Legal and Religious Discourse in the Antigone
| Author | Roger S. Fisher |
| Pages | 63-82 |
■(
FOUR
>
Legal
and
Religious
Discourse
in
the
Antigone
LAW,
UNLIKE
OTHER
forms
of
enquiry,
is
unique
in
that
it
is
synonym
ous
with
its
medium
of
expression,
which
is
language.
Law
cannot
exist
without
words,
and
this
is
why
legal
narratives
merge
so
seamlessly
with
drama
and
rhetoric.
Law
is
about
more
than
rules,
and
a
trial
is
more
than
an
exercise
in
forensics,
because
both
depend
on
the
mediating
role
of
legal
discourse,
which
is
how
power
is
exercised,
contested,
or
conceded
when
people
speak
about
the
law.
Law
does
not
like
to
concede
that
it
is
so
dependent
on
language
and
words,
with
all
their
inherent
instability
and
ambiguity,
but
rules
cannot
exist
without
language
and
the
social
practices
that
cluster
around
rules,
such
as
who
gets
to
speak,
when,
and
how
(and
who
does
not
get
to
speak
at
all).
Legal
actors
seek
to
con
trol
the
meaning
of
words
in
order
to
exercise
power
over
other
people
(and
so
legal
discourse
goes
beyond
language
in
the
strict
sense
to
in
clude
other
means
of
communication,
such
as
non-verbal
gestures,
“
body
language,
”
metaphors,
and
even
ritual).
Legal
discourse
is
the
socially
prescribed
way
to
speak
and
act
in
the
context
of
a
legal
dispute
where
“
the
way
you
talk
...
makes
a
lot
of
difference
to
the
result
you
come
up
with.
”
1
Legal
discourse
is
a
formal
conversation
about
power
that
usually
(but
not
exclusively)
takes
place
in
a
courtroom
and
consists
of
the
norms
and
conventions
of
speaking
performatively
about
a
legal
topic
using
so
cially
acceptable
language,
recognized
practices
of
reasoning
about
law,
and
appropriate
contexts
for
doing
so.
As
a
linguistic
and
sociological
[63]
Antigone
v.
Creon
phenomenon,
a
trial
is
a
highly
ritualized
and
highly
regulated
contest
in
which
rhetoric
and
language
are
used
by
two
opponents
to
try
to
win
(rather
than
simply
a
forensic
investigation
into
what
happened
in
fact).
Under
this
definition,
a
trial
becomes
nothing
more
than
a
competition
involving
the
demonstration
of
superior
linguistic
competency.
Because
legal
discourse
involves
the
performance
of
justice,
we
may
speak
of
discourse
competency
in
the
context
of
a
trial
or
dramatic
pres
entation
of
a
trial,
whereas
it
would
be
nonsense
to
use
such
a
term
about
a
philosophical
or
theoretical
work
on
legal
theory.
1
To
ask
how
people
speak
and
act
around
the
topic
of
justice
is
not
the
same
thing
as
asking
what
the
nature
of
justice
is
in
the
abstract
sense.
Trials
(in
real
life
or
performed
on
the
stage)
are
not
debates
about
the
meaning
of
justice
in
the
philosophical
sense,
but
occasions
where
justice
is
performed
in
the
sociological
sense.
The
meaning
of
justice
is
always
an
open
question
in
any
trial
or
in
any
play
depicting
a
trial
(and
is
always
the
focus
of
the
dramatic
interest
in
the
narrative
being
performed).
That
question
must
always
be
resolved,
formally
and
temporarily
(if
not
substantively),
be
cause
justice
itself
is
a
kind
of
performance.
This
is
where
a
court
of
law
and
a
theatre
merge
—
both
are
places
of
performance.
A
courtroom
is
a
place
where
the
meaning
of
justice
is
never
in
question
(unlike
in
a
gradu
ate
seminar
in
philosophy)
because
a
verdict
is
by
definition
always
just
(unless
a
court
of
appeal
says
otherwise,
which
simply
substitutes
one
lin
guistic
assertion
about
justice
for
another).
When
trials
end,
the
case
is
closed,
a
perfect
illustration
of
a
discourse
rule
specific
to
legal
discourses.
Any
debate
about
whether
the
verdict
was
just
or
not
must
move
else
where
(to
a
philosophy
seminar
or
to
a
legislature,
for
example,
where
other
discourses
take
place).
The
essential
function
of
a
legal
discourse,
whether
in
society
at
large
or
in
a
dramatic
presentation
onstage,
is
to
assert
and
demonstrate
the
primacy
and
power
of
one
discourse
over
competing
discursive
practices,
making
claims
about
justice
in
a
rhetorical
or
justificatory
manner.
The
critical
question
is
not
the
normative
nature
of
each
competing
concept
of
justice,
but
the
discursive
manner
of
each
competing
concept
of
justice.
How,
for
example,
does
the
discourse
of
religious
law
speak
and
behave
in
contrast
to
the
discourse
of
man-made
law?
The
two
discourses
some
[64]
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