How Does Legitimacy Operate in Emerging Capital Markets? Investigating the Moderating Effects of Premium Listings and Firm Size on Risk
Author | Wesley Mendes‐Da‐Silva,Luciano Rossoni |
Published date | 01 September 2019 |
Date | 01 September 2019 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/cjas.1496 |
How Does Legitimacy Operate in Emerging
Capital Markets? Investigating the Moderating
Effects of Premium Listings and Firm Size on Risk
Luciano Rossoni*
Universidade do Grande Rio
Wesley Mendes-Da-Silva
Fundação Getúlio VargasBusiness School at São Paulo and
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Drawing on an institutional theoretical perspective, we
investigate the impact of the origins of organizational legit-
imacy on systematic risk using a sample of 358 Brazilian
companies between the years 2002 and 2007. We regard
three origins of legitimacy—formal–regulatory (presence in
premium listings), cultural–cognitive (board of directors),
and normative legitimacy (reputation)—to empirically in-
vestigate how a company’s size and adherence to premium
lists moderate other sources of legitimacy. Our results
indicate that only under apparently better quality corporate
governance conditions—presence in premium listings—do
corporate reputation and the board of directors reduce
systematic risk. In addition, we show that the effect of repu-
tation on risk is positively moderated by firm size. Copyright
© 2018 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords: legitimacy, systematic risk, corporate reputa-
tion, board of directors, corporate governance
Résumé
A partir d’une perspective théorique institutionnelle,
nous étudions l’impact des origines de la légitimité
organisationnelle sur le risque systématique à partir d’un
échantillon de 358 entreprises brésiliennes entre 2002 et
2007. Nous considérons trois origines de la légitimité - la
réglementation formelle (présence dans les listes de primes),
la légitimité culturelle et cognitive (conseil d’administration)
et la légitimité normative (réputation) - pour étudier
empiriquement comment la taille d’une entreprise et
l’adhésion aux listes de primes modèrent d’autres sources
de légitimité. Nos résultats indiquent que ce n’est que dans
des conditions de gouvernance d’entreprise apparemment
de meilleure qualité - présence dans les listes de primes -
que la réputation de l’entreprise et le conseil
d’administration réduisent le risque systématique. De plus,
nous montrons que l’effet de la réputation sur le risque est
positivement modéré par la taille de l’entreprise. Copyright
© 2018 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Mots-clés: légitimité, risque systématique, réputation de
l’entreprise, conseil d’administration, gouvernance
d’entreprise
Introduction
There are signs that the capital market in emerging
economies such as Brazil is inefficient, given its weak legal
protection for investors (Black, Carvalho, & Gorga, 2010,
2012; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny,
1998), and the fact that it is culturally unsupported (Aguilera
& Jackson, 2003; Fligstein & Choo, 2005).
Under such circumstances, and placing oneself in the
position of investors, what parameters would be appropriate
to assess whether a company is reliable for investment? In
addition to the firm’s level of corporate governance (Black
& Kim, 2012) and the market factors commonly related to
the economic-financial analysis of companies, studies indi-
cate that investment decisions are based both on
embeddedness in social relationships (Fracassi & Tate,
2012; Granovetter, 1985) and on beliefs and values that are
institutionally legitimized in these markets (Bell,
Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014; Davis, 2005; Fiss, 2008;
Fligstein & Choo, 2005).
The authors would like to thank Professor Chang Hoon Oh, Associate
Editor of the Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, the two anony-
mous reviewers, and Professor Sandro Cabral (Insper, Brazil) for their very
helpful comments. This research received financial support from the
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq),
Brazil, Grant: 471930/2014-8.
*Please address all correspondence to: Luciano Rossoni, Unigranrio, Rua da
Lapa 86 Rio de Janeiro-RJ CEP 20021-180, Brazil. Email: lrossoni@gmail.com
Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences
Revue canadienne des sciences de l’administration
36: 404–417 (2019)
Published online 27 April 2018 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/CJAS.1496
Can J Adm Sci
36(3), 404–417 (2019)Copyright © 2018 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 404
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