions are useful as a star ting point,

but lawyers and off‌icial s need to know whether and how the legisl ation

applies to the problem with which they are deal ing. It is this concrete

sense of meaning — the text as it applies, or does not apply, to particu-

lar facts — th at is sought in statutory interpretation.

Finally, the notion that statutory interpretation is a rule-governed

activity is mi sleading. The “rules” are not really r ules in the Dworkinian

STATUT ORY INTER PRETATION30

sense, and therefore they do not impose binding constraints on judg-

es and other interpreters.1 The failure to “follow” a rule of statutory

interpretation is not an appealable or reviewable error. Although bad

interpretations may be appe aled or reviewed, the error lies in fai ling

to interpret the statute correctly or rea sonably, not in failing to apply a

particular st atutory interpretation rule. As Lord Reid wrote in Maun sell

v Olins:

They [the rules of statutory inte rpretation] are not rules in the ord i-

nary sen se of having some bindi ng force. They are our servants, not

our masters. They are aid s to construction, pres umptions or point-

ers. Not infrequently one “r ule” points in one direction, another in a

different direct ion. In each case we must look at all rele vant circum-

stances and decide a s a matter of judgment what weight to attach to

any particular “rule.”2

As Lord Reid indicates, the function of the rules is not to dictate out-

comes in statutory interpretation cases. When the rules all point to the

same interpretation, the inter preter may feel bound to adopt that interpre-

tation. An alternative inter pretation would likely be set aside as incorrect

or unreasonable. But if ordinar y meaning supports one outcome while

purpose and presumed intent support another, the interpreter must rely

on his or her own judgment to decide which outcome is better.

Although statutory interpretation r ules do not necessarily dictate

outcomes, they are indispensable in formulating the arguments used

by counsel to argue cases and by judges to justify outcomes once a

conclusion has been reached. However impossible it may be to capture

the actual process of decis ion making — a personal, complex, and often

highly intuitive process — the resulting decision requires a legal justif‌i-

cation. Statutory interpretation rules supply lawyers and judges with a

vocabulary for describing interpretation problems and with legally ac-

ceptable reasons for preferring one solution over another. They permit

a judge to say that the interpretation adopted is the most appropriate

one in the circumstances, not because the judge personally prefers that

interpretation, but because it take s into account considerations th at are

made relevant by the rules.

1 Ronald Dworkin w rites that rules a re binding; therefore, they ca nnot conf‌lict

with one another, and t hey produce a single correct outcome. By contra st, prin-

ciples are not bindi ng but operate as pointers — reasons to prefer one s olution

over another. It is common for a set of fact s to be subject to conf‌licting pri nci-

ples. See RM Dwork in, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, M A: Harvard Universi-

ty Press, 1985).

2 [1975] AC 373 at 382 (HL).