R. v. Johnson (J.J.), (2003) 186 B.C.A.C. 161 (SCC)

• Judge: McLachlin, C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps, JJ.
• Court: Supreme Court (Canada)
• Case Date: September 26, 2003
• Jurisdiction: Canada (Federal)
• Citations: (2003), 186 B.C.A.C. 161 (SCC);2003 SCC 46;[2003] 2 SCR 357;186 BCAC 161;230 DLR (4th) 296;[2003] CarswellBC 2354;58 WCB (2d) 154;177 CCC (3d) 97;19 BCLR (4th) 243;[2004] 2 WWR 393;308 NR 333;[2003] SCJ No 45 (QL);JE 2003-1825;306 WAC 161;13 CR (6th) 205;[2003] ACS no 45

R. v. Johnson (J.J.) (2003), 186 B.C.A.C. 161 (SCC);

    306 W.A.C. 161

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

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Temp. Cite: [2003] B.C.A.C. TBEd. SE.050

Her Majesty The Queen (appellant) v. Jerimiah Josia Johnson (respondent) and Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario and Attorney General of Alberta (intervenors)

(28945; 2003 SCC 46; 2003 CSC 46)

Indexed As: R. v. Johnson (J.J.)

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin, C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps, JJ.

September 26, 2003.

Summary:

The sentencing judge found an accused convicted of sexual assault to be a dangerous offender and sentenced him to indeterminate detention. The judge did not consider the availability of the long-term offender provi­sions of the Criminal Code, finding those provisions inapplicable where the offence for which the accused was convicted pre-dated the Criminal Code amendments enacting the long-term offender provisions. The accused appealed.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal, Saunders, J.A., dissenting, in a judgment reported (2001), 159 B.C.A.C. 255; 259 W.A.C. 255, allowed the appeal, set aside the dangerous offender designation and ordered a new hearing. The court held that s. 11(i) of the Charter (benefit of lesser punish­ment) entitled the accused to the benefit of the long-term offender provisions notwith­standing that the sexual assault predated the amendments. The Crown appealed. At issue was (1) whether, under the current regime, a sentencing judge had to consider the long-term offender provisions prior to de­claring an accused dangerous and subject to an indeterminate sentence and (2) whether a sentencing judge must take into account the long-term offender provisions where the predicate offence pre-dated the enactment of the long-term offender provisions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. A sentencing judge had to con­sider the long-term offender provisions be­fore declaring an offender dangerous and impos­ing the mandatory indeterminate deten­tion. Further, where an offence predated the amendments enacting the long-term offender provisions, the accused was entitled to the benefit of the new long-term offender provi­sions.

Civil Rights - Topic 3131.1

Trials - Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings - Criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings - Right to benefit of lesser punishment - [See Criminal Law - Topic 6574 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 6502

Dangerous or long-term offenders - Deten­tion - General - Considerations and condi­tions precedent - If an accused met the criteria under s. 753(1) of the Criminal Code, a sentencing judge had a discretion to declare him to be a dangerous offender, which provided for a mandatory indetermi­nate sentence - If an accused was declared to be a long-term offender, he was to be sentenced to a determinate sentence of at least two years and subjected to communi­ty supervision for no more than 10 years - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "a sentencing judge must take into account the long-term offender provisions prior to declaring an offender dangerous and im­posing an indeterminate sentence. If a sentencing judge is satisfied that the sen­tencing options available under the long-term offender provisions are sufficient to reduce the threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons to an acceptable level, the sentenc­ing judge cannot properly declare an offender dangerous and thereupon impose an indeterminate sentence, even if all of the statutory criteria have been satisfied." - See paragraphs 15 to 40.

Criminal Law - Topic 6508

Dangerous or long-term offenders - Deten­tion - General - Dangerous offender - Legislation - Interpretation and application - [See Statutes - Topic 2417 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 6510

Dangerous or long-term offenders - Deten­tion - General - Powers of judge - [See Criminal Law - Topic 6502 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 6516

Dangerous or long-term offenders - Deten­tion - General - Appeals - Scope of - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "if a court of appeal has the power to dismiss an appeal against a declaration that an offender is dangerous on the basis that the error of law has resulted in no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, that power may be exercised in only the rarest of circumstances" - See paragraph 49.

Criminal Law - Topic 6574

Dangerous or long-term offenders - Deten­tion - Sentencing - Considerations - The accused was convicted of sexual assault at a time when the Criminal Code provided for the designation of an accused as a dangerous offender, giving the sentencing judge the option of imposing a determinate or indeterminate sentence - When the accused was being sentenced, the Criminal Code had been amended to provide for a dangerous offender designation (mandatory indeterminate sentence) or a long-term offender designation (determinate sentence of two years or more plus community supervision for up to 10 years) - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "sen­tencing judges were required to consider the applicability of the long-term offender provisions. If the [accused] satisfies the long-term offender criteria and there is a reasonable possibility that the harm could be reduced to an acceptable level under the long-term offender provisions, the proper sentence, under the current regime, is not an indeterminate period of detention, but, rather, a determinate period of detention followed by a long-term supervision order. If this is the case, s. 11(i) of the Charter dictates that the [accused] is entitled to be sentenced to a period of determinate deten­tion followed by a long-term supervision order." - See paragraphs 41 to 45.

Statutes - Topic 2417

Interpretation - Interpretation of words and phrases - "May" and "shall" - Section 753(1) of the Criminal Code provided that the court "may" find an accused to be a dangerous offender if the statutory criteria were met - The Crown submitted that "may" was imperative, not discretionary; that if the criteria were met the judge "must" make a dangerous offender declar­ation - The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed - The judge retained a discretion whether to declare an offender dangerous where he met the statutory criteria - Had Parliament intended a dangerous offender designation to be automatic upon proof of the statutory criteria, the word "shall" would have been used - The court noted that "there may be circumstances in which an offender meets the statutory criteria for a dangerous offender designation but the goal of protecting the public can be achieved without indeterminate detention" - See paragraphs 15 to 20.

Cases Noticed:

R. v. Edgar (D.G.) (2003), 309 N.R. 1; 186 B.C.A.C. 199; 306 W.A.C. 199 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 1].

R. v. Smith (S.J.) (2003), 309 N.R. 5; 186 B.C.A.C. 208; 306 W.A.C. 208 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 1].

R. v. Mitchell (S.K.) (2003), 309 N.R. 8; 186 B.C.A.C. 205; 306 W.A.C. 205 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 1].

R. v. Kelly (M.E.) (2003), 309 N.R. 11; 186 B.C.A.C. 202; 306 W.A.C. 202 (S.C.C.), refd to. [para. 1].

R. v. Potvin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525; 93 N.R. 42; 21 Q.A.C. 258, refd to. [para. 16].

Brown v. Metropolitan Authority et al. (1996), 150 N.S.R.(2d) 43; 436 A.P.R. 43 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 17].

R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309; 80 N.R. 161; 82 N.S.R.(2d) 271; 207 A.P.R. 271, refd to. [para. 19].

R. v. Moore (1984), 10 C.C.C.(3d) 306 (Ont. H.C.), refd to. [para. 19].

R. v. Proulx (J.K.D.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61; 249 N.R. 201; 142 Man.R.(2d) 161; 212 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 22].

R. v. Jones (S.), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229; 166 N.R. 321; 43 B.C.A.C. 241; 69 W.A.C. 241, refd to. [para. 23].

R. v. Moore (1985), 7 O.A.C. 33; 16 C.C.C.(3d) 328 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. Boutilier (J.H.) (1995), 144 N.S.R.(2d) 293; 416 A.P.R. 293; 101 C.C.C.(3d) 1 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. Dow (D.R.) (1999), 120 B.C.A.C. 16; 196 W.A.C. 16; 134 C.C.C.(3d) 323 (C.A.), folld. [para. 25].

R. v. J.T.H. (2002), 209 N.S.R.(2d) 302; 656 A.P.R. 302 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. D.W.M., [2001] A.R. Uned. 148 (Prov. Ct.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. Neve (L.C.) (1999), 237 A.R. 201; 197 W.A.C. 201; 137 C.C.C.(3d) 97; 71 Alta. L.R.(3d) 92 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. Driver (T.M.G.), [2000] B.C.T.C. 11 (S.C.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. O.G., [2001] O.J. No. 1964 (H.C.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. Tremblay (J.G.) (2000), 274 A.R. 203; 87 Alta. L.R.(3d) 229 (Q.B.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. Roy, [1999] Q.J. No. 5648 (Sup. Ct.), revd. (2002), 167 C.C.C.(3d) 203 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. F.M., [2001] O.T.C. 931 (Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. Morin (W.J.) (1998), 173 Sask.R. 101 (Q.B.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. R.C. (1996), 145 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 271; 453 A.P.R. 271 (Nfld. C.A.), refd to. [para. 25].

R. v. Hatchwell, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 39; 3 N.R. 571, refd to. [para. 29].

R. v. Carleton (1981), 32 A.R. 181 (C.A.), affd. [1983] 2 S.C.R. 58; 52 N.R. 293; 47 A.R. 160, refd to. [para. 33].

R. v. Mitchell (S.K.) (2002), 162 B.C.A.C. 247; 264 W.A.C. 247; 161 C.C.C.(3d) 508 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 49].

R. v. Bevan and Griffith, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599; 154 N.R. 245; 64 O.A.C. 165, refd to. [para. 49].

Statutes Noticed:

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 718.2(d), sect. 718.2(e) [para. 28]; sect. 753 [para. 4]; sect. 753(1) [para. 5]; sect. 753(5) [para. 37]; sect. 753.1 [para. 6].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Driedger, Elmer A., The Construction of Statutes (4th Ed. 2002), p. 58 [para. 17].

Counsel:

William F. Ehrcke, Q.C., and Beverly MacLean, for the appellant;

Gil D. McKinnon, Q.C., and James I.S. Sutherland, for the respondent;

Robert J. Frater and David Schermbrucker, for the intervenor, Attorney General of Canada;

Ian W. Bulmer, for the intervenor, Attor­ney General of Ontario;

Goran Tomljanovic, for the intervenor, Attorney General of Alberta.

Solicitors of Record:

Ministry of Attorney General, Vancouver, B.C., for the appellant;

Gil D. MacKinnon, Q.C., and James I.S. Sutherland, Vancouver, B.C., for the respondent;

Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa, On­tario, for the intervenor, Attorney Gen­eral of Canada;

Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervenor, Attorney General of Ontario;

Attorney General of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta, for the intervenor, Attorney General of Alberta.

This appeal was heard on January 16, 2003, before McLachlin, C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada.

On September 26, 2003, Iacobucci and Arbour, JJ., jointly delivered the following judgment in both official languages for the Supreme Court of Canada.