R. v. Pawlowski (A.), (2009) 479 A.R. 8 (PC)

• Judge: Fradsham, P.C.J.
• Court: Provincial Court of Alberta (Canada)
• Case Date: December 07, 2009
• Citations: (2009), 479 A.R. 8 (PC);2009 ABPC 362

R. v. Pawlowski (A.) (2009), 479 A.R. 8 (PC)

MLB headnote and full text

Temp. Cite: [2009] A.R. TBEd. DE.082

In The Matter of s. 24(1) of the Judicature Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2, and s. 52, part VII of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11;

And In The Matter Of an application pursuant to ss. 2(a), (b), (c), (d), 7, and 24(1) and (2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Her Majesty The Queen v. Artur Pawlowski and The Attorney General for Alberta (intervenor)

(A08139530E; A06303706K, A06303754K, A06300394K, A08546123E, A08652604E; A06322702K; 2009 ABPC 362)

Indexed As: R. v. Pawlowski (A.)

Alberta Provincial Court

Fradsham, P.C.J.

December 7, 2009.

Summary:

The accused was the head of the Street Church Ministries, a registered religious organization that ministered to the homeless, the poor, and those involved with drugs and crime. The accused conducted services, using a sound amplification system, in a public park. He had a permit to do so. Following noise complaints by residents, the permit was not renewed. The accused continued to use a sound amplification system in the park. He was ticketed for violating a city bylaw respecting sound amplification. Several days later, he conducted a service on a sidewalk next to the park, placing the speakers on the sidewalk as close to the park as he could get. The accused was charged with violating a city bylaw respecting placing material on a sidewalk. On two other occasions, the accused placed signs, tables, banners, etc., in front of city hall and on a public sidewalk. He was ticketed for violating a bylaw respecting placing material on a street. On another occasion, he used a sound amplification system mounted on a vehicle and was charged under the Traffic Safety Act with making loud and unnecessary noise from a motor vehicle. Finally, the accused used a "boom box" to amplify his voice on a street corner and was charged with "stunting" under the Act. The tickets were in response to multiple public complaints concerning the noise levels, which had prompted the city not to renew permits allowing the organization to use an amplification system in the park. The accused had been charged under s. 17(1)(a) of the city's Street Bylaw (placing "material" on a street without a permit), s. 21(e) of the city's Parks and Pathways Bylaw (operating an amplification system without a permit), s. 115(2)(e) of the Traffic Safety Act (engaging in a stunt or activity likely to distract, etc., highway users) and s. 82 of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation (causing loud and unnecessary noise from a vehicle). The accused challenged the constitutionality of the provisions of the bylaws, regulation and Act on the ground that they were overly broad and vague. The challenged sections also allegedly violated the accused's freedom of religion (Charter, s. 2(a)) and freedom of expression (s. 2(b)). The accused also claimed that the bylaw officers and police were guilty of abusive conduct.

The Alberta Provincial Court held as follows: (1) s. 17(1)(a) of the Street Bylaw and s. 82 of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation were impermissibly vague and overly broad. Section 21(e) of the Parks and Pathways Bylaw and s. 115(2)(e) of the Traffic Safety Act were not impermissibly vague or overly broad; (2) ss. 17(1)(a) and 21(e) infringed freedom of religion (Charter, s. 2(a)). Sections 115(2)(e) and 82 did not violate s. 2(a); (3) ss. 17(a)(a), 21(e) and 82 violated freedom of expression (Charter, s. 2(b)). Section 115(2)(e) did not violate s. 2(b); (4) ss. 17(1)(a), 21(e) and 82 were not saved as reasonable limits prescribed by law under s. 1 of the Charter and were declared to be of no force and effect; (5) the bylaw officers and police were guilty of abusive conduct towards the accused, but this was not one of those "clearest" of cases where a stay of proceedings was warranted; and (6) the accused was not guilty of "stunting" under s. 115(2)(e), as his activities would not distract, startle or interfere with highway users.

Civil Rights - Topic 303

Freedom of conscience and religion - General - Scope of right - The Alberta Provincial Court stated that "the test to be applied in determining whether the state (or another third party) has infringed the right of freedom of religion consists of assessing whether the claimant sincerely believes in a belief or practice that has a nexus with his or her religious beliefs - assessed subjectively or objectively - and whether that state action leads to an impairment that is non-trivial or not insignificant. In circumstances where the claimant's right of freedom of religion may conflict with the right or rights of others, analysis under s. 1 is likely to be more appropriate than attempting to determine the scope of the freedom of religion." - See paragraph 172.

Civil Rights - Topic 382

Freedom of conscience and religion - Infringement of - What constitutes - The accused was the head of the Street Church Ministries, a registered religious organization that ministered to the homeless, etc. - He conducted services, using a sound amplification system, in a public park - He had a permit to do so - Following noise complaints by residents, the permit was not renewed - The accused continued to use a sound amplification system in the park - He was ticketed for violating a city bylaw respecting sound amplification - Several days later, he conducted a service on a sidewalk next to the park, placing the speakers on the sidewalk as close to the park as he could get - He was charged with violating a city bylaw respecting placing material on a sidewalk - On two other occasions, the accused placed signs, tables, banners, etc., in front of city hall and on a public sidewalk - He was ticketed for violating a bylaw respecting placing material on a street - On another occasion, he used a sound amplification system mounted on a vehicle and was charged under the Traffic Safety Act with causing loud and unnecessary noise from a motor vehicle - Finally, the accused used a "boom box" to amplify his voice on a street corner and was charged with "stunting" under the Act - The tickets were in response to multiple public complaints concerning the noise levels, which had prompted the city not to renew permits allowing the organization to use an amplification system in the park - The accused was charged under s. 17(1)(a) of the city's Street Bylaw (placing "material" on a street without a permit), s. 21(e) of the city's Parks and Pathways Bylaw (operating an amplification system without a permit), s. 115(2)(e) of the Traffic Safety Act (engaging in a stunt or activity likely to distract, etc., highway users) and s. 82 of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation (causing loud and unnecessary noise from a vehicle) - The Alberta Provincial Court held that s. 17(1)(a) violated the accused's right to freedom of religion (Charter, s. 2(a)) and was not saved as a reasonable limit prescribed by law under s. 1 of the Charter - The remaining three challenged sections did not infringe freedom of religion - See paragraphs 233 to 254.

Civil Rights - Topic 1803

Freedom of speech or expression - General principles - Freedom of expression - Scope of - The Alberta Provincial Court stated that the two-step analysis for determining whether a particular government action violated freedom of expression was "(1) Was the plaintiff's activity within the sphere of conduct protected by freedom of expression? (2) Was the purpose or effect of the government action to restrict freedom of expression?". ... while the values underlying freedom of expression have exceptional importance in allowing for citizen participation in a free and democratic society, when that expression takes on certain forms (e.g., being libellous, or threatening), or occurs in places where such expression is incompatible with the fundamental purpose of the place, limits on the freedom are permissible. When considering expression that occurs in a public place, a court must undertake a balancing of rights, as between the individual seeking to express himself or herself and the members of the public who may be using the space for other legitimate purposes." - See paragraphs 176, 186.

Civil Rights - Topic 1845

Freedom of speech or expression - Limitations on - Resulting from regulation of streets - [See Civil Rights - Topic 1850.9 ].

Civil Rights - Topic 1850.9

Freedom of speech or expression - Limitations on - Noise bylaws - The accused was the head of the Street Church Ministries, a registered religious organization that ministered to the homeless, etc. - He conducted services, using a sound amplification system, in a public park - He had a permit to do so - Following noise complaints by residents, the permit was not renewed - The accused continued to use a sound amplification system in the park - He was ticketed for violating a city bylaw respecting sound amplification - Several days later, he conducted a service on a sidewalk next to the park, placing the speakers on the sidewalk as close to the park as he could get - He was charged with violating a city bylaw respecting placing material on a sidewalk - On two other occasions, the accused placed signs, tables, banners, etc., in front of city hall and on a public sidewalk - He was ticketed for violating a bylaw respecting placing material on a street - On another occasion, he used a sound amplification system mounted on a vehicle and was charged under the Traffic Safety Act with causing loud and unnecessary noise from a motor vehicle - Finally, the accused used a "boom box" to amplify his voice on a street corner and was charged with "stunting" under the Act - The tickets were in response to multiple public complaints concerning the noise levels, which had prompted the city not to renew permits allowing the organization to use an amplification system in the park - The accused was charged under s. 17(1)(a) of the city's Street Bylaw (placing "material" on a street without a permit), s. 21(e) of the city's Parks and Pathways Bylaw (operating an amplification system without a permit), s. 115(2)(e) of the Traffic Safety Act (engaging in a stunt or activity likely to distract, etc., highway users) and s. 82 of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation (causing loud and unnecessary noise from a vehicle) - The Alberta Provincial Court held that ss. 17(1)(a), 21(e) and 82 infringed the accused's right to freedom of expression (Charter, s. 2(b)) and were not saved as reasonable limits prescribed by law under s. 1 - Section 115(2)(e) did not infringe freedom of expression - See paragraphs 255 to 283.

Civil Rights - Topic 3107

Trials - Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings - Void for vagueness doctrine - The Alberta Provincial Court stated that "statutory language may be imprecise, and yet not fall into the category of unconstitutional vagueness unless the provision, subject to 'a sensible construction', still fails to provide even an 'intelligible standard' or 'sufficient guidance' for its application. Further, though, the discretion of law enforcement officials must be limited within the law - not merely by the application of the law - with the restraint on government power being clear from a reasonable interpretation of the impugned statute. Conversely, the law itself should provide fair notice to an individual whether his or her conduct falls within the scope of some legislative scheme." - See paragraph 156.

Civil Rights - Topic 3107

Trials - Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings - Void for vagueness doctrine - [See Highways - Topic 5885 , Motor Vehicles - Topic 4279 , Municipal Law - Topic 3767 and Municipal Law - Topic 3780 ].

Civil Rights - Topic 3107.2

Trials - Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings - Overbreadth principle - [See Highways - Topic 5885 , Motor Vehicles - Topic 4279 , Municipal Law - Topic 3767 and Municipal Law - Topic 3780 ].

Civil Rights - Topic 3157.4

Trials - Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings - Criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings - Abuse of process - The Alberta Provincial Court stated that "abuse of process can be said ... to relate to a prosecution that offends the community's basic sense of decency and fair play and calls into question the integrity of the justice system. Whether the allegation relates to specious or malicious charges being brought against an individual, or to inappropriate actions by a prosecutor when, for example, in contact with potential witnesses, no court can be drawn into justifying such activities by allowing a trial to proceed in the circumstances. However, undeniably, even allowing for the intersection of analyses under the common law and under the Charter, the granting of a stay in response to evidence of abuse of process remains reserved for only the 'clearest of cases'" - See paragraph 193.

Civil Rights - Topic 3157.4

Trials - Due process, fundamental justice and fair hearings - Criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings - Abuse of process - The accused was the head of the Street Church Ministries, a registered religious organization that ministered to the homeless, etc. - He conducted services, using a sound amplification system, in a public park - He had a permit to do so - Following noise complaints by residents, the permit was not renewed - The accused continued to use a sound amplification system in the park - He was ticketed for violating a city bylaw respecting sound amplification - Several days later, he conducted a service on a sidewalk next to the park, placing the speakers on the sidewalk as close to the park as he could get - He was charged with violating a city bylaw respecting placing material on a sidewalk - On two other occasions, the accused placed signs, tables, banners, etc., in front of city hall and on a public sidewalk - He was ticketed for violating a bylaw respecting placing material on a street - On another occasion, he used a sound amplification system mounted on a vehicle and was charged under the Traffic Safety Act with causing loud and unnecessary noise from a motor vehicle - Finally, the accused used a "boom box" to amplify his voice on a street corner and was charged with "stunting" under the Act - The tickets were in response to multiple public complaints concerning the noise levels, which had prompted the city not to renew permits allowing the organization to use an amplification system in the park - The accused was charged under s. 17(1)(a) of the city's Street Bylaw (placing "material" on a street without a permit), s. 21(e) of the city's Parks and Pathways Bylaw (operating an amplification system without a permit), s. 115(2)(e) of the Traffic Safety Act (engaging in a stunt or activity likely to distract, etc., highway users) and s. 82 of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation (causing loud and unnecessary noise from a vehicle) - The Alberta Provincial Court stated that "I am concerned by the actions of certain City officials. ... Perhaps not 'the clearest of cases' of abuse of power, the City's attempts, through Bylaw Officers and police officers, to limit the scope of the efforts by the accused to minister to his congregants, fall precariously close to being excessive and, to any reasonable observer, an abuse of power" - See paragraphs 284 to 292.

Civil Rights - Topic 8348

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Application - Exceptions - Reasonable limits prescribed by law (Charter, s. 1) - The Alberta Provincial Court stated that "there are two distinct ways in which vagueness or overbreadth of a particular piece of legislation may negatively affect the constitutionality of that legislation. First, in what has been called the 'threshold' approach, a piece of legislation may be so vague that it fails to constitute a 'limit prescribed by law', preventing any reasoned analysis under s. 1 of the Charter. ... Second, ... a piece of legislation, despite having passed this 'threshold' test 'may not qualify as a reasonable limit. Generality and imprecision of language may fail to confine the invasion of a Charter right within reasonable limits. In this sense vagueness is an aspect of overbreadth.' ... statutory vagueness leading to wide discretionary powers should not, in and of itself, disentitle a law to s. 1 scrutiny. Only when a law, as a result of vagueness, 'could truly be described as failing to offer an intelligible standard' would a circumventing of the s. 1 balancing analysis be justified." - See paragraphs 152 to 154.

Civil Rights - Topic 8348

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Application - Exceptions - Reasonable limits prescribed by law (Charter, s. 1) - The Alberta Provincial Court stated that "analysis under s. 1 ... asks to broad questions: (1) Does the impugned legislation seek to address a pressing and substantial objective? (2) Does the impugned legislation reflect proportionality in addressing the objective? Within the second question, a court is called upon to ask whether there is a rational connection between the legislation and the objective, whether the legislation constitutes only a minimal impairment of a Charter right, and whether the benefits of the legislation are sufficient to outweigh the negatives of the infringement on the Charter right." - See paragraph 190.

Civil Rights - Topic 8380.2

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Denial of rights - Remedies - Declaration of statute invalidity - The Alberta Provincial Court, discussing the court's jurisdiction to grant a declaration of statute invalidity for a Charter breach, stated that "this court is not empowered to make broad declarations on invalidity other than within the context of adjudicating a specific allegation of violation of the legislative provision" - See paragraph 196.

Criminal Law - Topic 255

Abuse of process - Power of court - Re prevention and remedies - [See second Civil Rights - Topic 3157.4 ].

Highways - Topic 5885

Offences - Use of highways - Stunts - What constitute - Section 115(2)(e) of the Traffic Safety Act made it an offence "to perform or engage in any stunt or other activity that is likely to distract, startle or interfere with users of the highway" - The Alberta Provincial Court stated that "the offence of 'stunting' has been the subject of judicial interpretation and, in that interpretation, has been defined as engaging in either a 'stunt' or in another activity likely to frighten, surprise, shock, perplex, or confuse other users of the highway, and has been defined to not include activities that simply draw attention to the participant, or which otherwise attract the notice of other users of the highway" - The court rejected the submission that s. 115(2)(e) was vague or overly broad - In any event, the court would have found the accused not guilty under s. 115(2)(e), as his conduct did not distract or startle any drivers and did not create a danger to the motoring public - See paragraphs 212, 231, 232, 300 to 304.

Highways - Topic 5886

Offences - Use of highways - Distracting, startling or interfering with other users - [See Highways - Topic 5885 ].

Motor Vehicles - Topic 4279

Offences - Particular offences - Vehicle noise - Section 82(a) of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation made it an offence to "create or cause the emission of any loud and unnecessary noise from a vehicle" - The Alberta Provincial Court held that s. 82(a) was vague and overly broad, stating that "the term 'unnecessary' is, at best, vague, offering no intelligible standard, and, at worst, overbroad. Only the term 'loud' offers any precision" - If s. 82(a) was not vague or overly broad, the infringement of s. 7 of the Charter could not be saved under s. 1 - The court stated that "I accept that there is a pressing and substantial concern relating to the need to ensure that noise pollution from the operation of motor vehicles is kept to a minimum. ... In considering the proportionality of the impugned section, I accept that there is a rational connection between the provision and the concern, but, given its potential breadth, I find that the impairment created by the section is not one that is minimal." - See paragraphs 227 to 230.

Municipal Law - Topic 3767

Bylaws - Particular bylaws (incl. scope of) - Noise control bylaw - Section 21(e) of Calgary's Parks and Pathways Bylaw provided that "no person, while in a Park, shall operate an amplification system except in an area where such activity is specifically allowed by the Director" - The Alberta Provincial Court held that "it is not credible to say that there is no 'intelligible standard' or that sufficient debate would be precluded by vagueness in the law. Reasonable parties would have sufficient notice that the use of a sound amplification system in a city park, without a permit, could result in an infraction. The law is not vague or overly broad." - See paragraphs 224 to 225.

Municipal Law - Topic 3780

Bylaws - Particular bylaws (incl. scope of) - Littering bylaw - Section 17(1)(a) of Calgary's Street Bylaw made it an offence to "place, dispose, direct or allow to be placed, directed, or disposed, any Material belonging to that person or over which that person exercises control, on any portion of a Street" - "Street" included, by definition, a sidewalk - The Alberta Provincial Court held that s. 17(1) was vague and overly broad - The court stated that "the term 'material' is both vague and, by potentially capturing so many objects or articles, overly broad. By failing to provide notice to individuals regarding what behaviour is or is not acceptable under s. 17(1) of the Street Bylaw, I am inclined to conclude that the term 'material' is so vague as to constitute a breach of fundamental justice, and that breach fails to meet the threshold for a s. 1 analysis." - See paragraphs 221 to 222.

Cases Noticed:

R. v. Heywood (R.L.), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761; 174 N.R. 81; 50 B.C.A.C. 161; 82 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 147].

Reference Re Sections 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123; 109 N.R. 81; 68 Man.R.(2d) 1, refd to. [para. 149].

R. v. Zundel (1987), 18 O.A.C. 161; 31 C.C.C.(3d) 97 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 150].

Osborne, Millar and Barnhart et al. v. Canada (Treasury Board) et al., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69; 125 N.R. 241, refd to. [para. 152].

Taylor and Western Guard Party v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892; 117 N.R. 191, refd to. [para. 154, footnote 10].

Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Procureur général), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; 94 N.R. 167; 24 Q.A.C. 2, refd to. [para. 154].

R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society et al. (No. 2), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606; 139 N.R. 241; 114 N.S.R.(2d) 91; 313 A.P.R. 91, refd to. [para. 155].

R. v. Edmonton Sun et al. (2003), 320 A.R. 217; 288 W.A.C. 217; 221 D.L.R.(4th) 438 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 157].

Piikani Investment Corp. et al. v. Piikani First Nation et al., [2008] A.R. Uned. 743 (Q.B.), refd to. [para. 158].

Quebec (Ville) v. L'Heureux, 1996 CarswellQue 626 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 159].

Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141; 340 N.R. 305; 2005 SCC 62, refd to. [para. 161].

Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony et al. v. Alberta (2009), 390 N.R. 202; 460 A.R. 1; 462 W.A.C. 1; 2009 SCC 37, refd to. [para. 164].

Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys et al., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256; 345 N.R. 201, refd to. [para. 164, footnote 16].

Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem et al., [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551; 323 N.R. 59, refd to. [para. 166, footnote 17].

Sheena B., Re, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315; 176 N.R. 161; 78 O.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 171].

R. v. Centre islamique du West Island, [2000] Q.J. No. 7549 (Mun. Ct.), refd to. [para. 174].

R. v. Koptyo (1987), 24 O.A.C. 81 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 175].

Cheema v. Ross et al. (1991), 2 B.C.A.C. 92; 5 W.A.C. 92; 82 D.L.R.(4th) 213 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 176, footnote 19].

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; 58 N.R. 81; 60 A.R. 161, refd to. [para. 178].

Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada et al. v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139; 120 N.R. 241, refd to. [para. 184].

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; 65 N.R. 87; 14 O.A.C. 335, refd to. [para. 187, footnote 24].

R. v. Regan (G.A.), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297; 282 N.R. 1; 201 N.S.R.(2d) 63; 629 A.P.R. 63, refd to. [para. 191, footnote 26].

R. v. Scott, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 979; 116 N.R. 361; 43 O.A.C. 277, refd to. [para. 191].

R. v. O'Connor (H.P.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411; 191 N.R. 1; 68 B.C.A.C. 1; 112 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 192].

Workers' Compensation Board (N.S.) v. Martin et al., [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504; 310 N.R. 22; 217 N.S.R.(2d) 301; 683 A.P.R. 301, refd to. [para. 195].

Director of Child Welfare (Alta.) v. Jordan, P.C.J. et al. (2000), 279 A.R. 328; 196 D.L.R.(4th) 151 (Q.B.), refd to. [para. 196].

Schachter v. Canada et al., [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679; 139 N.R. 1, refd to. [para. 202].

R. v. Jones (1983), 43 A.R. 251; 149 D.L.R.(3d) 727 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 208].

R. v. Gabrielson (1986), 76 A.R. 81 (Q.B.), refd to. [para. 213].

Arcade Amusements Inc. v. Montreal (City), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 368; 58 N.R. 339, refd to. [para. 216].

Montreal v. Morgan (1920), 60 S.C.R. 393, refd to. [para. 216, footnote 30].

Pawlowski et al. v. Calgary (City), [2007] A.R. Uned. 262 (Q.B.), refd to. [para. 218].

R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd. - see R. v. Videoflicks Ltd. et al.

R. v. Videoflicks Ltd. et al., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713; 71 N.R. 161; 19 O.A.C. 239; 55 C.R.(3d) 193, refd to. [para. 239].

Vancouver (City) v. Maurice et al. (2005), 207 B.C.A.C. 233; 341 W.A.C. 233; 2005 BCCA 37, refd to. [para. 263, footnote 39].

R. v. Jorgensen (R.) et al., [1995] 4 S.C.R. 55; 189 N.R. 1; 87 O.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 291].

Statutes Noticed:

Calgary (City) Bylaws, Parks and Pathways Bylaw, Bylaw No. 20M2003, sect. 21(e) [para. 144].

Calgary (City) Bylaws, Street Bylaw, Bylaw No. 20M88, sect. 2(16), sect. 2(21), sect. 17(1)(a) [para. 146].

Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, sect. 115(2)(e) [para. 143].

Traffic Safety Act Regulations (Alta.), Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation, Reg. 304/2002, sect. 82 [para. 141].

Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation - see Traffic Safety Act Regulations (Alta.).

Counsel:

Michael Bates and Rebecca Snukal, for Artur Pawlowski;

Sarah Clive, for the Crown;

Roy Verman, for the City of Calgary;

Donald Padget, for the Attorney General of Alberta (intervenor).

This matter was heard at Calgary, Alberta, before Fradsham, P.C.J., of the Alberta Provincial Court, who delivered the following judgment on December 7, 2009.