R. v. J.L.M.A.,

• Judge: Fraser, C.J.A., Côté, Hunt, O'Brien and Watson, JJ.A.
• Neutral Citation: 2010 ABCA 363
• Date: 06 November 2009
• Court: Court of Appeal (Alberta)

R. v. J.L.M.A. (2010), 499 A.R. 1; 514 W.A.C. 1 (CA)

MLB headnote and full text

Temp. Cite: [2010] A.R. TBEd. DE.023

Her Majesty the Queen (appellant) v. J.L.M.A. (respondent)

(0803-0284-A; 2010 ABCA 363)

Indexed As: R. v. J.L.M.A.

Alberta Court of Appeal

Fraser, C.J.A., Côté, Hunt, O'Brien and Watson, JJ.A.

December 2, 2010.

Summary:

An accused was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced. The Crown filed a Notice of Appeal on November 7, 2008. On February 18, 2009, the Crown filed a Notice of Application for leave to reconsider four previously decided sentencing cases of the Court of Appeal. Each was a memorandum of judgment. A motions panel granted leave to reconsider the four cases.

Berger, J.A., of the Alberta Court of Appeal, in a decision reported at 464 A.R. 122; 467 W.A.C. 122, recused himself where he had authored three of the four memorandum under reconsideration and they made his position on the issue under appeal clear. The Criminal Trial Lawyers Association applied for leave to intervene in the appeal.

The Alberta Court of Appeal, per Watson, J.A., in a decision reported at 464 A.R. 310; 467 W.A.C. 310, dismissed the motion.

The Alberta Court of Appeal, comprised of a five person panel, allowed the appeal, Hunt and O'Brien, JJ.A., dissenting. The court overruled the four cases for which leave for reconsideration had been granted. The court allowed the Crown's appeal of the accused's sentence and substituted a sentence of two years' less a day plus two years' probation for the 90 days' intermittent sentence that had been imposed by the trial judge. The court then suspended the sentence.

Editor's Note: Certain names in the following case have been initialized or the case otherwise edited to prevent the disclosure of identities where required by law, publication ban, Maritime Law Book's editorial policy or otherwise.

Civil Rights - Topic 5504

Equality and protection of the law - General principles and definitions - Scope of right - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "The equality guarantee in s. 15 of the Charter also reinforces the need for courts of appeal to take a leadership role in achieving uniformity of approach in sentencing. Parliament recognized the importance of equality before and under the law by codifying parity, which is grounded in equality, as a normative sentencing principle." - See paragraph 87.

Constitutional Law - Topic 5.3

General - General principles - Unwritten constitutional principles - Constitutionalism and the rule of law (incl. access to justice) - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "The principle of legality is fundamental to the rule of law and constitutionalism in democratic societies. ... It requires that all government action comply with the law. Although the principle of legality has not been expressly codified in Canada, the judiciary, as the third branch of government, is nonetheless bound by it as guardian of the Constitution. ... Sentencing, being one of the strongest powers given to the courts in a free and democratic society, must be carried out in a way which conforms to the legality principle. ... In the context of the criminal law, the legality principle requires that the law must be (1) accessible, that is understandable; (2) foreseeable in its consequences; and (3) non-arbitrary in its application. This last requirement means that where discretion is conferred on a judge, the law must set out the scope of that discretion and manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to avoid arbitrary, capricious or excessive action." - See paragraphs 84 and 85 and footnote 131.

Courts - Topic 5

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - General principles - Authority and use of precedents - General - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "Stare decisis is essential to law. ... It is a 'central pillar of our law'. ... Unpredictability is unworkable. Unprincipled differing results in similar cases are unjust. Since the top court (anywhere) can hear few cases, most predictability and consistency have to come from courts of appeal. ... Trial courts would be immediately overwhelmed if every case (civil or criminal) had to go to trial on every issue. Settlements and plea bargains are vital. Accused persons and counsel have to know what the case law is and what sentence to expect. Without that, no negotiation can be realistic, and every trial would become a horse race." - See paragraph 183.

Courts - Topic 5

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - General principles - Authority and use of precedents - General - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "The rules of precedent interlock and form part of an integrated whole. Those rules are based on experience and practicalities, and flow from court structures, the necessities of stare decisis and the roles of courts of appeal." - See paragraph 230.

Courts - Topic 8

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - General principles - Precedents - Court of Appeal - Weight (incl. memorandums and reserved judgments) - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "A trial court (and intermediate appeal courts) must follow precedents of appellate courts which hear appeals (directly or indirectly) from those courts. ... Appellate decisions bind even if the lower court thinks that the higher court's precedent is clearly wrong ... or that the higher court's decision is wider than its rationale requires. ... Court of appeal decisions also bind trial judges even if the trial judges think that the court of appeal decisions were based on some reasoning or precedent now shaken or even gone, or that the general trend of higher courts' views is now contrary." - See paragraph 184.

Courts - Topic 8

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - General principles - Precedents - Court of Appeal - Weight (incl. memorandums and reserved judgments) - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "If a court of appeal did not follow its own precedents, then courts of appeal would remove predictability, not give it. In that event, trial judges lose all motive to follow court of appeal decisions. Worse, trial judges could not follow appellate precedent because it would often be self-contradictory. ... exception to stare decisis, since it is at play in all criminal cases but the minor. Virtually all appellate courts hold that they are bound to follow their own previous precedents. Subject to a few exceptions or procedures, appellate authority binds all judges and panels of that court. ... Liberty of the subject does not constitute some general stand-alone to stare decisis, since it is at play in all criminal cases but the minor ..." - See paragraphs 185 and 186.

Courts - Topic 8

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - General principles - Precedents - Court of Appeal - Weight (incl. memorandums and reserved judgments) - The Alberta Court of Appeal held that it, like most Canadian Courts of Appeal, was not restricted to overruling a prior decision only where it was given per incuriam (in ignorance of and contrary to governing legislation) - The court reviewed its reconsideration procedure, which was mandatory and had been codified in Part A.3 of its Consolidated Practice Directions - The court discussed the criteria for and scope of its reconsideration process - The court concluded that "[d]iscussing the scope of exceptions to stare decisis is boxing with a man of straw. Alberta's Practice Direction provides a fair and safe procedure to reconsider precedent." - See paragraphs 185 to 208.

Courts - Topic 8

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - General principles - Precedents - Court of Appeal - Weight (incl. memorandums and reserved judgments) - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "For many years, this Court has required circulation of draft written decisions containing new law to all members of the Court for their comment. A number of other courts of appeal in Canada also follow this procedure. Making new law is important, and so deserves more care and checking; comments from judges off the panel are a very valuable safety net. All judges who wish to comment on the principles of law are given a chance to suggest improvements, clarification, or criticisms. Circulation of a draft is not a plebiscite but rather a chance to criticize, improve, and debate principles of law. The Chief Justice may order the appeal reargued with a larger panel. That has happened from time to time." - The court held that its Notice to the Profession on the subject, which was approved by the court and was akin to a Practice Direction, remained in effect - That Direction provided, inter alia, that "In accordance with the principle of stare decisis as it has developed through the case law, lower courts are bound by such judgments, as is this Court, subject to our reconsideration procedure." - See paragraphs 209 and 210.

Courts - Topic 8

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - General principles - Precedents - Court of Appeal - Weight (incl. memorandums and reserved judgments) - The Alberta Court of Appeal discussed the different value given to sentencing memoranda of judgment versus reserved reasons - The difference related not to the label but to the different processes used to create the two types of judgment, notably circulation to the whole court or not - If new law was being made, it should be by reasons for judgment reserved - The court set out 10 reasons why sentencing memoranda had little weight as precedent: (1) they were heavily fact driven; (2) it took much more time to write a precedential decision; (3) typically, each single sentence appeal involved a myriad of facts, yet turned on only one or two of them; (4) a draft judgment which would make new general law had to be circulated to the whole court, but often a sentence appeal would become moot or unjust after two or three months so reserving decision was impossible; a quick memorandum of judgment not making any new general law was the solution; (5) a sentencing memorandum of judgment meant that all three panel members believed that they created no new law and that the issues required no new law be created; (6) the whole court participated in reserves; (7) different types of judgments were created for different audiences; (8) counsel who saw and heard no suggestion of novel or contested law were entitled to prepare economically, and not research all the law and policy on each possible topic in each case; (9) given the deferential standard of review on appeal, dismissing a sentence appeal did not indicate agreement with the sentence, and still less did denying leave to appeal; and (10) it would be unfair to change the weight of precedent retroactively; were the rule of precedent different, most memoranda would have been written with different explanations, or with many more facts and recitals - See paragraphs 212 to 225.

Courts - Topic 8

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - General principles - Precedents - Court of Appeal - Weight (incl. memorandums and reserved judgments) - The Alberta Court of Appeal held that the precedential value of a sentencing memorandum of judgment would be a function of the reasoning contained therein - However, a sentencing memorandum of judgment could not contradict, nullify or overrule reasons for judgment reserved including those that were guideline starting point judgments - See paragraphs 226 to 229.

Courts - Topic 17

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - General principles - Scope of stare decisis - [See second and third Courts - Topic 8 ].

Courts - Topic 87

Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - Prior decisions of same court - Provincial courts - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "... Trial judges are not bound by the decisions their colleagues make. ... While principles of comity encourage trial judges to carefully consider decisions of their colleagues, each is free to take a different position - and sometimes does - on the relative gravity of an offence." - See paragraph 82, footnote 126.

Criminal Law - Topic 670

Sexual offences, public morals and disorderly conduct - Sexual offences - Rape or sexual assault - Sexual assault defined - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "A sexual assault is a major sexual assault where the sexual assault is of a nature or character such that a reasonable person could foresee that it is likely to cause serious psychological or emotional harm, whether or not physical injury occurs. The harm might come from the force threatened or used or from the sexual aspect of the situation or from any combination of the two. A major sexual assault includes but is not limited to non-consensual vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio and cunnilingus. ... We are satisfied that assessing whether a sexual assault is a major sexual assault is well within the capacity of sentencing judges. ... We find it unnecessary to include in the definition of major sexual assault an express reference to violence or threat of violence in perpetrating the sexual assault. It goes without saying that a major sexual assault is an act of violence." - See paragraphs 171 and 172.

Criminal Law - Topic 4856

Appeals - Indictable offences - Grounds of appeal - Illegal or improper sentence - [See Constitutional Law - Topic 5.3 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5800

Sentencing - General - The Alberta Court of Appeal reviewed the historical background leading up to the 1996 sentencing reforms in Canada, from the time of unfettered discretion in sentencing, to appellate review, to initial steps toward reform - See paragraphs 18 to 27 - The court discussed the 1996 reforms in which Parliament prescribed a sentencing framework (Criminal Code, ss. 718 to 718.2), which left sentencing to the courts but moderated their discretion by requiring that the sentence meet the proportionality principle and that reasons be provided - Further, within a year, Parliament confirmed that in deciding whether to impose a conditional sentence, a court also had to be satisfied that it would be consistent with the sentencing principles in ss. 718 to 718.2 - Further limits were placed on sentencing discretion vis-à-vis conditional sentences - In 2005, Parliament enacted s. 718.01 which imposed minimum punishments for child sexual offences, thereby removing these offences from the Code's conditional sentencing provisions regardless of the circumstances - It also provided that when a court imposed sentences for an offence involving the abuse of children, it was to give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence - In 2007, Parliament excluded from the conditional sentencing regime any offence defined as a "serious personal injury offence" (including all sexual assaults) and certain other offences (s. 742.1) - See paragraphs 28 to 43.

Criminal Law - Topic 5800

Sentencing - General - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that the sentencing process in Canada was an individualized one (case-by-case basis) in the discretion of the sentencing court, subject to two limitations: where Parliament had prescribed a minimum sentence or a mandatory one - The court stated that four aspects of this individualized process, particularly as it related to cases of serious sexual assault, merited special mention - First, though individualized to the case, the sentencing process was not exclusively about the offender, but also about the harm to the victim and the community from the crime - Harm represented one of the central elements in the proportionality principle, the gravity of the offence - Second, in the absence of any appellate guidance, the range of possible sentence for most crimes was theoretically broad and thus the margin for potential unwarranted disparity great - Third, there continued to be a wide divergence of judicial views in sentencing for serious sexual assaults - All courts have an affirmative duty to ensure that invalid considerations no longer affect sentencing in this area - Fourth, to maintain confidence in the criminal justice system, an offender's sentence should be based on the facts of the case - and what he or she did - and not on the sentencing judge's philosophy or preferences - Parliament had accepted that some differences in sentences would arise from the human factor - But wide disparities in sentencing untethered to valid distinctions between cases caused serious problems for the criminal justice system - Such disparities undermined the public's trust in that the criminal justice system, and the exercise of state power that it involved, would treat people fairly and equally - They also bred disrespect for the law - See paragraphs 66 to 70.

Criminal Law - Topic 5801.1

Sentencing - General - Proportionality - The Alberta Court of Appeal discussed the proportionality principle in sentencing - See paragraphs 45 to 55 - The court stated that "When Parliament reformed sentencing in Canada in 1996, it deliberately chose to make the proportionality principle - otherwise known as the 'just deserts' principle - the only governing sentencing principle under the Code. ... The proportionality principle in s. 718.1 requires that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. ... This principle is fundamental to the integrity of the sentencing regime that Parliament has prescribed. ... Proportionality is based on a simple, yet compelling, premise. The severity of sanction for a crime should reflect the overall degree of moral blameworthiness, that is the seriousness, of the criminal conduct. ... And that is properly measured by two things: the gravity of the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility. " - See paragraphs 47 and 48.

Criminal Law - Topic 5801.1

Sentencing - General - Proportionality - The Alberta Court of Appeal discussed the relationship between the proportionality principle and the secondary sentencing principles and objectives - See paragraphs 56 to 65.

Criminal Law - Topic 5806.1

Sentencing - General - Sentencing parity - General - [See Civil Rights - Topic 5504 and first Criminal Law - Topic 6201 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5833

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Deterrence - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "It is sometimes argued that deterrence - and sentencing offenders to jail - does not do any good because it does not help the individual offender and further that, despite jailing offenders, we still have crime in our society. We do not intend to explore this issue at length. However, three points should be made. First, by including general deterrence as one of the sentencing objectives in the [Criminal] Code, Parliament has ended any dispute about its validity. Hence, it is not for the judiciary to countermand a sentencing objective that Parliament has endorsed on the basis that placing it on the sentencing scale won't do the offender 'any good'. Second, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the legitimacy of general deterrence in sentencing numerous times. These decisions bind as well. Third, the 'deterrence does not work' theory ignores the fact that, as important as it is to stop one offender from re-offending, it is equally important to stop ten others from starting. ... For these reasons, a sentencing judge must give sufficient consideration to deterrence, both specific and general, when the crime so warrants. Lip service alone is not enough." - See paragraph 277.

Criminal Law - Topic 5834

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Circumstances tending to increase sentence - The Alberta Court of Appeal held that sexually assaulting an unconscious victim was an aggravating factor in sentencing - See paragraphs 282 to 284.

Criminal Law - Topic 5834.1

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Seriousness of offence - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "[c]ategorization is ... integral to the proportionality principle. It is also instrumental to a court's use of both starting points and sentencing ranges. ... Offences can be categorized on various bases. One unifying concept is to use the three historical characteristics of crime for this purpose: conduct, circumstances and consequences. Conduct goes to the unlawful act over which the offender has control. Circumstances go to the context in which the unlawful act is perpetrated. Consequences go to the result of the unlawful act. Courts have used all three bases, whether individually or in combination, for classification purposes. ... while categorization is key to both starting points and sentencing ranges, it can also be used by itself for offences where categories of varying degrees of seriousness are emerging but no associated starting points or sentencing ranges have yet been set. ..." - See paragraphs 93 to 98.

Criminal Law - Topic 5834.2

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Effect on victim (incl. victim impact statements) - [See Criminal Law - Topic 5834.1 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5834.6

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Seriousness of circumstances - [See Criminal Law - Topic 5834.1 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5835.2

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Categorization - [See Criminal Law - Topic 5834.1 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5837

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Mitigating circumstances - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "[w]ith respect to intoxication, the seriousness of a sexual assault is not lowered because an offender was intoxicated by drugs or alcohol while committing it. Intoxication should not generally be a mitigating factor in sentence. ... Indeed, as this Court noted in Sandercock [1985], intoxication, when offered in mitigation, is 'often suspect'. ... That said, intoxication can indicate spontaneity rather than planning and could be considered here in assessing the spontaneity of this offender's assault." - See paragraph 291.

Criminal Law - Topic 5843

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Content of a presentence report - The Alberta Court of Appeal gave the following cautionary note about pre-sentence reports: "They are not designed to explore the gravity of the offence nor the mens rea degree of responsibility of the offender for it. Further, the fact that authors of these reports or others may make recommendations as to a suitable disposition in no way reduces the obligation of the sentencing judge to assess what is a just sanction." - See paragraph 287.

Criminal Law - Topic 5846.5

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sentence precedents (incl. starting point principle and sentencing ranges) - The Alberta Court of Appeal provided an overview of starting point sentencing - The court discussed the roots of starting point sentencing - The court described how starting point sentencing worked - The court held that "... deviations from the starting point in service of proportionality are an inseparable aspect of the starting point approach. Therefore, mere departure from the starting point does not, by itself, demonstrate error in principle. But a significant degree of departure may do so. ... The difference said to justify the deviation from the starting point should be a relevant difference . This is consistent with the parity principle which requires similarity of outcome for cases that are relevantly similar . ... guideline starting points are capable of evolution as circumstances change. Since their existence and rationale are public, they are subject to scrutiny and debate. ..." - See paragraphs 99 to 107.

Criminal Law - Topic 5846.5

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sentence precedents (incl. starting point principle and sentencing ranges) - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "... starting point sentencing accords with the proportionality principle. It is hostile to rigidity and actively embraces the aim of a proportional sentence fit for the offence and offender. The argument that it unreasonably confines 'judicial discretion' is misplaced. Every process of reasoning must start somewhere and it needs acceptable standard reference points along the way. ... Starting point sentencing is not only loyal to Parliament's will - and the governing proportionality principle it has mandated - but antithetical to randomness and arbitrariness, the polar opposite of judicial decision-making." - See paragraph 108.

Criminal Law - Topic 5846.5

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sentence precedents (incl. starting point principle and sentencing ranges) - The Alberta Court of Appeal reviewed and discussed the Supreme Court of Canada's jurisprudence on starting points - See paragraphs 109 to 115 - The Court of Appeal concluded that starting point sentencing had a meaningful function in Canada - The court stated that "This includes the obligation on the part of appeal courts to properly define categories within an offence for purposes of setting a starting point. Starting point sentencing also obliges appeal courts to assess the fitness of a sentence imposed in light of the relevant starting point and the reasons offered for the resulting sentence. ... In fact, even without a relevant starting point for an offence, it would be reviewable error for a sentencing judge to fail to give proper weight to the gravity of an offence by diminishing its seriousness. That said, we concede that it is not an error in principle, by itself , for a sentencing judge to fail to expressly place an offence within a properly described category or to fail to expressly advert to a relevant starting point provided that the resulting sentence is reasonable in the circumstances having regard to the relevant starting point as adjusted for that offence and that offender . But if the resulting sentence is not, then that will constitute an error in principle that may warrant appellate intervention." - See paragraphs 116 and 117.

Criminal Law - Topic 5846.5

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sentence precedents (incl. starting point principle and sentencing ranges) - The Alberta Court of Appeal reviewed the usefulness of sentencing ranges - The court stated that they constituted only the most rudimentary sentencing guideline - At the front end of the sentencing process, they were of limited value because by definition a range went from a low to a high end - Further, the "research" that produced such putative ranges was often limited and parochial - Case data was frequently bereft of fact details or wanting in discussion of principle and policy - Without any proper assessment of proportionality, an appeal court's use of a range alone to determine fitness of a sentence was highly problematic - Since a range typically covered a wide spectrum, the mere fact that a sentence fell within a range, or not significantly outside it, told an appeal court little, if anything, about whether the actual sentence was fit - A sentence could be disproportionately low or high and still be somewhere in the "range" - The court stated that "These limitations of sentencing ranges are understandable. Ranges, which evolved out of the tariff approach, represent a compilation of some sentences imposed by some judges in some cases in some part of the past. Further, a sentencing range is not an essential component of the proportionality principle. A range develops as an outcome of proportionality; it is not necessarily a determinant of it. Despite these restraints, ranges continue to have value, particularly as a verification check on outcomes as well as an influential factor in setting starting points. Nevertheless, as helpful as ranges may be, the sentencing regime Parliament has prescribed includes the use of more appropriate analytical methods to guide sentencing." - See paragraphs 120 to 125.

Criminal Law - Topic 5846.5

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sentence precedents (incl. starting point principle and sentencing ranges) - The Alberta Court of Appeal stated that "[t]his Court readily concedes that fixing minimum sentences is for Parliament. ... But starting points do not amount to minimum sentences. ... A starting point is just that - a starting point, not an ending point. ... Starting points are not an automatic number for cases, nor a reason to exclude relevant considerations. Doing so skips past all the reasoning process intended by the starting point approach." - See paragraph 131.

Criminal Law - Topic 5846.5

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sentence precedents (incl. starting point principle and sentencing ranges) - The Alberta Court of Appeal held that starting points did not improperly preclude taking good character into account - While "ordinary" good character had already been taken into account in setting the starting point, it remained open to an offender to argue that the offender's character was "even better than might be supposed", in other words, better than a person of "ordinary or average" good character - Judges should avoid introducing unjust comparators since "good character" could be wrongly confused with work history, family stability, popularity, success, etc. - This was especially so since general economic conditions may well influence such factors as employment opportunity - Where sexual offences were concerned, good character had limits to its scope - The good character premise was that an offender should be able to contend in mitigation that he or she had acted as a law-abiding citizen generally - It was difficult to see the logic of assigning mitigation credit for apparent prior compliance with social norms in the face of a serious sexual assault - See paragraphs 132 to 136.

Criminal Law - Topic 5846.5

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sentence precedents (incl. starting point principle and sentencing ranges) - The Alberta Court of Appeal held that neither Parliament (in its 1996 sentencing reforms), nor judicial pronouncements since R. v. Sandercock (1985 Alta. C.A.), had nullified starting points - See paragraphs 137 to 146.

Criminal Law - Topic 5846.5

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sentence precedents (incl. starting point principle and sentencing ranges) - The Alberta Court of Appeal explained why a starting point was not set exclusively by reference to a range - See paragraphs 150 to 155 - The court concluded that "... starting points need not be riveted to some sort of statistical central pylon. To take this approach would involve appeal courts in impractical searches for artificial midpoints on a continuing basis. The starting point approach rejects a purely arithmetical calculation of averages or medians in favour of a more principled determination of an appropriate starting point. Numerous legitimate factors are relied on, of which past sentencing practice is only one. We see no advantage to sacrificing the probity and humanity of this approach to statistical purity." - See paragraph 156.

Criminal Law - Topic 5846.5

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sentence precedents (incl. starting point principle and sentencing ranges) - The Alberta Court of Appeal held that a starting point did not require an accompanying range - Both had legitimacy and utility in their own right - While they could be combined as part of an integrated sentencing regime, neither lost its validity if used alone - See paragraphs 157 to 160.

Criminal Law - Topic 5846.5

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sentence precedents (incl. starting point principle and sentencing ranges) - The Alberta Court of Appeal held that there was nothing to stop the development of community-disposition starting points, and there was such preference in existing Alberta authority - See paragraph 164.

Criminal Law - Topic 5848.1

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Negligence or conduct of victim - The Alberta Court of Appeal referred to a number of rape myths - The court stated that one such myth was "... the notion that non-consensual sexual intercourse is only a 'real' major sexual assault if the complainant has been violated by a stranger who has, for example, broken into her home or pulled her off the street. On this theory, if the unlawful act is not in this category - if the complainant has drunk too much or was imprudent as to her safety - it does not qualify as a major sexual assault. But even where a complainant has done either, this does not offer the slightest mitigation in sentence. ... This thinking perpetuates pernicious rape myths that the courts have repeatedly sought to eradicate. ... It has no place in sentencing for sexual assault in this country." - See paragraph 269.

Criminal Law - Topic 5848.10

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sexual offences - The Alberta Court of Appeal discussed the gravity of sexual assaults and the harm inherent in them - The court stated that "if, in a charge under s. 271, the Crown wishes to lead evidence that the harm went beyond that inherent in sexual assault simpliciter on the basis that the physical, psychological or emotional harm met the definition of 'bodily harm' under s. 272, then the Crown remains free to lead, and prove, that aggravating evidence for sentencing purposes. ... In other words, while the Crown has the right to charge the offender under s. 272 if that additional harm has occurred, the Crown is not required to do so. This falls within the scope of prosecutorial discretion. It all comes down to this. The Supreme Court has never endorsed the concept of a harmless rape or other major sexual assault. And this Court is certainly not prepared to do so. For these reasons, in sentencing for sexual assaults under s. 271, the sentencing judge must take into account the likelihood of serious psychological or emotional harm to victims flowing from a major sexual assault. ... Indeed, we are bound to say that, given what is now known about the nature and extent of the harm inherent in major sexual assaults, it would be irresponsible to do otherwise." - See paragraphs 173 to 181.

Criminal Law - Topic 5848.10

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Sexual offences - [See Criminal Law - Topic 670 , second Criminal Law - Topic 5800 , Criminal Law - Topic 5834 and sixth Criminal Law - Topic 5846.5 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5932

Sentence - Sexual assault - The Alberta Court of Appeal confirmed its decision in R. v. Sandercock (1985) that the starting point for a major sexual assault on an adult victim was three years' imprisonment - The court also confirmed that this starting point was not based on a guilty plea - That would be a mitigating factor reducing sentence - See paragraph 169.

Criminal Law - Topic 5932

Sentence - Sexual assault - The accused, who was of Aboriginal heritage, was convicted after trial of sexually assaulting the complainant, a distant relative, while she was unconscious - He was 18 years old - She was 22 - Out of kindness, the complainant had offered to let the accused stay in her family home - They went to a bedroom in the basement and sat on the bed with their backs up against the wall talking, drinking and watching television - While he was speaking on a cell phone, she passed out - The accused then began having sexual intercourse with her - She awoke and pushed him off her - No prior record - The sentencing judge found that before passing out, the complainant had done nothing to encourage the offender to have sex with her - He also found that the accused knew that it was wrong and that he did not have her consent - He convicted the accused of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to 90 days' imprisonment to be served intermittently, plus three years' probation - The Alberta Court of Appeal held that the reasons for judgment revealed several serious reviewable errors which individually and collectively warranted appellate intervention - The sentencing judge concluded that the offence was only "technically" a major sexual assault - The complainant awoke to find the offender's penis in her vagina - Therefore, this was incontrovertibly a major sexual assault, and of an unconscious complainant - A "technical" major sexual assault was an oxymoron - Second, presumably because of the improper characterization of the unlawful act, the sentencing judge effectively ignored binding authority, Sandercock (1985, Alta. C.A.), and the starting point of three years that it set for a major sexual assault - Third, he gave insufficient weight to denunciation and deterrence - Fourth, he failed to consider the parity principle - Fifth, he failed to treat the fact that the complainant was unconscious as an aggravating factor - The court applied the starting point and the proportionality principle - In mitigation, the court considered that the accused was only 18 years old, immature and had learning disabilities - Further, he had impulse control deficits - The court substituted a sentence of two years' less a day plus two years' probation - The court stayed the custodial sentence where, inter alia, the accused had served the prior sentence and the substantive appeal had taken more than 1.5 years longer than the ordinary process because of the issues raised - The court was satisfied that public confidence in the administration of justice would not be injured - See paragraphs 12 to 15 and 252 to 298.

Criminal Law - Topic 6201

Sentencing - Appeals - Variation of sentence - Powers of appeal court (incl. standard of review) - The Alberta Court of Appeal discussed the role of the courts of appeal in sentencing - The court stated that through its 1996 sentencing reforms in particular, Parliament strengthened the oversight role of courts of appeal to aid two of its key objectives: uniformity of approach in sentencing and reducing unfounded disparity in result - It accomplished this by: (1) retaining broad sentencing review powers in favour of courts of appeal; (2) requiring written reasons for sentence dispositions; and (3) prescribing parity as a normative principle in sentencing - Deference influenced, but did not supplant, appellate review - Requiring reasons for sentences (Criminal Code, s. 726.2) also reinforced the review role of courts of appeal - Sentencing reasons served three principal objectives: facilitating meaningful appellate review of sentence fitness; providing the parties with an intelligible explanation for the result; and ensuring public accountability - By prescribing parity as a normative sentencing principle as part of the 1996 sentencing reforms, Parliament necessarily reinforced the powers of courts of appeal - They were institutionally better able to properly assure similarity of treatment in sentencing - Trial judges were not bound by their colleagues' decisions - However, they were bound by the courts' of appeal decisions in their province or territory - Morever, courts of appeal heard appeals province/territory-wide and could see when and where problems were arising - Local judges were not entitled to invent their own standards in criminal sentencing isolated from national or provincial/territorial standards - This would necessarily create differential pockets of legal authority, leading inevitably to significant inequities - See paragraphs 71 to 83.

Criminal Law - Topic 6201

Sentencing - Appeals - Variation of sentence - Powers of appeal court (incl. standard of review) - [See second Criminal Law - Topic 5932 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 6203

Sentencing - Appeals - Variation of sentence - Grounds for varying sentence imposed by trial judge - [See second Criminal Law - Topic 5932 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 6214

Sentencing - Appeals - Variation of sentence - Considerations - Where sentence of trial court fully or partially served (incl. appeal delay) - [See second Criminal Law - Topic 5932 ].

Words and Phrases

Major sexual assault - The Alberta Court of Appeal discussed what constituted a "major sexual assault" for sentencing purposes - The court stated, inter alia, that "A sexual assault is a major sexual assault where the sexual assault is of a nature or character such that a reasonable person could foresee that it is likely to cause serious psychological or emotional harm, whether or not physical injury occurs. The harm might come from the force threatened or used or from the sexual aspect of the situation or from any combination of the two. A major sexual assault includes but is not limited to non-consensual vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio and cunnilingus." - See paragraphs 170 to 172.

Cases Noticed:

R. v. C.A.M., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; 194 N.R. 321; 73 B.C.A.C. 81; 120 W.A.C. 81; 105 C.C.C.(3d) 327, refd to. [paras. 3, 312, footnote 4].

R. v. Kain (K.) (2004), 348 A.R. 159; 321 W.A.C. 159; 185 C.C.C.(3d) 501; 2004 ABCA 127, overruled [para. 5, footnote 6]; consd. [para. 301].

R. v. C.E.N. (2004), 357 A.R. 255; 334 W.A.C. 255; 191 C.C.C.(3d) 26; 2004 ABCA 310, overruled [para. 5, footnote 7]; consd. [para. 301].

R. v. Jefferson (A.A.) (2008), 440 A.R. 310; 438 W.A.C. 310; 2008 ABCA 365, overruled [para. 5, footnote 8]; consd. [para. 301].

R. v. White (S.C.) (2008), 440 A.R. 43; 438 W.A.C. 43; 2008 ABCA 328, overruled [para. 5, footnote 9]; consd. [para. 301].

R. v. Sandercock (1985), 62 A.R. 382; 22 C.C.C.(3d) 79; 40 Alta. L.R.(2d) 265 (C.A.), affd. [para. 5, footnote 10]; refd to. [para. 304].

R. v. W.B.S.; R. v. M.P. (1992), 127 A.R. 65; 20 W.A.C. 65; 73 C.C.C.(3d) 530 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 5, footnote 10].

R. v. Gladue (J.T.), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688; 238 N.R. 1; 121 B.C.A.C. 161; 198 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 16, footnote 14].

Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; 221 N.R. 241; 106 O.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 16, footnote 15].

R. v. Gisby (K.) et al. (2000), 271 A.R. 303; 234 W.A.C. 303; 148 C.C.C.(3d) 549; 2000 ABCA 261, refd to. [para. 17, footnote 16].

R. v. Craig (J.A.), [2009] 1 S.C.R. 762; 388 N.R. 254; 271 B.C.A.C. 1; 458 W.A.C. 1; 2009 SCC 23, refd to. [para. 17, footnote 16].

Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 17, footnote 16].

R. v. J.T.B., [2009] N.R. Uned. 185; [2009] 1 A.C. 1310; [2009] UKHL 20, affing. [2008] EWCA Crim. 815; [2008] 3 W.L.R. 923 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 17, footnote 16].

Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 715; 348 N.R. 148; 210 O.A.C. 342; 2006 SCC 20, refd to. [para. 17, footnote 17].

A.Y.S.A. Amateur Youth Soccer Association v. Canada Revenue Agency, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 42; 367 N.R. 264; 2007 D.T.C. 5527; [2008] 1 C.T.C. 32; 2007 SCC 42, refd to. [para. 17, footnote 17].

R. v. Daoust (C.) et al., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 217; 316 N.R. 203; 2004 SCC 6, refd to. [para. 17, footnote 17].

R. v. Finlay, [1924] 4 D.L.R. 829; 43 C.C.C. 62 (Sask. C.A.), refd to. [para. 21, footnote 22].

R. v. Sprague et al., [1975] 1 W.W.R. 22; 19 C.C.C.(2d) 513 (Alta. C.A.), refd to. [para. 21, footnote 22].

R. v. Baldhead (1966), 55 W.W.R.(N.S.) 757; 4 C.C.C. 183 (Sask. C.A.), refd to. [para. 21, footnote 22].

R. v. Morrissette (1970), 75 W.W.R.(N.S.) 644; 1 C.C.C.(2d) 307 (Sask. C.A.), refd to. [para. 21, footnote 22].

R. v. Jourdain and Kudyba (1958), 121 C.C.C. 82 (Man. C.A.), refd to. [para. 21, footnote 22].

R. v. McDonnell (T.E.), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948; 210 N.R. 241; 196 A.R. 321; 141 W.A.C. 321; 145 D.L.R.(4th) 577, consd. [para. 22, footnote 23]; refd to. [para. 307].

R. v. Proulx (J.K.D.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61; 249 N.R. 201; 142 Man.R.(2d) 161; 212 W.A.C. 161; 2000 SCC 5, refd to. [paras. 26, 349, footnote 35].

R. v. T.L.B. (2007), 409 A.R. 40; 402 W.A.C. 40; 2007 ABCA 61, leave to appeal denied (2007), 375 N.R. 391; 433 A.R. 399; 429 W.A.C. 399 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 37, footnote 48].

R. v. Pierce (M.) (1997), 97 O.A.C. 253; 32 O.R.(3d) 321; 114 C.C.C.(3d) 23 (C.A.), leave to appeal denied (1997), 224 N.R. 154; 105 O.A.C. 319 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 38, footnote 49].

R. v. Maheu (1997), 116 C.C.C.(3d) 361 (Que. C.A.), refd to. [para. 38, footnote 49].

R. v. McDonald (D.P.), [1997] 4 W.W.R. 318; 152 Sask.R. 81; 140 W.A.C. 81; 113 C.C.C.(3d) 418 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 38, footnote 49].

R. v. Brady (J.R.) (1998), 209 A.R. 321; 160 W.A.C. 321; 121 C.C.C.(3d) 504; 1998 ABCA 7, refd to. [para. 38, footnote 49].

R. v. J.W. (1997), 99 O.A.C. 161; 33 O.R.(3d) 225; 115 C.C.C.(3d) 18 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 38, footnote 50].

R. v. Ursel (D.A.) et al. (1997), 96 B.C.A.C. 241; 155 W.A.C. 241; 117 C.C.C.(3d) 289 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 38, footnote 50].

R. v. Horvath (B.A.), [1997] 8 W.W.R. 357; 152 Sask.R. 277; 140 W.A.C. 277; 117 C.C.C.(3d) 110 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 38, footnote 52].

R. v. Spence (S.); R. v. Fraser (D.L.) (1992), 131 A.R. 301; 25 W.A.C. 301; 78 C.C.C.(3d) 451 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 41, footnote 54].

R. v. H.G.V. (2001), 277 A.R. 262; 242 W.A.C. 262; 2001 ABCA 54, refd to. [para. 41, footnote 54].

R. v. J.J.W. (2004), 348 A.R. 395; 321 W.A.C. 395; 2004 ABCA 50, refd to. [para. 41, footnote 54].

R. v. Lyons (E.J.) (2005), 371 A.R. 74; 354 W.A.C. 74; 2005 ABCA 258, refd to. [para. 41, footnote 54].

R. v. Skwarchuk (K.) (2007), 409 A.R. 87; 402 W.A.C. 87; 2007 ABCA 195, refd to. [para. 41, footnote 54].

R. v. C.H.L. (2008), 446 A.R. 315; 442 W.A.C. 315; 2008 ABCA 366, refd to. [para. 41, footnote 54].

R. v. S.M.H. (2009), 464 A.R. 114; 467 W.A.C. 114; 2009 ABCA 315, refd to. [para. 41, footnote 54].

R. v. Pritchard (T.) (2005), 371 A.R. 27; 354 W.A.C. 27; 2005 ABCA 240, refd to. [para. 41, footnote 54].

R. v. P.A.L. (2009), 457 A.R. 96; 457 W.AC. 96; 2009 ABCA 79, refd to. [para. 41, footnote 54].

R. v. Lebar (S.M.) (2010), 260 O.A.C. 169; 252 C.C.C.(3d) 411; 2010 ONCA 220, refd to. [para. 42, footnote 55].

R. v. Nasogaluak (L.M.), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206; 398 N.R. 107; 474 A.R. 88; 479 W.A.C. 88; 251 C.C.C.(3d) 293; 2010 SCC 6, refd to. [paras. 46, 312, footnote 63].

R. v. L.M., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163; 374 N.R. 351; 231 C.C.C.(3d) 310; 2008 SCC 31, refd to. [paras. 47, 313, footnote 65].

R. v. Morrisey (M.L.) (No. 2), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90; 259 N.R. 95; 187 N.S.R.(2d) 1; 585 A.P.R. 1; 2000 SCC 39, refd to. [para. 52, footnote 75].

R. v. Malmo-Levine (D.) et al., [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571; 314 N.R. 1; 191 B.C.A.C. 1; 314 W.A.C. 1; 2003 SCC 74, refd to. [para. 55, footnote 82].

R. v. Wust (L.W.) et al., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455; 252 N.R. 332; 134 B.C.A.C. 236; 219 W.A.C. 236; 2000 SCC 18, refd to. [para. 55, footnote 82].

R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3; 157 N.R. 1; 65 O.A.C. 321; 83 C.C.C.(3d) 346, refd to. [para. 58, footnote 86].

R. v. Fleury (1990), 113 A.R. 77 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 60, footnote 87].

R. v. S.F.S., [1979] A.J. No. 450 (C.A), refd to. [para. 60, footnote 87].

R. v. Johnas et al. (1982), 41 A.R. 183; 2 C.C.C.(3d) 490 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 60, 407, footnote 87].

R. v. T.S. (1991), 110 A.R. 238 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 60, footnote 87].

R. v. Engelhardt (N.J.) (1999), 228 A.R. 337; 188 W.A.C. 337; 1999 ABCA 4, refd to. [para. 60, footnote 87].

R. v. Chung (K.P.) et al. (1999), 232 A.R. 193; 195 W.A.C. 193; 1999 ABCA 86, leave to appeal denied (2000), 253 N.R. 193; 266 A.R. 373; 228 W.A.C. 373 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 60, footnote 88].

R. v. Hewlett (J.J.) (2002), 312 A.R. 165; 281 W.A.C. 165; 167 C.C.C.(3d) 425; 2002 ABCA 179, refd to. [para. 60, footnote 88].

R. v. Nguyen (K.H.) (2007), 404 A.R. 281; 394 W.A.C. 281; 2007 ABCA 138, refd to. [para. 60, footnote 88].

R. v. MacIntyre and Liron (1992), 135 A.R. 166; 33 W.A.C. 166 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 60, footnote 89].

R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309; 80 N.R. 161; 82 N.S.R.(2d) 271; 207 A.P.R. 271, refd to. [para. 64, footnote 95].

Wong v. R., [2001] HCA 64; 207 C.L.R. 584, refd to. [para. 70, footnote 100].

R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368; 43 N.R. 361; 68 C.C.C.(2d) 477, refd to. [para. 73, footnote 103].

R. v. Shropshire (M.T.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227; 188 N.R. 284; 65 B.C.A.C. 37; 106 W.A.C. 37; 102 C.C.C.(3d) 193; 129 D.L.R.(4th) 657, refd to. [paras. 74, 312, footnote 104].

R. v. G.W., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 597; 247 N.R. 135; 181 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 139; 550 A.P.R. 139; 138 C.C.C.(3d) 23, refd to. [para. 74, footnote 107].

R. v. Charters (K.-L.) (2004), 366 A.R. 381; 2004 ABQB 533, refd to. [para. 74, footnote 107].

R. v. L.F.W., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 132; 249 N.R. 345; 185 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1; 562 A.P.R. 1; 2000 SCC 6, refd to. [paras. 76, 432, footnote 111].

R. v. Stone (B.T.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290; 239 N.R. 201; 123 B.C.A.C. 1; 201 W.A.C. 1; 134 C.C.C.(3d) 353; 173 D.L.R.(4th) 66, appld. [para. 76, footnote 111]; refd to. [para. 327].

R. v. R.E.M., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3; 380 N.R. 47; 260 B.C.A.C. 40; 439 W.A.C. 40; 2008 SCC 51, refd to. [para. 77, footnote 114].

R. v. Gagnon (L.), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621; 347 N.R. 355; 207 C.C.C.(3d) 353; 2006 SCC 17, refd to. [para. 77, footnote 115].

R. v. Sheppard (C.), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869; 284 N.R. 342; 211 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 50; 633 A.P.R. 50; 162 C.C.C.(3d) 298; 2002 SCC 26, refd to. [para. 78, footnote 117].

R. v. Teskey (L.M.), [2007] 2 S.C.R. 267; 364 N.R. 164; 412 A.R. 361; 404 W.A.C. 361; [2007] 8 W.W.R. 385; 2007 SCC 25, refd to. [para. 79, footnote 121].

R. v. Goodstoney (G.E.) (2008), 440 A.R. 357; 438 W.A.C. 357; 2008 ABCA 401, refd to. [para. 79, footnote 122].

R. v. Feeney (M.), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13; 212 N.R. 83; 91 B.C.A.C. 1; 148 W.A.C. 1; 115 C.C.C.(3d) 129, refd to. [para. 80, footnote 123].

R. v. Crazybull (C.D.) (1993), 141 A.R. 69; 46 W.A.C. 69 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 83, footnote 127].

R. v. Power (K.M.) (2002), 311 A.R. 27; 2002 ABQB 153, refd to. [para. 83, footnote 128].

Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; 228 N.R. 203, refd to. [para. 84, footnote 129].

Cooper v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854; 204 N.R. 1; 140 D.L.R.(4th) 193, refd to. [para. 84, footnote 130].

Bell v. Canadian Human Rights Commission - see Cooper v. Canadian Human Rights Commission.

United States of America v. Burns and Rafay, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; 265 N.R. 212; 148 B.C.A.C. 1; 243 W.A.C. 1; 151 C.C.C.(3d) 97; 2001 SCC 7, refd to. [para. 84, footnote 130].

Rice, P.C.J. v. New Brunswick, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405; 282 N.R. 201; 245 N.B.R.(2d) 299; 636 A.P.R. 299; 209 D.L.R.(4th) 564; 2002 SCC 13, refd to. [para. 84, footnote 130].

Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance) - see Rice, P.C.J. v. New Brunswick.

Application Under Section 83.28 of the Criminal Code, Re, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248; 322 N.R. 205; 199 B.C.A.C. 45; 326 W.A.C. 45; 2004 SCC 42, refd to. [para. 84, footnote 130].

R. v. Kang-Brown (G.), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456; 373 N.R. 67; 432 A.R. 1; 424 W.A.C. 1; 2008 SCC 18, refd to. [para. 84, footnote 130].

A.S. et al. v. United Kingdom (Secretary of State for the Home Department), [2009] N.R. Uned. 198; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 138; [2009] UKHL 32, refd to. [para. 85, footnote 131].

R. (ex rel. Purdy) v. United Kingdom (Director of Public Prosecutions), [2009] N.R. Uned. 207; [2009] UKHL 45; [2010] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 1, refd to. [para. 85, footnote 131].

R. v. Song (Z.) (2009), 257 O.A.C. 221; 249 C.C.C.(3d) 289; 2009 ONCA 896, refd to. [para. 85, footnote 132].

R. v. F.H.A. (2010), 487 A.R. 122; 495 W.A.C. 122; 2010 ABCA 99, refd to. [para. 85, footnote 132].

R. v. Ostertag (T.K.) (2000), 266 A.R. 57; 228 W.A.C. 57; 2000 ABCA 232, refd to. [paras. 87, 327, footnote 133].

Vriend et al. v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493; 224 N.R. 1; 212 A.R. 237; 168 W.A.C. 237; 156 D.L.R.(4th) 385, refd to. [para. 88, footnote 135].

R. v. Mills (B.J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668; 248 N.R. 101; 244 A.R. 201; 209 W.A.C. 201; 139 C.C.C.(3d) 321; 180 D.L.R.(4th) 1, refd to. [para. 88, footnote 135].

Reference Re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3; 217 N.R. 1; 206 A.R. 1; 156 W.A.C. 1; 121 Man.R.(2d) 1; 158 W.A.C. 1; 156 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1; 483 A.P.R. 1; 118 C.C.C.(3d) 193, refd to. [para. 88, footnote 136].

Doucet-Boudreau et al. v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) et al., [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3; 312 N.R. 1; 218 N.S.R.(2d) 311; 687 A.P.R. 311; 2003 SCC 62, refd to. [para. 88, footnote 137].

R. v. Tallman, Tallman, Laboucan and Auger (1989), 94 A.R. 251; 48 C.C.C.(3d) 81 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 83, footnote 138].

R. v. T.E. (1985), 65 A.R. 353 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 96, footnote 140].

R. v. Matwiy (S.B.) and Langston (J.D.) (1996), 178 A.R. 356; 110 W.A.C. 356; 105 C.C.C.(3d) 251 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 96, footnote 140].

R. v. Bulat (J.A.) (1996), 184 A.R. 391; 122 W.A.C. 391 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 96, footnote 140].

R. v. Laberge (K.K.) (1995), 165 A.R. 375; 89 W.A.C. 375 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 97, footnote 143].

R. v. Konkolus (1988), 86 A.R. 144; 58 Alta. L.R.(2d) 289; 6 M.V.R.(2d) 220; 1988 CarswellAlta 54 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 98, footnote 145].

R. v. Bibi, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1193; 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 177 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 101, footnote 150].

R. v. Billam, [1986] 1 All E.R. 985; 82 Cr. App. Rep. 347 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 102, footnote 153].

Attorney General's Reference (No. 128 of 2001), [2002] EWCA Crim. 388; [2002] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 66, refd to. [para. 102, footnote 153].

R. v. Wells (J.W.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207; 250 N.R. 364; 250 A.R. 273; 213 W.A.C. 273; 141 C.C.C.(3d) 369; [2000] 3 W.W.R. 613; 30 C.R.(5th) 254; 2000 SCC 10, consd. [para. 106, footnote 159]; refd to. [para. 325].

R. v. Maskill (1981), 29 A.R. 107; 58 C.C.C.(2d) 408 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 107, footnote 160].

R. v. Law (B.K.) (2007), 409 A.R. 190; 402 W.A.C. 190; 2007 ABCA 203, folld. [para. 108, footnote 161]; refd to. [para. 324].

R. v. Henry (D.B.) et al., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609; 342 N.R. 259; 376 A.R. 1; 360 W.A.C. 1; 219 B.C.A.C. 1; 361 W.A.C. 1; 2005 SCC 76, refd to. [paras. 115, 413, footnote 169].

R. v. Ilesic (B.C.) (2000), 271 A.R. 195; 234 W.A.C. 195; 2000 ABCA 254, refd to. [paras. 116, 327, footnote 170].

R. v. Rahime (S.) et al. (2001), 286 A.R. 377; 253 W.A.C. 377; 2001 ABCA 203, refd to. [paras. 116, 327, footnote 170].

R. v. Christie (R.D.) (2004), 357 A.R. 47; 334 W.A.C. 47; 2004 ABCA 287, refd to. [paras. 116, 327, footnote 170].

R. v. Longtin (J.A.E.) (2001), 159 B.C.A.C. 315; 259 W.A.C. 315; 2001 BCCA 614, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. R.K., [1983] A.J. No. 216 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Anderson (K.M.) (2007), 246 B.C.A.C. 191; 406 W.A.C. 191; 2007 BCCA 462, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Ross (P.S.) (1999), 138 Man.R.(2d) 75; 202 W.A.C. 75 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Bernier (D.C.) (2003), 179 B.C.A.C. 218; 295 W.A.C. 218; 177 C.C.C.(3d) 137; 2003 BCCA 134, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Pakoo (K.G.) (2004), 190 Man.R.(2d) 133; 335 W.A.C. 133; 2004 MBCA 157, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Waugh (R.W.) (2006), 297 N.B.R.(2d) 303; 771 A.P.R. 303; 2006 NBCA 25, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Best (A.D.) (2006), 248 N.S.R.(2d) 343; 789 A.P.R. 343; 2006 NSCA 116, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

Attorney General's Reference (No. 72 of 2008), [2009] EWCA Crim. 893, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Kane, 2005 QCCA 753, leave to appeal denied (2006), 354 N.R. 198 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Cook, 2009 QCCA 2423, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Sidhu, 2009 QCCA 2441, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Madden (K.) (1996), 88 O.A.C. 153; 104 C.C.C.(3d) 548 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Collins (D.A.) (2004), 363 A.R. 30; 343 W.A.C. 30; 2004 ABCA 356, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Woods (L.) (2008), 310 Sask.R. 16; 423 W.A.C. 16; 2008 SKCA 40, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Iron (L.J.) (2005), 269 Sask.R. 51; 357 W.A.C. 51; 2005 SKCA 84, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Charles (A.D.) (2008), 311 Sask.R. 216; 428 W.A.C. 216; 236 C.C.C.(3d) 92; 2008 SKCA 108, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. R.D.C. (2005), 200 O.A.C. 147 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. G.B. (2008), 234 O.A.C. 363; 2008 ONCA 179, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. J.R. et al., [2008] O.A.C. Uned. 698; 59 C.R.(6th) 158; 2008 ONCA 200, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. Borkowsky (H.) (2008), 225 Man.R.(2d) 117; 419 W.A.C. 127; 2008 MBCA 2, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. J.M.F. (2009), 251 Man.R.(2d) 3; 478 W.A.C. 3; 2009 MBCA 109, refd to. [para. 120, footnote 172].

R. v. D.D. (2002), 157 O.A.C. 323; 163 C.C.C.(3d) 471; 58 O.R.(3d) 788 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 129, footnote 184].

R. v. Foster (R.J.) et al. (1997), 161 N.S.R.(2d) 371; 477 A.P.R. 371 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 129, footnote 184].

R. v. Butler (D.A.) (2008), 270 N.S.R.(2d) 225; 865 A.P.R. 225; 239 C.C.C.(3d) 97; 2008 NSCA 102, refd to. [para. 129, footnote 184].

R. v. Muswagon (N.C.) (1993), 88 Man.R.(2d) 319; 51 W.A.C. 319 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 129, footnote 184].

R. v. Zong (1986), 72 N.S.R.(2d) 432; 173 A.P.R. 432 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 129, footnote 184].

R. v. Jackson (D.H.) (1994), 116 Sask.R. 146; 59 W.A.C. 146; 87 C.C.C.(3d) 56 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 129, footnote 184].

R. v. A.W.C. (2007), 304 Sask.R. 224; 413 W.A.C. 224; 2007 SKCA 87, refd to. [para. 129, footnote 184].

R. v. L.D.H. (2009), 343 Sask.R. 235; 472 W.A.C. 235; 2009 SKCA 135, refd to. [para. 129, footnote 184].

R. v. Foster (1984), 54 A.R. 372; 13 C.C.C.(3d) 435 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 129, footnote 185].

R. v. Tang (P.) (1997), 200 A.R. 70; 146 W.A.C. 70 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 129, footnote 185].

R. v. Ferguson (M.E.), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96; 371 NR. 231; 425 A.R. 79; 418 W.A.C. 79; 2008 SCC 6, refd to. [para. 131, footnote 187].

R. v. Kootenay (C.M.) (1994), 149 A.R. 41; 63 W.A.C. 41; 87 C.C.C.(3d) 109, refd to. [para. 136, footnote 195].

R. v. Profit, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 637; 159 N.R. 395; 68 O.A.C. 37; 85 C.C.C.(3d) 232, refd to. [para. 136, footnote 195].

R. v. McCraw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72; 128 N.R. 299; 49 O.A.C. 47, refd to. [para. 141, footnote 200].

R. v. Wells (J.W.) (1998), 216 A.R. 61; 175 W.A.C. 61 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 143, footnote 203].

R. v. Hastings (1985), 58 A.R. 108; 19 C.C.C.(3d) 86 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 164, footnote 211].

R. v. Neve (L.C.) (1999), 237 A.R. 201; 197 W.A.C. 201; 137 C.C.C.(3d) 97; 1999 ABCA 206, refd to. [para. 164, footnote 211].

R. v. D.W.G. (1999), 244 A.R. 176; 209 W.A.C. 176; 75 Alta. L.R.(3d) 196; 1999 ABCA 270, refd to. [paras. 171, 418, footnote 213].

R. v. Angelillo (G.), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 728; 355 N.R. 226; 2006 SCC 55, refd to. [para. 174, footnote 220].

R. v. Seaboyer and Gayme, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577; 128 N.R. 81; 48 O.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 177, footnote 224].

H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General) et al., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401; 333 N.R. 1; 262 Sask.R. 1; 347 W.A.C. 1; 2005 SCC 25, refd to. [para. 177, footnote 225].

X v. R.D.M., [2008] 1 S.C.R. 27; 370 N.R. 365; 250 B.C.A.C. 3; 416 W.A.C. 3; 53 C.C.L.T.(3d) 161; 2008 SCC 4, refd to. [para. 177, footnote 225].

R. v. Almon (J.D.) (1999), 250 A.R. 157; 213 W.A.C. 157; 1999 ABCA 316, refd to. [para. 181, footnote 233].

R. v. M.F.S. (2008), 432 A.R. 387; 424 W.A.C. 387; 2008 ABCA 157, refd to. [para. 181, footnote 233].

Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co. et al., [1914] A.C. 25; 83 L.J. Ch. 79 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 183, footnote 234].

R. v. Mankow (1959), 28 W.W.R.(N.S.) 433; 124 C.C.C. 337 (Alta. C.A.), refd to. [para. 183, footnote 235].

Woods Manufacturing Co. v. R., [1951] S.C.R. 504, refd to. [para. 184, footnote 238].

R. v. Bonneteau (R.A.) (1994), 157 A.R. 138; 77 W.A.C. 138 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 184, footnote 238].

R. v. Mitchell (W.F.) (1994), 162 A.R. 109; 83 W.A.C. 109; 35 C.R.(4th) 282 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 184, footnote 238].

Ferring Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) et al. (2003), 310 N.R. 186; 2003 FCA 274, refd to. [para. 184, footnote 238].

Broome v. Cassell & Co., [1972] A.C. 1027; [1972] 1 All E.R. 801 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 184, footnote 239].

Baker v. R., [1975] A.C. 774; [1975] 3 All E.R. 55 (P.C.), refd to. [para. 184, footnote 239].

R. v. United Kingdom (Secretary of State for Work and Pensions), [2008] N.R. Uned. 271; [2008] UKHL 63; [2009] 1 A.C. 311; [2009] 2 All E.R. 556 (H.L.), refd to. [paras. 184, 191, footnotes 239, 250].

R. v. Kinnear (R.) (2005), 199 O.A.C. 323; 198 C.C.C.(3d) 232 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 184, footnote 239].

St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla (Attorney General) v. Reynolds, [1980] A.C. 637 (West Indies P.C.), refd to. [para. 184, footnote 239].

Alberta Provincial Judges' Association v. Alberta, [1999] 12 W.W.R. 66; 237 A.R. 276; 197 W.A.C. 276; 1999 ABCA 229, leave to appeal denied [2000] 1 S.C.R. xviii; 258 N.R. 194; 261 A.R. 399; 225 W.A.C. 399, refd to. [para. 184, footnote 240].

Dowsett v. Edmunds, [1926] 3 W.W.R. 447 (Alta. C.A.), refd to. [para. 184, footnote 241].

R. v. Sawchyn, [1981] 5 W.W.R. 207; 30 A.R. 314; 124 D.L.R.(3d) 600 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1981] 2 S.C.R. xi; 39 N.R. 616; 33 A.R. 198, refd to. [para. 184, footnote 241].

Nova, An Alberta Corp. v. Guelph Engineering Co. et al. and Daniel Valve Co. et al. (1984), 50 A.R. 199; 5 D.L.R.(4th) 755 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 184, footnote 241].

eBay Canada Ltd. et al. v. Minister of National Revenue (2008), 382 N.R. 261; 2008 FCA 348, refd to. [paras. 184, 396, footnote 241].

R. v. Van de Wiele (A.), [1997] 3 W.W.R. 477; 152 Sask.R. 65; 140 W.A.C. 65 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 184, footnote 241].

Barrett et al. v. Krebs et al., [1995] 10 W.W.R. 640; 174 A.R. 59; 102 W.A.C. 59 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 185, footnote 242].

Farrell v. Alexander, [1976] 3 W.L.R. 145; [1976] UKHL 5; [1977] A.C. 59, refd to. [paras. 185, 387, footnote 242].

R. v. Hayden (P.A.) (1997), 200 A.R. 279; 146 W.A.C. 279; 52 Alta. L.R.(3d) 346 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 185, 421, footnote 242].

Davis v. Johnson, [1978] 1 All E.R. 1132; [1979] A.C. 264 (H.L.), refd to. [paras. 185, 397, footnote 242].

Chekaluck v. Sallenback, [1948] 1 W.W.R. 510; [1948] 2 D.L.R. 452 (Alta. C.A.), refd to. [paras. 186, 396, footnote 243].

Domco Industries Ltd. v. Armstrong Cork Canada Ltd., Armstrong Cork Co., Armstrong Cork Industries Ltd., Armstrong Cork Inter-Americas Inc., Congoleum-Nairn Inc., Congoleum Industries Inc. and Congoleum Corp., [1981] 2 F.C. 510; 35 N.R. 181 (F.C.A.), affd. [1982] 1 S.C.R. 907; 42 N.R. 254, refd to. [para. 186, footnote 243].

Delta Acceptance Corp. v. Redman, [1966] 2 O.R. 37; 55 D.L.R.(2d) 481 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 186, 413, footnote 243].

Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., [1944] K.B. 718; [1944] All E.R. 293 (C.A.), dist. [para. 188, footnote 246]; refd to. [para. 386].

Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., [1946] A.C. 163; 79 Lloyd's. Rep. 35 (H.L.), refd to. [paras. 188, 387, footnote 247].

MT (Palestinian Territories) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2008] EWCA Civ. 1149, refd to. [para. 189, footnote 248].

Porto Seguro Companhia de Seguros Gerais v. Belcan S.A. et al., [1996] 2 F.C. 751; 195 N.R. 241 (F.C.A.), refd to. [para. 189, footnote 249].

Williams v. Glasbrook Brothers, [1947] 2 All E.R. 884 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 191, footnote 250].

Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., [1975] 3 All E.R. 801; [1976] A.C. 443 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 191, footnote 250].

Whipps Cross University NHS Tr. v. Iqbal, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1190; [2008] Pers. Inj. & Q.R. 9, refd to. [paras. 191, 397, footnote 250].

R. v. Dean (1992), 127 A.R. 376; 20 W.A.C. 376; 2 Alta. L.R.(3d) 153 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 192, 385, footnote 251].

R. v. 517653 Ontario Ltd. (1985), 10 O.A.C. 120 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 193, footnote 253].

R. v. Bell (1977), 15 O.R.(2d) 425 (C.A.), revd. [1979] 2 S.C.R. 212; 26 N.R. 457, refd to. [para. 193, footnote 253].

Murphy v. Welsh (1991), 50 O.A.C. 246 (C.A.), revd. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1069; 156 N.R. 263; 66 O.A.C. 240, refd to. [para. 195, footnote 254].

Gagnon v. Frey et al., [2005] A.R. Uned. 35; 2005 ABCA 106, refd to. [para. 196, footnote 256].

Chauvet et al. v. Workers' Compensation Board Appeals Commission (Alta.) et al. (2007), 409 A.R. 17; 402 W.A.C. 17; 2007 ABCA 155, refd to. [para. 196, footnote 256].

McDonald v. Alberta (Criminal Injuries Review Board), [2008] A.R. Uned. 300; 2008 ABCA 372, refd to. [para. 196, footnote 256].

National Steel Car Ltd. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 7135 (2006), 218 O.A.C. 207; 278 D.L.R.(4th) 345 (C.A.), leave to appeal denied (2007), 374 N.R. 389; 241 O.A.C. 395 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 197, footnote 257].

Affordable Cottages Inc. v. 772592 Ontario Inc., [2002] O.J. No. 1178 (C.A.), leave to appeal denied (2003), 317 N.R. 398; 188 O.A.C. 399 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 197, footnote 257].

Skidmore et al. v. Blackmore (1995), 55 B.C.A.C. 191; 90 W.A.C. 191; 2 B.C.L.R.(3d) 201; 122 D.L.R.(4th) 330 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 197, footnote 258].

Andreychuk v. RBC Life Insurance Co. (2008), 265 B.C.A.C. 86; 446 W.A.C. 86; 305 D.L.R.(4th) 110; 2008 BCCA 492, refd to. [para. 197, footnote 258].

R. v. Cruz (C.A.) (1995), 66 B.C.A.C. 28; 108 W.A.C. 28; 102 C.C.C.(3d) 183 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 197, footnote 258].

R. v. Osmond (G.R.) (2007), 246 B.C.A.C. 274; 406 W.A.C. 274; 227 C.C.C.(3d) 375; 2007 BCCA 470, leave to appeal denied [2008] 1 S.C.R. xii; 385 N.R. 396; 269 B.C.A.C. 319; 453 W.A.C. 319, refd to. [para. 197, footnote 258].

Thomson v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal (N.S.) et al. (2002), 205 N.S.R.(2d) 55; 643 A.P.R. 55; 2002 NSCA 58, refd to. [para. 197, footnote 259].

Langley v. North West Water Authority, [1991] 3 All E.R. 610; [1991] 1 W.L.R. 697 (C.A.), leave to appeal denied [1991] 1 W.L.R. 71 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 198, footnote 260].

Jindal Iron and Steel Co. et al. v. Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co. Jordan Inc., [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1363; 332 N.R. 323; [2005] 1 All E.R. 175; [2004] UKHL 49, refd to. [para. 199, footnote 261].

Ship Jordan II, Re - see Jindal Iron and Steel Co. et al. v. Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co. Jordan Inc.

Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd. et al., [2009] UKHL 38; 398 N.R. 201; [2009] 1 A.C. 1101 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 199, footnote 261].

Polowin (David) Real Estate Ltd. v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. (2005), 199 O.A.C. 266; 255 D.L.R.(4th) 633 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2006), 350 N.R. 398; 216 O.A.C. 400 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 199, footnote 262].

Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. et al. v. Canada et al. (2009), 245 O.A.C. 291; 2009 ONCA 59, affd. (2010), 402 N.R. 206; 482 A.R. 66; 490 W.A.C. 66; 2010 SCC 21, refd to. [para. 199, footnote 262].

Bell v. Cessna Aircraft Co., [1983] 6 W.W.R. 178; 46 B.C.L.R. 145 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 199, footnote 262].

United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Locals 527, 1370, 1598, 1907 and 2397 v. Labour Relations Board (B.C.) (2006), 229 B.C.A.C. 219; 379 W.A.C. 219; 272 D.L.R.(4th) 253; 2006 BCCA 364, refd to. [para. 199, footnote 262].

Miller v. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 293 N.R. 391; 220 D.L.R.(4th) 149; 2002 FCA 370, leave to appeal denied (2003), 314 N.R. 397 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 199, footnote 262].

Heinz (H.J.) Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 F.C.R. 281; 320 N.R. 300; 2004 FCA 171, affd. [2006] 1 S.C.R. 441; 347 N.R. 1; 2006 SCC 13, refd to. [para. 199, footnote 262].

R. v. Grumbo (J.) (1998), 168 Sask.R. 78; 173 W.A.C. 78; 159 D.L.R.(4th) 577 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 199, footnote 262].

R. v. Neves (J.A.), [2006] 4 W.W.R. 464; 201 Man.R.(2d) 44; 366 W.A.C. 44; 2005 MBCA 112, refd to. [para. 199, footnote 262].

Agriculture Financial Services Corp. v. Redmond (1998), 216 A.R. 321; 175 W.A.C. 321 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 199, footnote 264].

Gonzalez v. Driver Control Board (Alta.) et al. (2003), 327 A.R. 308; 296 W.A.C. 308; 2003 ABCA 112, refd to. [para. 199, footnote 264].

McAteer v. Billes et al. (2006), 397 A.R. 365; 384 W.A.C. 365; 2006 ABCA 312, leave to appeal denied (2007), 383 N.R. 395; 454 A.R. 82; 455 W.A.C. 82 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 199, footnote 264].

B., Re, [2009] N.R. Uned. 211; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 2496; [2009] UKSC 5; [2010] 1 All E.R. 22, refd to. [para. 222, footnote 272].

R. v. Kasokeo (J.R.) (2009), 324 Sask.R. 156; 451 W.A.C. 156; 2009 SKCA 48, refd to. [para. 248, footnote 290].

R. v. H.H. (2002), 158 O.A.C. 272 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 248, footnote 290].

R. v. M.R.G. (2005), 215 B.C.A.C. 288; 355 W.A.C. 288; 2005 BCCA 426, refd to. [para. 248, footnote 290].

R. v. Corson (R.G.) (2003), 186 B.C.A.C. 22; 306 W.A.C. 22; 2003 BCCA 430, refd to. [para. 248, footnote 290].

R. v. White (A.B.) (2000), 144 B.C.A.C. 131; 236 W.A.C. 131; 2000 BCCA 516, refd to. [para. 248, footnote 290].

R. v. N.R.B. (2001), 213 Sask.R. 218; 260 W.A.C. 218; 2001 SKCA 125, refd to. [para. 248, footnote 290].

R. v. N.J.R.L. (2005), 201 Man.R.(2d) 153; 366 W.A.C. 153; 2005 MBCA 152, refd to. [para. 248, footnote 290].

R. v. J.S.S. (2001), 187 Man.R.(2d) 196; 330 W.A.C. 196; 2001 MBCA 144, refd to. [para. 248, footnote 290].

R. v. Grieve (J.H.) (1999), 128 B.C.A.C. 81; 208 W.A.C. 81; 1999 BCCA 419, refd to. [para. 248, footnote 290].

R. v. Byer (G.), [2007] O.A.C. Uned. 390; 2007 ONCA 694, refd to. [para. 248, footnote 290].

R. v. Thurairajah (2008), 233 O.A.C. 265; 229 C.C.C.(3d) 331; 2008 ONCA 91, refd to. [para. 248, footnote 290].

R. v. Dingwall (D.D.) (2005), 361 A.R. 306; 339 W.A.C. 306; 2005 ABCA 14, refd to. [para. 252, footnote 291].

R. v. Wharry (W.E.) (2008), 437 A.R. 148; 433 W.A.C. 148; 2008 ABCA 293, refd to. [para. 252, footnote 291].

R. v. Nguyen (T.M.) (2008), 257 B.C.A.C. 38; 432 W.A.C. 38; 234 C.C.C.(3d) 67; 2008 BCCA 252, refd to. [para. 252, footnote 291].

R. v. Smith and Southam, 2008 QCCA 1391, refd to. [para. 252, footnote 291].

R. v. Ewanchuk (S.B.) (1998), 212 A.R. 81; 168 W.A.C. 81; 13 C.R.(5th) 324; 1998 ABCA 52, revd. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330; 235 N.R. 323; 232 A.R. 1; 195 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 269, footnote 300].

R. v. Wood (1975), 26 C.C.C.(2d) 100 (Alta. C.A.), refd to. [para. 275, footnote 304].

R. v. Willaert (1953), 16 C.R. 138; 105 C.C.C. 172 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [para. 275, footnote 305].

R. v. Mellstrom, [1975] 3 W.W.R. 385; 22 C.C.C.(2d) 472 (Alta. C.A.), refd to. [para. 275, footnote 305].

R. v. Kozy (1990), 41 O.A.C. 27; 74 O.R.(2d) 545 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 317].

R. v. Vu (S.V.) (2003), 183 B.C.A.C. 227; 301 W.A.C. 227; 2003 BCCA 339, refd to. [para. 317].

R. v. Spina (M.) (1997), 200 A.R. 133; 146 W.A.C. 133 (C.A.), refd to. [para 327].

R. v. Marchesi (R.J.) (2009), 460 A.R. 294; 462 W.A.C. 294; 2009 ABCA 304, refd to. [para. 327].

R. v. Ewanchuk (S.B.) (2002), 299 A.R. 267; 266 W.A.C. 267; 2002 ABCA 95, refd to. [para. 327].

R. v. Cuerrier (H.G.), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371; 229 N.R. 279; 111 B.C.A.C. 1; 181 W.A.C. 1; 162 D.L.R.(4th) 513, refd to. [para. 377].

R. v. McDonnell (T.E.) (1995), 169 A.R. 170; 97 W.A.C. 170 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 384].

R. v. Beaudry (M.J.) (2000), 271 A.R. 219; 234 W.A.C. 219; 2000 ABCA 243, refd to. [para. 388].

R. v. L.S.Y. (2009), 457 A.R. 15; 457 W.A.C. 15; 2009 ABCA 89, refd to. [para. 390].

R. v. Beaver (1984), 51 A.R. 159; 11 W.C.B. 443 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 407].

Osborne v. Rowlett (1880), 13 Ch. D. 774, refd to. [para. 413].

R. v. Oliver (D.E.) (1996), 187 A.R. 147; 127 W.AC. 147; 32 W.C.B.(2d) 3 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 420].

Statutes Noticed:

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 718 [para. 31]; sect. 718.1 [para. 33]; sect. 718.2 [para. 34].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Alberta Court of Appeal, Consolidated Practice Directions, Part A.3 [para. 196]; paras. A.3(b) [paras. 196, 199, footnote 263]; A.3(c), A.3(d) [para. 196]; Practice Direction A.4 [para. 213, footnote 269].

Alberta Court of Appeal, Notice to the Profession (March 27, 2000), generally [paras. 210, 211, 412, footnotes 266, 267].

Archambault Report - see Canada, Report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach.

Bickel, Alexander Mordecai, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (1978), generally [para. 88, footnote 135].

Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769), vol. 1, pp. 59 to 62 [para. 17, footnote 16]; vol. 4, c. 1, pp. 5 [para. 32, footnote 39]; 15 [para. 34, footnote 41]; 16 [para. 46, footnote 62]; 17 [paras. 34, 45, footnotes 41, 62]; 18 [para. 34, footnote 41].

Brennan, Shannon and Taylor-Butts, Andrea, Sexual Assault in Canada 2004 and 2007, in Canada, Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics Profile Series (2008), Cat. No. 85F0033M, No. 19 [para. 270, footnote 301].

British Columbia Court of Appeal, Practice Directions (February 15, 1995), Practice Direction No. 11, generally [para. 198, footnote 260].

Brown, Desmond H., The Genesis of the Canadian Criminal Code of 1892 (1989), generally [para. 19, footnote 19].

Burbridge, George Wheelock, A Digest of the Criminal Law of Canada (1890), generally [para. 19, footnote 19].

Brzozowski, Jodi-Anne, Taylor-Butts, Andrea, and Johnson, Sara, Victimization and offending among the Aboriginal population in Canada, in Canada, Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics Juristat (2006), Cat. No. 85-002-XIE, vol. 26, No. 3 [para. 294, footnote 313].

Canada, Department of Justice, The Criminal Law in Canadian Society (White Paper) (1982), generally [para. 23, footnote 24].

Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates (August 4, 1982), p. 20039 [para. 178, footnote 229].

Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, No. 013 (May 29, 2006), pp. 1619 to 1621, 1633 [para. 42, footnote 57]; 1635 [para. 42, footnote 56].

Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, No. 092 (September 20, 1994), pp. 5870 [paras. 27, 29, footnotes 36, 37]; 5871 [paras. 17, 30, footnotes 18, 37]; 5873 [para. 17, footnote 18].

Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, No. 152 (April 10, 1997), pp. 9549, 9550 [para. 39, footnote 53].

Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, No. 152 (April 11, 1997), pp. 9615, 9516 [para. 143, footnote 204].

Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, No. 210 (June 15, 1995), p. 13,922 [para. 30, footnote 38].

Canada, Report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (Archambault Report) (1987), pp. 85 [para. 25, footnote 30]; 134 [para. 53, footnote 76]; 152 [para. 52, footnote 75]; 161 to 188 [para. 24, footnote 29]; 169 [para. 23, footnote 26]; 169, 170 [para. 25, footnote 31]; 301 to 331 [para. 25, footnote 32]; 328, 329 [para. 25, footnote 33].

Canada, Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, Taking Responsibility (Daubney Report) (1988), generally [para. 23, footnote 27].

Canada, Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics Juristat (2006), Cat. No. 85-002-XIE, vol. 26, No. 3 [para. 294, footnote 313].

Canada, Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics Profile Series (2008), Cat. No. 85F0033M, No. 19 [para. 270, footnote 301].

Canadian Criminal Justice Association, Position Paper: C-9 Conditional Sentencing (October 11, 2006), online: <http://www.ccja-acjp.ca/en/c9en.html>, generally [para. 43, footnote 58].

Coke, Edward, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts (1797), c. 1, pp. 40, 41 [para. 75, footnote 108].

Côté, Pierre André, Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (3rd Ed. 2000), pp. 381 to 392 [para. 16, footnote 14]; 423 to 441 [para. 17, footnote 17].

Cross, Rupert, and Harris, J.W., Precedent in English Law (4th Ed. 1991), p. 114 [para. 381].

Cross, Rupert, The English Sentencing System (2nd Ed. 1975), p. 148 [para. 100, footnote 146].

Daubney Report - see Canada, Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, Taking Responsibility.

Decore, John V., Criminal Sentencing: The Role of the Canadian Courts of Appeal and the Concept of Uniformity (1964), 6 Crim. L.Q. 324, generally [para. 22, footnote 23].

Dias, Reginald Walter Michael, Jurisprudence (4th Ed. 1976), pp. 162 [paras. 401, 413]; 163, 181 [para. 401]; 191 [para. 422].

Driedger, Elmer A., Construction of Statutes (2nd Ed. 1983), p. 87 [para. 16, footnote 15].

Du Mont, Janice, Charging and Sentencing in Sexual Assault Cases: An Exploratory Examination (2003), 15 Can. J. Women & Law 305, pp. 305 to 330 [para. 69, footnote 99].

Gleeson, Murray, Judicial Accountability (1995), 2 Judicial Rev. 117, p. 122 [para. 78, footnote 118].

Greenberg, Daniel, Hansard, The Whole Hansard and Nothing But the Hansard (2008), 134 L.Q.R. 181, generally [para. 17, footnote 16].

Gross, Hyman, and von Hirsch, Andrew, Sentencing (1981), generally [para. 45, footnote 61].

Grosman, Brian, New Directions in Sentencing (1980), generally [para. 22, footnote 23].

Halsbury's Laws of England (1st Ed. 1910), vol. 9, pp. 232, § 499 [para. 32, footnote 39]; 409 to 411, §§ 781 to 787 [para. 74, footnote 106].

Hansard - see Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates.

Heydon, J.D., How Can Trial Courts and Intermediate Appellate Courts Develop the Law? (2009), 9 Ox. U. Cwth. L.J. 1, pp. 9 to 13 [para. 183, footnote 237].

Hogarth, John, Sentencing as a Human Process (1971), p. 6 [para. 24, footnote 28].

Hogg, Peter W., and Bushell, Allison A., The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All) (1997), 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75, generally [para. 88, footnote 135].

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Counsel:

S.D. Hughson, Q.C., and J.B. Dartana, for the appellant;

A. Simic and D.J. Song, for the respondent.

This appeal was heard on November 6, 2009, by Fraser, C.J.A., Côté, Hunt, O'Brien and Watson, JJ.A., of the Alberta Court of Appeal. The court delivered the following reserved reasons for judgment on December 2, 2010, which included the following opinions:

Fraser, C.J.A., Côté and Watson, JJ.A. - see paragraphs 1 to 300;

Hunt and O'Brien, JJ.A. (concurring in part) - see paragraphs 301 to 440.