Making Sense of Extraterritoriality Jurisprudence: Heuristic Pro-forum Biases and the Need for an Algorithmic Approach

AuthorChristopher Ram
ProfessionThe author was, at the time of writing, Legal Counsel with Justice Canada
Pages143-166
143
six
Making Sense of Extraterritoriality
Jurisprudence: Heuristic Pro-forum Biases
and the Need for an Algorithmic Approach
CHRISTOPHER RAM*
A. INTRODUCTION
is chapter, the rst of two by me, seeks to point out a problem in Can-
adian jurisprudence concerning the limits of jurisdiction in cases with
transnational and extraterritorial aspects. e following chapter discusses
possible statutory and judicial responses that might address this problem.
Legal reasoning usually combines algorithmic reasoning, in which the
selection and application of principles and rules is itself rule based, with
heuristic reasoning. Heuristics, sometimes described as “common sense,”
“mental shortcuts,” or “rules of thumb,” generate assumptions, which are
applied, often unconsciously, to reach conclusions in complex scenarios
where information is incomplete or uncertain. Heuristics are essential to
complex legal reasoning and decision-making, but they become unreliable
when the assumptions extend beyond the factual contexts in which they
were developed, which frequently occurs when heuristics based on the
* e author was, at the time of writing, Legal Counsel with Justice Canada. Views
expressed herein are those of the author personally and are not intended to reect
the views or positions of the Government of Canada or any department or agency
thereof.
See Cass Sunstein, “Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing” ()  Minnesota
Law Review , and Jerey Rachlinski, “Heuristics, Biases and Philosophy”
() : Tulsa Law Review .
 
144
laws and legal cultures of one state are applied to parties or events that
arise in another.
Over time, conscious and unconscious heuristics that predominantly
favour forum state law and jurisdiction produce cumulative pro-forum
biases in jurisprudence. ese then clash with algorithmic heuristic inter-
pretive principles intended to preserve parliamentary supremacy and limit
judicial discretion in extraterritorial matters. Judges are required to pre-
sume that domestic law is intended to conform with international law and
not to have extraterritorial application unless the legislature itself clearly
says otherwise, but pro-forum biases produce inconsistent cases that apply
the presumption, create arbitrary exceptions, or on occasion, simply ignore
it. is is a problem because it shifts both the exclusive authority of Parlia-
ment to make extraterritorial laws and the executive authority of ministers
over foreign policy into the hands of independent judges.
e solutions proposed in the next chapter include judicial and statu-
tory changes to reinforce the presumption against extraterritoriality as a
fairly hard limit on judicial discretion, to allow less discretion for heuristic
“common sense” reasoning, and choosing among rules based on pro-forum
biases. Drafting conventions should require clear and consistent language
whenever extraterritorial application is intended and silence when it is
not. Reliance on clear language would also ensure that international law
and foreign policy implications and safeguards were duly considered and
documented during the legislative process. Apart from reinforcing judicial
independence and the superior roles of Parliament and ministers over
extraterritorial matters, this would distinguish between substantive juris-
prudence that evolves dierently for constitutional, criminal, and other
domestic substantive questions, and jurisdictional cases that should apply
the same territorial limits to all Canadian laws.
B. JURISDICTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Questions of jurisdiction are fundamentally dierent from other issues
of domestic law. Domestic reasoning, principles of law, and heuristic
R v Hape,  SCC  at paras – [Hape].
See cases listed in note  below.
“Jurisdiction” creates other limits on domestic law and judicial authority, but ref-
erences herein are only to limits based on national sovereignty and territoriality at
international law.

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