Prevention and security: a new governance model for France through a contract-based territorial approach.

• Author: Roche, Sebastian

Dans le modele organisationnel conventionnel pour la securite publique et la prevention du crime, le gouvernement central et ses agents au palier local jouent un role dominant. L'analyse de la situation actuelle revele que le role de l'Etat se fait plus modeste, tandis que les approches et les intervenants concernes se multiplient (citoyens, municipalites, gouvernement central, Europe, milieux des affaires, compagnies d'assurances). Cela nous amene a conclure que l'Etat perd son monopole en la matiere, qu'il ne peut plus imposer une << demarche descendante >> et qu'une nouvelle forme de gouvernance fondee sur le modele territorial contractuel est desormais la norme.

In the past two decades in France, new stakeholders and new public mechanisms have appeared, notably local crime prevention initiatives, while a general reform of public administration has taken place, with repercussions on the division of power among public authorities and police forces in particular. From a practical standpoint, the level at which decisions are made and the way in which security and prevention are ensured have been transformed.

Public debates have centred on the more extreme aspects of the changes. In 2004, social workers organized a national demonstration (the first in the history of the field) to protest against "securitarism" (a law-and-order approach). The increasing powers of local police forces signalled a danger for France's national security model, according to Lionel Jospin, then prime minister, (1) and raised the spectre of "sheriffization" (in 2001 and 2002, this was the term used by Socialist politicians). Moreover, the lurking privatization of security and its potential consequences are frequently decried by the media, as well as by certain academics. The words "sheriff" and "market" allude to a supposedly American model, while some radical opinion pieces warn that our tendency to align ourselves with the United States puts French society at risk.

These viewpoints seem to suggest that nothing good has come of the procedural review that has been conducted, both at the highest levels of the national government and in French cities and towns, over the past 20 years. There is a tendency to bemoan the loss of a golden age (while failing to mention the general dissatisfaction of citizens with their public institutions at the time). A weakness of these critiques is that they do not bother to look closely at the many changes that have taken place in how security is governed throughout the Western world, or at the nature of the new models that have arisen.

How can these changes in security policy in France and Europe be interpreted? We are witnessing a profound transformation in the nature and number of organizations involved in security and in the rules that govern their actions and practices. (2) The monopoly in matters of security is breaking down. Meanwhile, the deregulation of the professions is eliminating both the public police forces' monopoly on policing and social workers' monopoly on prevention. This does not mean a complete withdrawal by public authorities; rather, it indicates a change in the institutional structure of these fields.

The role of local authorities in security governance

The relationship between the central government and local authorities has been transformed in recent years. The general evolution of the status of local government in the conduct of public policy has also entered the realm of insecurity. The increased power of local authorities has been made clear in three ways:

1. through the adoption of new legislation and the resulting transfer of jurisdiction;

2. through reforms that emphasize community and are closely tied to the new contractual practices between public authorities; and

3. through the development by municipalities of new methods to tackle new issues such as insecurity.

   Starting in 1983, a long period of centralization gave way to legislation aimed at decentralization, giving broader powers to local elected officials. But neither the police nor the justice system were decentralized at that time (nor were they under the second wave of decentralization, initiated by the government of Jean-Pierre Raffarin 20 years later). Legislation introduced in 1986 gave jurisdiction over prevention (child protection) to general councils (the elected assembly at the level of the departement) but not to mayors. However, these restrictions did not prevent mayors from asserting their role as key participants and even becoming the pivotal players in local security policy under this legislation. Thus, looking only at the most recent change, mayors have been allowed to create CLSPDs (contrats locaux de securite et de prevention de la delinquance, or local security and crime prevention contracts) without the approval of prefects. This was not the case with the Local Security Contracts (CLS), introduced in 1997. In this legislation, the minister of the interior included the right of mayors to be informed of trends in crime rates by the police and the gendarmes. The effect of this measure was to further reinforce the position of the mayors.

   Territorial authorities are no longer viewed as mere relays between the central government and local communities, and the supervisory powers of prefects have been diminished. Bachelet and Rangeon (1996) have demonstrated that prefects have lost many of their powers and that these devolved administrations, weakened by decentralization, are demanding greater autonomy from prefects. Decentralization has therefore indirectly encouraged the involvement of urban mayors in matters of public security, including both prevention and repression. Generally speaking, their ability to tackle social issues--and their legitimacy in doing so--will increase, as will their ability to coordinate activities, whereas the opposite is true of devolved administrations. Nevertheless, this should not lead to the conclusion that the state is absent from the local level or that mayors can always impose their views easily. When the mayors of large cities come out against national reforms, they come into conflict with the prefect and the process grinds to a halt; if prefects do not get involved in the contractual approach, either personally or through their chiefs of staff, the process will stagnate. (3)

   Contracts and partnerships

   Other French political scientists have already noted that, increasingly, cities are administered by various organizational players. This explains the level of interest in different types of partnerships and cooperation that use a contractual approach: while it may be an exaggeration to say that "dialogue has now replaced hierarchical relationships" (Meny and Surel 2001: 436) in "an intergovernmental model" (467), a combination of hierarchical and dialogue-based models is now being used.

   Contracts and accords have become the usual vehicles for public policy, including security policy. Over the past 20 years various mechanisms have firmly established this network of diverse local organizations, without unduly weakening the perceived superior authority of the central government. Indeed, various types of contracts enabled mayors to federate local prevention responses in 1982 and matters of security more generally in 1998. (4) This was accomplished despite the fact that these procedures are not contracts in the legal sense and do not provide for any sanctions for parties that do not fulfil their commitments. The jurisdiction of local communities is recognized more fully in contracts than it is in law. It is therefore appropriate to refer to municipal jurisdiction, even though there is no legal basis for this.

   The central government, regardless of the political party in power, requires its civil servants and officials to interact more frequently with local elected officials. This is the case in police matters (5) as well as in justice (Wyvekens 1997) and social work. All these professional groups are reluctant to intensify these relations, which they perceive as additional constraints and even as a potential source of political interference in their activities. The use of contracts as a way to direct public initiatives reflects these changes, as we have just seen.

   A focus on community or proximity in a contractual agreement implies that the state will negotiate its commitments (their form, nature, and scope) with local authorities. Each party is supposed to contribute to the initiative being put forward. Therefore, the degree of control exercised by prefects is now determined by the resources they can bring to the negotiating table rather than by their position as representatives of the central government. When the local security contracts (CLS) were created in 1997, prefects had a new resource at their disposal in the local political market. They could use the 15,000 ALMS positions (agents locaux de mediation sociale, or local social mediation officers) and 20,000 police assistant positions (ADS), 85% state funded, as an incentive for signing such contracts. The role of the central government representative at the department level is as much a function of the nature of the contracts as of the tools of political exchange associated with the "new jobs, new services" policy.

   This does not mean that the state has no local presence: 85% of public police in France are still employees of the central government and are deployed throughout the entire territory...