Defamation

• Author: Philip H. Osborne
• Profession: Faculty of Law. The University of Manitoba
• Pages: 425-450

425

CHAPTER 7

DEFA M AT ION

A. INTRODUCTION

The interest of persons in protecting their good reputations was rec-

ognized early in the development of the common law and it continues

to receive strong protection under the tort of defamation. This is in

marked contrast to the response of tort law to most other intangible

personal interests. Tort law has been very slow, for example, in de-

veloping remedies for breach of privacy, harassment, and emotional

distress, and it has “passed” on the issue of discrimination. There are a

number of reasons why reputation is one of the few dignitary interests

that has received speci al protection.1 Some are historical. The invention

of the printing press prompted the development in the common law of

strong criminal and civil laws to combat seditious and blasphemous

libel,2 which was perceived as a serious threat to the public order and

to the Crown.3 The high value placed on reputation by the English elite

classes and t he desire to minimize violence, part icularly by duelling, as

a means of defending one’s honour were also factors. Canadian judges

1 Battery, assault , and private nuisance protect dig nitary interest s to some degree.

2 At common law, defamation wa s actionable as libel (written def amation) and

slander (verbal defam ation). The extent to which th is dichotomy remains in t he

Canadia n law of defamation is dealt w ith later in this chapte r.

3 J.G. Fleming, An Introduction to the L aw of Torts, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 1985) at 196. Libel cont inues to be a crime in Can ada: see Criminal

Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s s. 296–301.

THE LAW OF TORTS426

have maintained the high priority that has traditionally been given to

the protection of reputation. This is explained in part by the pivotal

role of reputation in the protection of personal dignity, status, prestige,

and power; by the sensitivity of judges to the importance of reputa-

tion in their own professional c areers; by the extensive economic harm

that can f‌low from an attack on a person’s reputation; by the power of

modern systems of mass communication to disseminate defamatory

statements to large numbers of persons; and by the need to encourage

persons of integrity to enter and continue in public service. The pro-

tection of reputation does, however, impinge on other highly valued

interests such as freedom of expression and freedom of the press, both

of which are protected by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Freedom

of speech guards against oppressive and abusive governmental actions,

protects the free exchange and testing of political ideas, facilitates a

search for truth, enhances the eff‌icient operation of the marketplace,

supports a f‌lourishing artistic community, and maximizes the f‌low of

information essential for individual, social, and political decision mak-

ing. It is the foundation of a vibrant and free democracy. Defamation

law strikes a balance between these competing interests. An unduly

assiduous protection of reputation may diminish the f‌low of import-

ant information and may lead news media outlets to be overly cau-

tious in publishing investigative journalism in the public interest.4 An

unduly robust protection of freedom of expression and freedom of the

press may be very destructive of a person’s hard-earned and unblem-

ished reputation for integrity and honesty. The law of defamation has

traditionally favoured the protection of reputation over free-speech in-

terests and, to a signif‌icant degree, modern Canadian defamation law

continues to ref‌lect this bias. Recently, however, the Supreme Court

has begun a gradual recalibration of defamation law in favour of free

speech. It has been inf‌luenced by reform in other common law jurisdic-

tions and by the failure of traditional doctrine to ref‌lect suff‌iciently the

constitutional recognition of freedom of expre ssion and freedom of the

press in the Charter.5

4 This phenomenon is know n as “libel chill.”

5 See Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, and the discussion of the defenc e

of responsible com munication on a matter of public intere st in section E(4),

below in thi s chapter.