Outside/In: Lesbian and Gay Issues as a Site of Struggle in the Judgments of Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dube

AuthorShelley A.M. Gavigan
Pages347-365
Eighteen
Outside/In:
Lesbian
and Gay
Issues
as a
Site
of
Struggle
in the
Judgments
of
Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dube
SHELLEY
A.M.
GAVIGAN*
Introduction
I
have been asked
to
address
and
assess
the
contribution
of
Justice Claire
L'Heureux
Dube
to
lesbian
and gay
equality struggles,
a
contribution that
justly
has
been explicated, analyzed,
and
celebrated
elsewhere.1
Indeed,
after
my
research assistant
had
collected
a
dozen cases,
and
twice
as
many articles,
her
leave-taking
was
both
ominous
and
sceptical: "With
the
topic
you
have
given
yourself,
I
don't
know
how you are
going
to
find
something
new to
say."
Fair
enough.
For,
indeed, what
can be
said
of
Justice L'Heureux-Dube that
has
not
already been said:
of her
fearlessness,
her
tenacity,
her
passion,
her
com-
passion,
her
indefatigability,
her
unflinching commitment
to
equality,
and the
fact
she is not
afraid
of the
"F"
(for
feminist)
word,
not to
mention
the
"L"
(for
lesbian)
and
"G"
(for
gay)
words,
nor
does
she
hesitate
to
challenge
the
"really
Big F"
(for Family) word.
What
more
can be
said?
That
she has
never
been
afraid
of
bringing
the
outside
in.
That
she
starts with
the
experience
of
the
"other"—the
one or
ones whose voices
and
experiences have
not
been
welcome
or
well heard
by the
law.
In the
context
of
criminal
law,
she
starts
with
the
harm done
and the
experience
of the
victim
(a
challenge
for
many
of
us
schooled
in the
sensibilities
of the
subjectivist tradition
and
attentive
to the
rights
of the
accused).
In
equality litigation,
she
starts with
the
experience
of
the
equality-seeking group. When lesbians
and gay men
began taking their
347
348
ADDING
FEMINISM
TO LAW
lives
to the
Supreme Court,
she was not
afraid
of
what
she
saw. And, impor-
tantly,
she
incorporated
the
insights
of
feminism when
she
turned
her
mind
to
their claims.
The
Judgments
In
the
current context,
one
might
be
forgiven
for
succumbing
to the
tempta-
tion
to
adopt
the
generic "relationship recognition"
or
"equal families" gloss
that
is
often invoked
to
describe
the
lesbian
and gay
struggles
that
have been
or are
currently
before
the
Canadian courts. But,
as I
have argued elsewhere,
these cases have been drawn from
different
social sites
and
legal
contexts:2
they have involved gays
and
lesbians
as
unionized
workers
in the
public
sec-
tor3
and
their right
to
human rights protection
if
they work
in a
non-union-
ized
workplace
in the
quasi-private sector
in
Alberta.4
Many "same-sex
fami-
ly"
cases have
transcended
the
conventional
boundaries
of
family
law and
included claims
to
entitlement
for
social
benefits5
and
survivors'
benefits
under public pension
and
insurance
plans,6
or
challenges
to
adoption
and
child
welfare
legislation.7
In
fact,
only
one
lesbian case
in the
"conventional"
family
law
area reached
the
Supreme Court during Justice L'Heureux-Dube's
tenure
on the
Court: that
of M. v.
H.,
which involved
the
fallout
from
a
failed
lesbian
relationship
and the
claim
by one for
spousal
support
from
the
other.8
In
rereading Justice L'Heureux-Dube's judgments,
I am
struck
by the
consistency
and
clarity
of her
analysis when lesbian
and gay
issues appeared
before
her, whether
in the
context
of
entitlement work-related
benefits
(Mossop),
social benefits
(Egan)y
the
right
to
human rights protection
(Vriend),
the
definition
of
spouse
in
family
law
legislation
(M. v.
H.),
or the
policy
of a
Christian University
to
proscribe
"sinful
behaviours" such
as
homosexuality
for the
members
of its
students,
faculty,
and
staff,
and the
response
of the
provincial accreditation body
(Trinity
Western
University).9
If,
as
one
commentator observed,
the
Court
"fumbled"10
towards equality,
it was
not
because Justice L'Heureux-Dube ever dropped
the
ball, although
one
does
imagine
the
scrimmage
line—or
the
rugby
scrum—when
one
reads
the
4:4:1
split
or
8:1
lopsided decisions.
And
yet,
in a
struggle that surely
was not one
for
the
faint
of
heart
(in her
words,
the
"battle
for
equality"),11
Justice
L'Heureux-Dube appears
to
have been able
to
move
the
Court, when
one
con-
siders
the
ground gained between
her
1993 dissent
in
Mossop
(concurred
in
by
McLachlin
J.) and the
1999 decision
in M. v. H. (an
8:1
decision, with
the

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT