Martin v. American International Assurance Life Co. et al., (2003) 301 N.R. 127 (SCC)

• Judge: McLachlin, C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps, JJ.
• Court: Supreme Court (Canada)
• Case Date: March 21, 2003
• Jurisdiction: Canada (Federal)
• Citations: (2003), 301 N.R. 127 (SCC);2003 SCC 16;12 BCLR (4th) 201;[2003] 1 SCR 158;178 BCAC 161;48 CCLI (3d) 1;223 DLR (4th) 1;[2003] SCJ No 14 (QL);301 NR 127;[2003] 6 WWR 1;120 ACWS (3d) 869;JE 2003-600;[2003] ACS no 14

Martin v. Am. Intl. Assurance Life (2003), 301 N.R. 127 (SCC)

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[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

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Temp. Cite: [2003] N.R. TBEd. MR.043

American International Assurance Life Company Ltd. and American Life Insurance Company (appellants) v. Dorothy Martin (respondent)

(28540; 2003 SCC 16; 2003 CSC 16)

Indexed As: Martin v. American International Assurance Life Co. et al.

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin, C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps, JJ.

March 21, 2003.

Summary:

The insured was a family physician who became addicted to meperidine (demerol). In 1994 he completed a residential treatment program and did not consume any mood altering substances until the spring of 1996, when he suffered a painful orthopaedic injury. On the evening of October 30, 1996, he left his home, telling his spouse that he was going for a drive because he was unable to sleep due to pain. He was found dead in his office the following morning. Death was caused by an overdose of demerol, in combi­nation with a dose of phenobarbital, which he had administered intravenously. The insured did not intend to cause his death. At issue was whether the defendant insurers were liable for accidental death benefits. The policy covered death caused by "accidental means".

The British Columbia Supreme Court, in a decision reported (1999), 14 B.C.T.C. 300, found that the insured's death was not caused by accidental means where he inten­tionally consumed a dose of demerol in the lethal range combined with phenobarbital, which had a significant addictive effect on demerol. The insured courted the risk of death by consuming such a quantity and combination of drugs. The action against the insurers was dismissed. The insured's spouse appealed.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a judgment reported (2001), 149 B.C.A.C. 249; 244 W.A.C. 249, allowed the appeal. The insured's spouse was entitled to payment of the accidental death benefit. The insurers appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. The circumstances surrounding the insured's death supported the inference that his death resulted from "accidental means" where he had no intention of dying, but miscalculated the amount of demerol his body could tolerate.

Insurance - Topic 3565

Accident and sickness insurance - The contract - Interpretation of terms - Acci­dent defined - [See both Insurance - Topic 7250 ].

Insurance - Topic 7250

Life insurance - Payment of proceeds - Accidental death - What constitutes an accident - Accidental death benefits were available where the insured's death resulted from "accidental means" - The insured, a physician with a history of demerol abuse, died from a self-inflicted lethal dose of demerol - The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the insurers' submission that death was only caused by accidental means when both the death and the actions causing the death were accidental - The court stated that "death by accidental means" and "acci­dental death" had the same meaning - "Unintentional or unexpected death is seen as accidental; intentional or expected death as non-accidental. ... death is not non-accidental merely because the insured could have prevented death by taking greater care, or that a mishap was reason­ably foreseeable in the sense used in tort law. Nor does a death that is unintended become 'non-accidental' merely because that person was engaged in a dangerous or risky activity. ... The pivotal question is whether the insured expected to die. ... to the extent that the answer is unclear when the matter is viewed solely from the per­spective of the insured, the court may consider whether a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have expected to die." - The court discussed the more difficult case of an insured engaging in activities carrying an inordinate risk of death - Again, where the insured's expecta­tions were unclear, the issue was whether a reasonable person in the insured's posi­tion would have expected to die - Although death was not certain in all dangerous activities, it was within the realm of what a reasonable person would expect - In such cases, death would not result from "accidental means" - See para­graphs 9 to 30.

Insurance - Topic 7250

Life insurance - Payment of proceeds - Accidental death - What constitutes an accident - The insured, a physician with a history of demerol abuse, died from a self-inflicted dose of demerol combined with phenobarbital from an unknown source - The trial judge accepted that the insured did not intend to die, but that the insured's courting of the risk of death with knowl­edge of the dangers inherent in using the drug meant that his death was not "acci­dental" within the meaning of his insurance policy - The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the insured's death resulted from a miscalculation of the amount of demerol he could safely inject and constituted death by "accidental means" under the policy - The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that the circum­stances surrounding the insured's death supported the inference that his death resulted from "accidental means" where he had no intention of dying, but miscalcu­lated the amount of demerol his body could tolerate - Surrounding circumstances were inconsistent with any intention of dying - See paragraphs 31 to 41.

Cases Noticed:

Columbia Cellulose Co. v. Continental Casualty Co. (1963), 43 W.W.R.(N.S.) 355 (B.C.C.A.), affd. (1964), 42 D.L.R.(2d) 401 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 11].

Sloboda v. Continental Casualty Co., [1938] 2 W.W.R. 237 (Alta. C.A.), refd to. [para. 11].

Smith v. British Pacific Life Insurance Co., [1965] S.C.R. 434, refd to. [para. 11].

Aguilar v. London Life Insurance Co. (1990), 65 Man.R.(2d) 221; 70 D.L.R.(4th) 410 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 11].

Leontowicz v. Seaboard Life Insurance Co. (1984), 58 A.R. 66; 8 C.C.L.I. 290 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 11].

Reid Crowther & Partners Ltd. v. Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 252; 147 N.R. 44; 83 Man.R.(2d) 81; 36 W.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 12].

Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1934), 291 U.S. 491, refd to. [para. 14].

Fenton v. Thorley (J.) & Co., [1903] A.C. 443 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 15].

Glenlight Shipping Ltd. v. Excess Insur­ance Co., [1983] S.L.T. 241 (Sess. 2nd Div.), refd to. [para. 15].

Stats v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1153; 22 N.R. 91, refd to. [para. 19].

Straits Towing Ltd. et al. v. Walkem Machinery & Equipment Ltd. and Cana­dian Indemnity Co., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 309; 3 N.R. 523, refd to. [para. 20].

Candler v. London & Lancashire Guaran­tee & Accident Co. of Canada (1963), 40 D.L.R.(2d) 408 (Ont. H.C.), refd to. [para. 21].

Johnson v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. (1984), 45 O.R.(2d) 676 (C.A.), affing. (1982), 39 O.R.(2d) 559 (H.C.), refd to. [para. 21].

Cornish v. Accident Insurance Co. (1889), 23 Q.B.D. 453 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 22].

Brown v. Continental Casualty Co. (1926), 108 So. 464 (La.), refd to. [para. 22].

Bertalan Estate v. American Home Assur­ance Co. et al. (1999), 68 B.C.L.R.(3d) 118 (S.C.), refd to. [para. 22].

Thompson v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America (1951), 66 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. App.), refd to. [para. 25].

Allred v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America (1957), 100 S.E.2d 226 (N.C.), refd to. [para. 25].

Wagner v. International Railway Co. (1921), 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y.), refd to. [para. 28].

Horsley v. MacLaren, [1972] S.C.R. 441, refd to. [para. 28].

Corothers et al. v. Sobodian et al., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 633; 3 N.R. 184, refd to. [para. 28].

Housen v. Nikolaisen (2002), 286 N.R. 1; 219 Sask.R. 1; 272 W.A.C. 1 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 32].

Counsel:

David Norwood, Nina Bombier and Peter H. Griffin, for the appellants;

David A. Critchley and Robert B. Kearl, for the respondent.

Solicitors of Record:

Lenczner Slaght Royce Smith Griffin, Toronto, Ontario, for the appellants;

Cherrington Easingwood Kearl Critchley Wenner, Fort Langley, B.C., for the respondent.

This appeal was heard on October 28, 2002, before McLachlin, C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada.

On March 21, 2003, McLachlin, C.J.C., delivered the following judgment for the Supreme Court of Canada.