Method and fit: two problems for contemporary philosophies of tort law.

• Author: Lucy, William

This essay examines two contemporary philosophical accounts of tort law and seeks to show that they face two closely related problems: that of method and of fit.

The first problem holds that the method philosophical accounts of tort law actually adopt is in one vital respect structurally similar to that used by Economic Analysis of Law. The difficulty that arises is that these philosophical accounts of tort law cannot therefore distinguish themselves from economic accounts on the ground that they are methodologically superior. There is, in fact, a degree of panty between these philosophical accounts of tort, on the one hand, and economic accounts, on the other, with regard to the way in which they accommodate the details of, and the views of the participants in, the institution of tort law, its constitutive practices, and doctrines. This, of course, is hot to say that the content of our two sample philosophical accounts of tort law is the same as the content of economic accounts.

The second problem raises this question: how much of an institution, and its constitutive practices and rules, must a philosophical account of it fit? The two philosophical accounts of tort examined here have been criticized for failing to fit some allegedly significant features of the law. It is argued that one particular instance of this criticism is misguided and, more generally, that it is sometimes a mistake to expect too close a fit between nonnative explanations and the institutions and practices to which they relate. And this, of course, is hot to argue that there should be no close connection at all between such accounts and their objects.

The discussion of the problems of method and fit paves the way for some more general reflections on method in private law. These reflections, though tentative, might also have implications for general legal philosophy.

Cet article se penche sur deux conceptions philosophiques contemporaines du droit de la responsabilite delictuelle et tente de demontrer que celles-ci soulevent deux problemes: celui de la methode et celui de la correspondance.

Le premier probleme emane du fait que la methode adoptee par les conceptions philosophiques du droit de la responsabilite delictuelle est, a un egard fondamental, structurellement similaire a celle utilisee pour l'analyse economique du droit. Cette similarite entraine une difficulte puisque ces conceptions philosophiques du droit de la responsabilite delictuelle ne peuvent pas, sur la base d'une superiorite methodologique, se distinguer des analyses economiques du droit. Il y a, en fait, un degre de parite entre les conceptions philosophiques du droit de la responsabilite delictuelle et les analyses economiques, parite qui provient de la facon dont celles-ci s'adaptent aux caracteristiques et aux points de vue des participants de l'institution du droit de la responsabilite delictuelle, de ses pratiques constitutives et de ses doctrines. Cela dit, l'auteur ne soutient pas que le contenu des deux conceptions philosophiques du droit de la responsabilite delictuelle soit identique a celui des conceptions economiques.

Le second probleme souleve la question suivante : quel degre de correspondance devrait exister entre, d'une part, une institution et ses pratiques et regles constitutives et, d'antre part, la conception philosophique de cette institution? Les deux conceptions philosophiques de la responsabilite delictuelle etudiees dans l'article ont fait l'objet de critiques en raison de l'absence d'une correspondance suffisante entre celles-ci et certaines caracteristiques significatives du droit de la responsabilite delictuelle. L'auteur soutient qu'une de ces critiques est malavisee et que, de maniere generale, ce serait une erreur de s'attendre a une correspondance trop parfaite entre des explications normatives et les institutions et pratiques auxquelles elles se rapportent. Ce taisant, l'auteur ne pretend pas qu'il ne devrait pas y avoir de liens etroits entre ces conceptions et les objets auxquelles elles s'attachent.

Ces remarques au sujet des problemes de methode et de correspondance preparent le terrain pour une reflexion d'ordre general sur la methode en droit prive. Ces reflexions, quoique provisoires, pourraient egalement alimenter les reflexions sur la philosophie juridique en general.

Introduction I. The Elephant in the Room II. Bilateralism A. The Method B. A Problem Shared Is Still a Problem III. Corrective Justice A. Substantive Standing and the Liability to Correct B. Three Problems 1. Two Problems with Substantive Standing 2. Bluntness and the Liability to Correct IV. Made-to-Measure Philosophy Conclusion Introduction

Thomas Carlyle's view of economics as a "dismal science" would surely meet resistance from proponents of what can felicitously be called "first wave" North American law and economics. (1) This wave of law and economics ("EAL") is that body of scholarship engaged in extending the alleged insights of neoclassical economics to all aspects of legal doctrine and procedure, including almost every aspect of the design and operation of legal systems. It is embodied in texts like Richard Posner's classic Economic Analysis of Law and more recent additions such as Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen's Law and Economics and Steven Shavell's Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. (2) First-wave EAL's almost imperial range distinguished it from vanguard law and economics, which was concerned in the main with only obviously economic areas of legal doctrine like, for example, U.S. antitrust law. Furthermore, both the intellectual leaders and some of the most zealous proponents of first-wave EAL extended their analyses well beyond the confines of the law. It thus seemed that there was almost no aspect of social life that this approach could not explain. (3) Indeed, such has been the ostensible intellectual success of EAL that even a notable nonzealot has said it is "the most important development in legal scholarship of the twentieth century." (4)

This essay is not directly concerned with first-wave EAL, which, in light of the previous paragraph, might seem perverse. Hopefully, the impression of perversity dissipates once the true focus of the essay is stated: its concern is with one particularly interesting noneconomic reaction to two of EAL's core claims as they are applied to tort law. The reaction in question is that of those jurists and philosophers who champion the notion of corrective justice as the key to understanding tort law. The overarching issue in what follows is not, however, the moral or political acceptability of corrective justice, for it seems that as an intuitive or common sense matter corrective justice always has greater normative appeal than efficiency, the value EAL emphasizes. The concern is instead with the adequacy of the explanation and understanding of tort law offered by proponents of corrective justice, this issue being explored with an eye to the supposed methodological inadequacies of the EAL account.

The first argument offered here raises the issue of method--the issue of how theorists should go about constructing broadly "philosophical" accounts of tort (or any other aspect of) law--and illuminates a particular problem that it presents. (5) The problem is neither that there is no obvious or agreed-upon method for the task of offering a philosophical account of tort law, nor that there is a plethora of such methods. Rather, the problem unearthed is that, though economic and corrective justice accounts of tort law are apparently very different bodies of thought, and though they begin from ostensibly very different starting points, they ultimately differ radically neither in their method nor in the structure of their theoretical "outputs". Clearly, the substance of those theoretical outputs is indeed very different: the notion of corrective justice and the way in which it characterizes tort law is quite unlike the notion of efficiency and its characterization of tort. Yet the way in which these competing accounts come to the conclusion that one or other notion--either corrective justice or efficiency--informs and explains tort law is very similar. There is thus, surprisingly and contrary to first impressions, some degree of methodological parity between both economic and noneconomic accounts of tort law. This is indeed a problem if proponents of noneconomic accounts of tort law regard their enterprise as completely different from, and methodologically superior to, that engaged in by proponents of EAL.

The second argument offered here raises the issue of fit. This issue also plays a role in the first argument and is probably best regarded as but a particular manifestation of the general issue of method. The fit issue can be captured by a seemingly innocuous question: which features of the area of law in question must a philosophical account accommodate? This question is explored in a manner quite different to the first argument: the second argument, unlike the first, is principally a defence of corrective justice accounts of tort law. It defends noneconomic accounts against a criticism not unlike one frequently aimed at EAL, namely, that it is a bad fit with the detail of the law. A central claim of the second argument is that this fit "problem" is to some extent bogus, that it is a mistake to expect accounts of the normative basis of tort (or any other area of) law to fit all or very many of the details of legal doctrine. If this claim is correct, then it presents a difficulty for corrective justice accounts of tort law. The difficulty arises when such accounts are commended because they fit the detail and structure of tort law better than economic accounts. For it seems to be the case that both corrective justice and economic accounts of tort fail to fit some features or details of the law. The principal difference between them is thus not that one account fits the detail or structure of tort law...