NORTH AMERICAN SMOG: SCIENCE-POLICY LINKAGES ACROSS MULTIPLE BOUNDARIES.

• Author: VANNIJNATTEN, DEBORA L.

Within the North American context, the problem of ground-level ozone, or "smog," is not yet being addressed adequately. One reason for insufficient action is that there is conflict over what is to be done, and by whom. In the U.S., for example, when the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets attainment standards, localities out of compliance often cannot meet their obligations by their own actions alone since their air quality is affected by the actions of other polluters "upwind." The transport of nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds -- known smog precursors -- from the American midwest into the central Canadian provinces and across the Mexican-American border raises even more difficult questions about emission reduction roles and responsibilities.

If smog, and other air quality issues, for that matter, are inherently trans-boundary, they are also extremely complex. There are continuing scientific uncertainties with regard to long-range air transport as well as to pollutant interactions. What is the nature of the problem? Who is doing what to whom? How? These are technical questions that require effective, managed interplay between the scientific and policy decision processes in order to be resolved. What ought to be done? Whose behavior should be changed? How? These are political questions that involve allocating costs and benefits, and mediating relationships among parties deemed to be polluters and victims.

In an ideal world there would be plenty of time to resolve the science (what is) and feed that into the policy (what ought). But the real world is filled with uncertainties and imperfections. There are technical questions for which the science is rapidly evolving or that are simply beyond the capacities of existing knowledge to answer. There is also the politics of contending groups who have interests at stake involving policy. Some groups, usually environmentalists, want to speed up the process of decision-making and get to policy, which typically involves regulations. Others, usually industry, want to delay the imposition of regulations that may prove costly. Governments frequently stand in the middle, trying to make a decision. In the process science often gets indicted by those who do not like a policy output. On the other hand, everybody likes that science which provides evidence for what they want in policy.

What is to be done about science and policy dilemmas? Finding an answer within a nation is difficult enough where the boundaries are those of states or provinces. Finding an answer where the boundaries are national may be even more problematic owing to sovereignty concerns. We call this dilemma the "dual-boundary" problem -- bridging science and policy, across jurisdictions. Here we examine the role of "boundary mechanisms" created to cope with such quandaries.

In this essay we examine six mechanisms that attempt to address the dual-boundary problem with respect to smog policy on the North American continent. Each of the chosen mechanisms provides a potential setting for judgments that aid in consensus-building for contested environmental policy and help to move the decision-making process forward. Our goal is to identify those factors that are conducive to such consensus-building. Moreover, we have chosen cases that differ according to the spatial level at which they operate in order that we might look at a variety of dual-boundary situations. Two mechanisms are subnational: the Ozone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG) in the U.S. and the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) in Canada. Two are bilateral, one U.S.-Canada, the other U.S.-Mexico. These are the Air Quality Committee (AQC) and the Big Bend Air Quality Working Group (BBAQWG). The third set of mechanisms is trilateral, engaging Canada, the U.S. and Mexico: the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and the North American Research Strategy for Tropospheric Ozone (NARSTO).

Our findings indicate that these six cases fall along a continuum of success to failure. While no case offers a perfect dual-boundary mechanism, the AQC and NARSTO appear to have been most successful. More generally, our examination of all cases leads us to conclude that six conditions are necessary for successful consensus-building across the dual-boundary. First, it is important that science-policy timelines intersect and that scientific input is utilized in both the problem definition and policy adoption phases of the policy process. Moreover, some attention must be given to the formalization of structures and processes for science-policy interaction and stakeholder input, although it is important to maintain flexibility. We also find that the presence of leaders (or facilitators) is critical, along with the need to build trust in a 'buffered' context. Finally, stakeholder involvement is a key ingredient for fruitful collaboration across the dual-boundary.

1. SMOG AND THE NORTH AMERICAN CONTEXT

   The formulation of smog policy in North America takes place in a context of established or nascent trans-boundary working relationships, structures and processes. In particular, Canada-U.S. negotiations on acid rain reductions spanned more than a decade from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, involved multiple U.S. administrations and Canadian governments along with successive rosters of public officials, engaged the work of numerous domestic and bilateral scientific bodies, and engendered various forms of collaboration among subnational units, both domestically and across national borders. [1] In the course of this activity, much of the groundwork was laid for addressing trans-boundary smog problems in the northern half of the continent. The acid rain story also highlights the complexities and controversies associated with science-policy interaction across borders. [2]

   Science conducted in Canada in the 1970s had indicated that acid rain (see Appendix 1) was having an adverse effect on eastern Canadian lakes and forests, and federal officials sought to initiate bilateral negotiations with the U.S. to achieve emissions reductions. Rather than negotiations, however, the U.S. consented to the formation of a bilateral research consultation group to study the issue. The group's final report, issued in 1980, concluded that acid rain was doing "irreversible damage" and that the primary emission sources were thermal generating plants in the midwestern U.S. and smelters in Canada, primarily Ontario. [3] 13.5. emission sources, the report also noted, were responsible for 70-80 percent of the pollutants. Thus, while Canada would benefit most from U.S. emission reductions, U.S. actors would bear most of the reduction costs. Shortly thereafter, however, a joint Memorandum of Intent (MOI) was signed in which both countries promised to negotiate an acid rain agreement. The MOI also establ ished a number of technical working groups to lay the scientific groundwork for negotiations. [4] Progress halted with the advent of the deregulatory Reagan administration.

   This new administration took the position that the existing science did not support action, and emission reductions were thus premature. [5] When the National Academy of Sciences released a comprehensive report in 1981 on the effects of acid rain and called for a 50 percent reduction in the acidity of precipitation in the northeast, the Reagan administration dismissed the report as "lacking in objectivity." [6] In 1983, another bilateral study on the causes and effects of acid rain failed to reach a consensus on the science and, indeed, each country released differently-worded reports, with the Canadians emphasizing to a greater degree environmental effects. [7] In 1985, Canada and the U.S. appointed special envoys to examine the problem again, and their joint report, issued one year later, recognized acid rain as a serious trans-boundary problem and called for U.S. action. [8] Yet, the U.S. administration, the coal industry, midwestern utilities, and their supporters in Congress took great pains to point out "scientific uncertainties" relating to the causes and effects of acid rain. [9] The science of acid rain had become politicized and scientists were increasingly drawn into cross-border policy debates. [10]

   In an effort to encourage American action and ensure that their own hands were 'clean,' Canadian federal and provincial governments sought to fashion a domestic reduction plan. A federal-provincial agreement-in-principle was reached in 1983, but it was not until 1985 that the seven eastern-most provinces formally agreed to the eastern Canadian acid rain program. Then, a few years later, all ten provinces agreed to a national SO2 reduction cap of 3.2 million tonnes. [11] Meanwhile, the northeastern states were unsuccessfully attempting to petition the EPA for improved controls on pollution from upwind states under provisions in Section 126 of the 1977 Clean Air Act. In addition, organizations such as the Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) were established to encourage cooperation on air quality issues of concern to regional groups of states. [12]

   It was not until the election of George H. W. Bush, who had promised to act on air pollution, and the successful reauthorization of the U.S. Clean Air Act in 1990, which set out new emission reduction requirements, that Canada-U.S. bilateral activities bore fruit. In 1991 the Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement was signed, committing both governments to specified SO2 and NOx reductions. The agreement also established a joint Air Quality Committee to monitor implementation and issue progress reports. An interesting feature of the agreement was that, although the original focus had been on reducing emissions of those pollutants implicated in the formation of acid rain, the stated objective was to control all types of trans-boundary air pollution between the two countries. Very...