Special Topics in Negligence

• Author: Philip H. Osborne
• Profession: Faculty of Law. The University of Manitoba
• Pages: 144-261

144

CHA PTER 3

SPECIAL TOPICS

IN NEGLIGENCE

A. INTRODUCTION

Negligence law is not static. It is constantly in f‌lux, adjusting to new

activities, unusual f act situations, shifts in societal attitudes, unusual

losses, and the public’s increasing demands for protection from risk-

laden conduct. In the past few decades, imagi native and innovative law-

yers have pushed the envelope of negligence liability to secure g reater

and greater protection of their clients. In this chapter, a number of

special and topical is sues are considered in more depth. Most illustrate

the moulding of negligence principles to new claim s, new situations,

new losses, or new defendants. Some concern the interact ion between

legislative regulation and negligence principles and the accountability

of governmental institutions. Another involves the legislative codif‌ica-

tion of negligence principles that has t aken place in the f‌ield of occupi-

ers’ liability. Others relate to the man ner in which negligence law has

addressed the unique aspects of various professional activ ities. Collect-

ively they illustrate the inherent f‌lexibility of negligence law, the inf‌lu-

ence of social policy, and the dynamism of the fault concept, and they

point to the future development of the law of negligence in this centur y.

Special Topics in Negligenc e 145

B. PRODUCTS LIABILITY

The mass production and consumption of consumer products in the

twentieth century presented a considerable challenge to tort law. Neg-

ligence law responded to this ch allenge, and the initial duty to take

reasonable care to manufacture products that are free of dangerous

defects — recognized in Donoghue v. Stevenson1 — has been comple-

mented by a duty to warn of the inherent dangers of products and a

duty to design products with re asonable care. Courts have, however,

proceeded more cautiously in respect of the duty to warn a nd to design

with care. The reason is that manufacturing defect s normally arise in

isolated rogue products. The defect is the result of a mist ake or mal-

function in the defendant’s manufactur ing or quality control systems.

In practice, therefore, the extent of liability w ill not normally be un-

manageable or overly burdensome. In contrast, liability arising from a

failure to warn of inherent dangers or a failure to use reasonable care

to design a safe product may condemn a complete line of the defend-

ant’s products and may place undue burdens on manufacturers.2 Th is

differentiation among the obligations of ma nufacturers i s also ref‌lected,

in a different way, in American product liability l aw. Strict liability is

the norm for manufacturing defect ca ses but, in cases of desig n f‌laws

and a failure to warn, fault is often required.

1) Manufacturing Defects

The modern law of products liability began with a defective bottle of

ginger beer and the case of Donoghue v. Stevenson. Lord Atk in stated:

[A] manufacturer of products, which he sel ls in such a form as to

show that he intends them t o reach the ultimate cons umer in the

form in which they left h im with no reasonable po ssibility of inter-

mediate exam ination, and with t he knowledge that absence of rea-

sonable care in the prep aration or putting up of the products w ill

result in an injur y to the consumer’s life or propert y, owes a duty to

the consumer to ta ke reasonable care.3

1 M’Alister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) [Donoghue].

2 Class act ions are increasingly comm on where many consumers have bee n put

at risk by a fai lure to warn of dangers or a failu re of design. See, for example,

Andersen v. St. Jude Medical In c., 2012 ONSC 3660, dealing w ith Silzone-coated

prosthetic heart valves.

3 Donoghue, above note 1 at 599.

THE LAW OF TORTS146

This passage outlines t he primary obligation of manufact urers. It is to

take reasonable care t hat their products are manufactured in compli-

ance with their intended sp ecif‌ications and design and that they are not

dangerously defective.

Lord Atkin’s formulation of this duty of care was e xpressed in cau-

tious and guarded ter ms. His language ref‌lected both the novelty of the

case and the state of negligence law at th at time. His expression of the

scope of the manufacturer’s duty has now been loosened and broad-

ened in almost every conceivable way.

The duty of care extends to all consumer and commercial prod-

ucts, including buildings. The requirement in Donoghue that t he prod-

uct must reach the consumer in the same form in which it left the

manufacturer initi ally gave rise to suggestions that the product must

be in a sealed package or bottle. Now it is ta ken to ref‌lect the normal

requirement of cause-in-fact and the need to show that the d amage

was caused by the manufacturer’s negligence and not by the negligence

of some other person or by the normal deterioration of the product

through wear and tear. The suggestion, in the ca se, that the defend-

ant would be protected from liability if the defect could be discovered

by an intermediate ex amination of the product by a third par ty or the

plaintiff ref‌lected the prevailing judicial attitude to inter vening acts

and to contributory negligence. Today, the failure of a third party, such

as a retailer, to discover a defect by reasonable inspection is unlikely

to exonerate the defendant. It is more likely that the ma nufacturer and

the third party will be held jointly and several ly liable.4 A failure by

the plaintiff to inspect the product suggests contributory negl igence,

which was a complete defence when Donoghue was decided. Now dam-

ages may be reduced on account of the plaintiff ’s fault but the defend-

ant will not be exonerated from all li ability.

The duty of care currently extends b eyond the manufacturers of

products. It rests on the makers of component parts, assemblers, in-

stallers, repairers, and building contractors. Liability is restricted to

those who may foreseeably be injured by the defective product but it is

diff‌icult to imagine a situation where a consumer, a user, or even a non-

user of a defective product who is injured by it would not satisfy that

4 But see Viridian Inc. v. Dresser Canada Inc., [2002] A.J. No. 937 (C.A.), where it

was held that a defen dant supplier of a component part was not un der a duty of

care to the pla intiff purchaser of a produc t manufactured by a thir d party. An

intermedi ate examination of the compone nt part by the third par ty was antici-

pated and it would have reve aled the defect. The defendant did not, howeve r,

know the use to wh ich the component would be put, and it needed fur ther

engineeri ng by the third part y before it could be used.