A reformed Senate as a check on prime ministerial power.

• Author: Sotiropoulos, Evan

One problem of Canadian parliamentary democracy is the concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister and the ascendancy of the Prime Ministers Office over Parliament. This article looks at some of the reasons for the weakness of the House of Commons vis a vis the Prime Minister. It then looks at the Senate and the place a reformed Senate may have in acting as a counterweight to a system that has been transformed from executive centred to prime ministerial dominated.

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In a representative democracy, individuals are elected to represent the views of the citizenry and, in theory, meet in a common place to actually debate public policy. Although the practice of politics is commonly divorced from the theory, the current rift between the two should concern all Canadians. It should be noted that as national elections become increasingly leader-centric, most candidates at the local level pin their political aspirations on the performance of their party with the hope of punching their ticket to Parliament. Therefore, when those green seats are distributed in Ottawa, the occupants are expected--following former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's theory--to 'sing from the same hymn book.' The British practice shows "a secular decline in party line voting ... over the past two decades," with even the Conservative majority government of the 1980s experiencing legislative defeat on several occasions (1). In contrast, the presence of strong party discipline in Canada has many negative consequences including reducing the responsiveness from elected officials (2). Since dissension is discouraged and individuals looking to advance their political career usually form a cohesive team, the centre can exert its considerable influence over backbench members. Customarily, cabinet solidarity and party discipline are integral parts of a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy, but should these traditions serve to restrict debate and circumvent the duty of an elected representative to question certain conclusions and even partake in the decision making process?

A matter of consternation among MPs is the fact that "the rules on what constitutes a government defeat are vague and hence flexible ... [since] an important matter remains subject to dispute" (3).

Liberal Party regimes--including the three under Chretien--would regularly muzzle backbenchers by declaring various non-money bills matters of confidence. The crack of the party whip was exemplified during the emotional debate to limit compensation to Hepatitis C victims. With the politics of the issue on their side, the Reform Party moved a motion obliging the government to pay damages to all sufferers; in an extraordinary move, Chretien declared the motion to be one of confidence despite the wording of the motion that omitted expressing non-confidence in the government (4). Furthermore, as his time in office came to an end, the Prime Minister indicated the omnibus package to amend the Canada Elections Act would be considered a matter of confidence--another extreme use of the party whip. Despite attempts to institutionalize a three-line whip modeled on the British example, Paul Martin ordered many in his caucus to support the party line on moral issues such as the vote on same-sex marriage. His short tenure as PM did little to transform a system reliant on access to the political centre or "Who do you know in the PMO?"

In a parliamentary system, maintaining the confidence of the House is a fundamental requirement of the governing party. Given that MPs typically vote as their party dictates, this cornerstone of Canadian democracy is constantly reinforced. For the government, steadfast support by its MPs allows for an executive to rule with little threat. For the opposition, a disciplined caucus allows for a unified and consistent alternative to be presented to the public. The question is this: can party disciplined be relaxed while still allowing a prime minister to effectively govern and simultaneously respecting the notion of responsible government? The British practice "shows that party discipline can be weakened ... without deviating in any serious way from the principles of responsible parliamentary government." (5) With minimal clout, government backbenchers resort to simply influencing the decision making process since their only real threat--voting against the government--is silenced by excessive party discipline; this in turn reduces their ability to keep a watchful eye on the executive. Frustrated with their inability to affect policy, many members of Parliament simply treat the House of Commons as a short stopover in a long career.

The Temporary Member

The high turnover among MPs prevents the development of institutional memory--a natural prerequisite to properly oversee and, where necessary, curb the actions of government. Many argue that "amateurism--the preponderance of short, interstitial careers--has, among other things, robbed the House of Commons of a cadre of dedicated and experienced MPs capable of challenging the power of cabinet (6)" Today, most people do not elect specialists but instead, send generalists to Ottawa without the proper skill set and experience to fulfill the duties of a parliamentarian. This claim is further substantiated by the perceived role MPs have over government decision making: in a survey produced by Public Policy Forum, October 2000, over 500 senior government officials ranked Members of the House of Commons second to last in their ability to influence policy. (7) Norman Ward argued decades ago that "most members of Parliament, far from being legislators who enact laws with the competence born of experience, are mere transients. (8)"

The critical election of 1993 and the corresponding composition of the thirty--fifth Parliament serve to highlight the problem of the temporary member. After the collapse of the federal Progressive Conservative (PC) Party, Jean Chretien and his Cabinet had almost all the meaningful experience in the House. The executive--including parliamentarian heavyweights like Herb Gray and Lloyd Axworthy--averaged eight years of federal service or two full terms, whereas opposition members had barely over a year experience under their belts (9). Simply put...