Reforming the House of Commons: lessons from the past and abroad.

• Author: Garner, Christopher

Christopher Garner is a doctoral candidate at Nuffield College, University of Oxford.

Polls reveal that a majority of Canadians think Parliament is not working, and that they are wholly dissatisfied with politics. Such levels of dissatisfaction causes those concerned with parliamentary democracy to worry about its current and future effectiveness. This article argues that Canadian reforms have looked far too often at reforming the overarching principles and institutional structures of parliament, ignoring those parts that work well and focusing on those with which we see problems. This article looks at some moderate reforms to the procedures of the House that can be effective in making for more effective government and opposition.

Gladstone is said to have reminded the House of Commons that "Honourable members are summoned to this place not to legislate or govern, but to be the constant critics of those who govern." Put another way, the principle function of the House is to call ministers to account thereby securing full discussion and ventilation of all the issues of the day. This same idea is echoed in works by Canadian political scientists and constitutional scholars as they outline with precision the principle ideas of responsible government.

Underlying responsible government is the idea that the House can hold the government to account effectively. That is, the House ought to have the power, through procedural channels, to scrutinise and criticise government policy, ministers, and actions. Thus, a fine balance must be maintained between the right of the government to govern, and those of the opposition parties to oppose. However, when former Prime Ministers suggest that MPs are simply `trained seals' or `nobodies once [they are] twenty minutes away from Parliament Hill' it becomes easy to question the operation of balance in the House. This questioning is easily furthered when we hear of the government using closure rules to limit debate.

Has Canada's form of parliamentary responsible government become one of government omnipotence, prime-ministerial rule and unaccountability? Some might answer in the affirmative to such a question. Balancing the right of governments with those of oppositions is not an easy business (especially as politics is inherently and overtly about power games), but it is still the foundation upon which our parliament rests. Losing sight of this has, arguably, cost a lot of time and effort in past reform attempts, and perhaps has even added to the perception that Canada's parliament is in a state of decline.

The reform process in Canada has acted much like a pendulum, swinging between changes that aim to increase the power of government in executing its business more rapidly and effectively, and those seeking to empower parliament (especially backbenchers) while concomitantly decreasing the powers afforded to government. This centrifugal pull has done little for the implementation of a long term reform effort.

Lessons from the Past?

If we take 1968 as our point of departure we can observe clearly the swing of this pendulum toward the government's advantage. In 1968 the Liberal government followed the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Procedure and adopted regular sittings of the House and revised the list of standing committees in accordance with the `shadowing' of government departments. (1) These reforms effectively reduced the log-jam that was being made by government business stalled on the floor of the House, through redirecting all government bills to standing committees that could examine the bills and report back to the House at a later time. However, investigations into the operation of these committees between 1968 and 1976 reveal that they were largely ineffectual, and plagued by high-turnovers in membership and low attendance. Moreover, efficiency in dispensing with government business, not effective opposition, was the result - a result that only added to debate at a time when people were asking whether parliamentary government was developing into a prime-ministerial dictatorship.

It took a time of bitter partisan conflict for the next reforms to the House to be effected. In 1982 following the infamous `bell ringing' incidents, the Special Committee on Reform of the Standing Orders (the Lefebvre Commitee) was struck. Among the items dealt with in the committee's reports were:

* the fixing of an annual calendar for House sittings and recesses;

* elimination of night sittings of the House;

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