Merges on Just IP: Are IP Rights Basic?

• Author: Gregory Hagen
• Pages: 349-367

349

EE

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Merges on Just IP: Are IP Rights Basic?

 

 : This chapter criticizes Robert Merges’s attempts to show

that current IP law is just on Rawls’ politically liberal theory of justice as fair-

ness. Merges argues that IP law is just because IP rights are basic rights that

enjoy a priority over distributive concerns and, therefore, that the inequal-

ities created by the current IP system are irrelevant to whether it is just. IP

rights are basic, he says, because they are necessary to provide the career

options for creative professionals that would further their autonomy and

self-ownership. But such a strong right to an occupation is not necessary

to the exercise and development of the moral powers necessary for social

cooperation which, on Rawls’s view, is a necessary condition for basic rights.

So, IP rights are not basic rights on Rawls’s view. This chapter suggests that,

at most, a very small subset of current IP rights would qualify as basic within

a politically liberal IP regime because a strong set of IP rights would gener-

ate inequalities that would strain people’s commitment to society and to its

IP rules. Most IP law would, thus, need to satisfy a principle of distribution

in order to be just.

: Ce chapitre critique les tentatives de Robert Merges visant à

démontrer que le droit de la PI actuel est juste au sens de la théorie politique

libérale de Rawls, selon laquelle justice équivaut à équité. Merges soutient

que le droit en matière de PI est juste parce que les droits reconnus par la

PI sont des droits fondamentaux ayant préséance sur les préoccupations de

nature distributive et que, par conséquent, les inégalités créées par le sys-

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tème actuel de la PI ne sont pas pertinentes pour déterminer si ce dernier

est juste ou non. Les droits de la PI sont fondamentaux, dit-il, parce qu’ils

sont nécessaires pour orir des perspectives de carrière à des profession-

nels créatifs en leur permettant d’accroître leur autonomie et leur réalisa-

tion de soi. Cependant, un droit aussi fort à une activité professionnelle n’est

pas essentiel à l’exercice et au développement des pouvoirs moraux néces-

saires à la coopération sociale qui, selon le point de vue de Rawls, est une

condition indispensable pour les droits fondamentaux. Ainsi, les droits de

la PI ne sont pas fondamentaux selon le point de vue de Rawls. Le chapitre

indique qu’au mieux, on pourrait qualier un très petit sous-ensemble des

droits actuels de fondamentaux dans le cadre d’un régime politiquement

libéral de PI, parce que sinon un vaste ensemble de droits de PI entraînerait

des inégalités susceptibles de compromettre l’engagement de la population

envers la société et ses règles en matière de PI. Le droit relatif à la PI doit

ainsi, dans une large mesure, satisfaire à un principe de distribution an de

demeurer juste.

A. INTRODUCTION POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND IP LAW

As intellectual property (“IP”) rights have gradually seeped into virtually

every area of our lives, the seemingly intractable disputes about the nature

and justiable scope of IP rights have become more polarized, hardened,

and vitriolic and the stakes have become larger.1 A key dispute is about

what justice demands of IP law. Some would resolutely say that the grant of

a right to exclude others from exploiting works, inventions, and other “in-

tellectual” objects is just, without regard to its eects on the distribution of

social goods. Others would say that justice would be done merely by grant-

ing an IP right to creators so long as it benets the least advantaged in so-

ciety. Still others would say a right of remuneration is more just than an IP

right. The problem is not merely a moral one, as our Supreme Court does

not give a consistent interpretation of what is just in IP law. 2 Does political

1 As a sample, consider the heated debates over the legal protection of technological pro-

tection measures in copyright law; the ratcheting up of IP protection in bilateral trade

agreements; the scope of fair dealing; P2P le sharing; the harmful use of trademarks

by advertisers; the emerging right of association with an event; and the patenting of the

human genome, DNA, stem cells, higher life forms, software, business methods, and

pharmaceuticals.

2 See Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc, 2002 SCC 34. The Supreme Court of

Canada explained that one of the objectives of copyright, “obtaining a just reward for the