R. v. Summers,

• Jurisdiction: Ontario
• Judge: Cronk, Pepall and Tulloch, JJ.A.
• Neutral Citation: 2013 ONCA 147
• Citation: 2013 ONCA 147,(2013), 304 O.A.C. 322 (CA),114 OR (3d) 641,297 CCC (3d) 166,[2013] CarswellOnt 2626,[2013] OJ No 1068 (QL),105 WCB (2d) 789,304 OAC 322,114 O.R. (3d) 641,(2013), 304 OAC 322 (CA),[2013] O.J. No 1068 (QL),304 O.A.C. 322
• Date: 11 October 2012
• Court: Court of Appeal (Ontario)

R. v. Summers (S.) (2013), 304 O.A.C. 322 (CA)

MLB headnote and full text

Temp. Cite: [2013] O.A.C. TBEd. MR.021

Her Majesty the Queen (applicant/appellant) v. Sean Summers (respondent)

(C53913; 2013 ONCA 147)

Indexed As: R. v. Summers (S.)

Ontario Court of Appeal

Cronk, Pepall and Tulloch, JJ.A.

March 12, 2013.

Summary:

The accused was convicted of manslaughter for his infant daughter's death (shaken baby syndrome). At trial, the accused pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. The judge concluded that the lack of parole eligibility during remand detention warranted enhanced credit (Criminal Code, s. 719(3.1)), at the rate of 1.5:1, which amounted to 16 months. The Crown appealed on the sole ground that the sentencing judge erred by holding that the lack of remission or parole eligibility during pre-sentence custody, on its own, could justify enhanced credit under s. 719(3.1). The Crown argued that properly interpreted, s. 719(3.1) contemplated that only exceptional circumstances could justify enhanced credit and that a remand offender's loss of remission and parole eligibility during pre-sentence custody did not qualify as an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of s. 719(3.1).

The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal. The court concluded that s. 719(3.1) allowed a sentencing judge to credit pre-sentence custody at a ratio up to, but not exceeding, 1.5:1 for each day spent in pre-sentence custody where, on consideration of all relevant circumstances, such credit was necessary to achieve a fair and just sanction in accordance with the statutory scheme for sentencing and punishment set out in the Code. On a proper record, the relevant circumstances that might justify such enhanced credit included ineligibility for remission and parole while in remand custody. The sentencing judge did not err in granting enhanced credit in this case.

Criminal Law - Topic 5848.2

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Time already served - Section 719(3) of the Criminal Code provided that credit for pre-sentence custody was limited to a maximum of one day for each day spent in custody - However, under s. 719(3.1), if circumstances justified it, the maximum was one and one-half days for each day spent in custody - The Crown argued that properly interpreted, s. 719(3.1) contemplated that only exceptional circumstances could justify enhanced credit and that a remand offender's loss of remission and parole eligibility during pre-sentence custody did not qualify as an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of s. 719(3.1) - The Ontario Court of Appeal interpreted these provisions and rejected the Crown's argument - The court concluded that s. 719(3.1) allowed a sentencing judge to credit pre-sentence custody at a ratio up to, but not exceeding, 1.5:1 for each day spent in pre-sentence custody where, on consideration of all relevant circumstances, such credit was necessary to achieve a fair and just sanction in accordance with the statutory scheme for sentencing and punishment set out in the Code - On a proper record, the relevant circumstances that might justify such enhanced credit included ineligibility for remission and parole while in remand custody - A showing of exceptional circumstances was not required - See paragraphs 1 to 119.

Criminal Law - Topic 5848.2

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Time already served - The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter respecting the death of his infant daughter from shaken baby syndrome - He spent approximately 10.5 months in pre-trial custody - The sentencing judge sentenced the accused to eight years' imprisonment - The judge concluded that the lack of parole eligibility during remand detention warranted enhanced credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code at the rate of 1.5:1, which amounted to 16 months - The Crown appealed, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in law by crediting the respondent's pre-sentence custody at the rate of 1.5:1 to take account of his ineligibility for remission and parole while in remand custody - The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal - The court saw no error in the sentencing judge's ultimate conclusion that the circumstances justified the granting of enhanced credit - The court therefore deferred to the sentencing judge's ruling on this issue - See paragraphs 120 to 126.

Criminal Law - Topic 5848.2

Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Time already served - The Ontario Court of Appeal discussed the nature of the evidence required from an accused who sought to establish that the circumstances justified enhanced credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody (Criminal Code, ss. 719(3) and 719(3.1)) - The court stated that the same general principles that governed the admission of evidence and the provision of information to the court for the purpose of sentencing also applied to determining the amount of credit, if any, to be granted for pre-sentence custody under ss. 719(3) and 719(3.1) - See paragraphs 121 to 123.

Statutes - Topic 2269

Interpretation - Presumptions and rules in aid - Different phrases have different meaning - The Ontario Court of Appeal in discussing the meaning of the phrase "if the circumstances justify it" in s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, referred to the presumption of consistent expression - The court stated that "under this rule of statutory interpretation, it is presumed that Parliament 'uses language carefully and consistently so that within a statute or other legislative instrument the same words have the same meaning and different words have different meanings'" - See paragraphs 56 to 119.

Words and Phrases

If the circumstances justify it - The Ontario Court of Appeal interpreted the meaning of the phrase "if the circumstances justify it" as found in s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (i.e., the provision respecting increased credit for time served in pre-sentence custody) - See paragraphs 56 to 119.

Cases Noticed:

R. v. Carvery (L.A.) (2012), 321 N.S.R.(2d) 321; 1018 A.P.R. 321; 2012 NSCA 107, refd to. [para. 4].

R. v. Stonefish (S.T.) (2013), 288 Man.R.(2d) 103; 564 A.P.R. 103; 2012 MBCA 116, refd to. [para. 4].

R. v. Mayers (A.W.) (2011), 310 B.C.A.C. 188; 526 W.A.C 188; 2011 BCCA 365, refd to. [para. 4, footnote 2].

R. v. Lee (C.J.) (2012), 524 A.R. 22; 545 W.A.C. 22; 2012 ABCA 17, refd to. [para. 4, footnote 2].

R. v. Serdyuk (O.S.) (2012), 533 A.R. 199; 557 W.A.C. 199; 2012 ABCA 205, refd to. [para. 4, footnote 2].

R. v. Johnson (2011), 268 C.C.C.(3d) 423; 2011 ONCJ 77, refd to. [para. 5].

R. v. R.H., 2010 ONCJ 735, affd. [2011] O.A.C. Uned. 357; 2011 ONCA 396, refd to. [para. 5].

R. v. Morris (K.A.), [2011] O.T.C. Uned. 5206; 2011 ONSC 5206, refd to. [para. 5].

R. v. Hawk (C.J.), [2012] O.T.C. Uned. 4745; 2012 ONSC 4745, refd to. [para. 5].

R. v. Haly (S.), [2012] O.T.C. Uned. 2302; 2012 ONSC 2302, refd to. [para. 5].

R. v. Sloan (1947), 87 C.C.C. 198 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [para. 32].

R. v. Rezaie (M.) (1996), 96 O.A.C. 268; 31 O.R.(3d) 713 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 33].

R. v. Shropshire (M.T.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227; 188 N.R. 284; 65 B.C.A.C. 37; 106 W.A.C. 37, refd to. [para. 35].

R. v. Proulx (J.K.D.) (2000), 249 N.R. 201; 142 Man.R.(2d) 161; 212 W.A.C. 161; 2000 SCC 5, refd to. [para. 35].

R. v. Nasogaluak (L.M.), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206; 398 N.R. 107; 474 A.R. 88; 479 W.A.C. 88; 2010 SCC 6, refd to. [para. 34].

R. v. Jacko (L.) (2010), 263 O.A.C. 326; 256 C.C.C.(3d) 113; 2010 ONCA 452, refd to. [para. 35].

R. v. Wust (L.W.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455; 252 N.R. 332; 134 B.C.A.C. 236; 219 W.A.C. 236; 2000 SCC 18, refd to. [para. 35].

R. v. Ipeelee (M.) (2012), 428 N.R. 1; 288 O.A.C. 224; 318 B.C.A.C. 1; 541 W.A.C. 1; 2012 SCC 13, refd to. [para. 35].

R. v. Francis (G.) (2006), 210 O.A.C. 41; 207 C.C.C.(3d) 536; 79 O.R.(3d) 551 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 36].

R. v. McDonald (C.) (1998), 111 O.A.C. 25; 40 O.R.(3d) 641 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 37].

R. v. Monje (F.) (2011), 273 O.A.C. 392; 2011 ONCA 1, refd to. [para. 38].

R. v. Downes (C.) (2006), 208 O.A.C. 324; 79 O.R.(3d) 321 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 39].

R. v. Sooch (S.S.) (2008), 433 A.R. 270; 429 W.A.C. 270; 2008 ABCA 186, refd to. [para. 39].

R. v. Kravchov (2002), 4 C.R.(6th) 137 (Ont. C.J.), refd to. [para. 39].

R. v. Critton (P.D.), [2002] O.T.C. 451 (Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 40].

R. v. Serniak and Stepanchikov, [2002] O.J. No. 5160 (Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 40].

R. v. J.B. (2004), 187 O.A.C. 307 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 41].

R. v. Vermette (I.M.) (2001), 156 Man.R.(2d) 120; 246 W.A.C. 120; 154 C.C.C.(3d) 193; 2001 MBCA 64, refd to. [para. 42].

R. v. C.A.M., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; 194 N.R. 321; 73 B.C.A.C. 81; 120 W.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 42].

Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; 221 N.R. 241; 106 O.A.C. 1; 154 D.L.R.(4th) 193, refd to. [para. 46].

Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex et al., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559; 287 N.R. 248; 166 B.C.A.C. 1; 271 W.A.C. 1; 2002 SCC 42, refd to. [para. 47].

R. v. Vittrekwa (G.), [2011] Yukon Cases Uned. (TC) 64; 2011 YKTC 64; 275 C.C.C.(3d) 193, refd to. [para. 66].

R. v. McIntosh (B.B.), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686; 178 N.R. 161; 79 O.A.C. 81; 21 O.R.(3d) 797, refd to. [para. 81].

Németh v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2010] 3 S.C.R. 281; 408 N.R. 198; 2010 SCC 56, refd to. [para. 34].

R. v. Hamilton (M.A.) et al. (2004), 189 O.A.C. 90; 72 O.R.(3d) 1 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 98].

R. v. Mac (M.K.) (2001), 140 O.A.C. 270; 195 D.L.R.(4th) 56; 40 C.R.(5th) 138, revsd. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 856; 287 N.R. 75; 159 O.A.C. 33; 2002 SCC 24, refd to. [para. 115].

R. v. Tse (Y.F.A.) (2012), 429 N.R. 109; 321 B.C.A.C. 1; 547 W.A.C. 1; 2012 SCC 16, refd to. [para. 116].

R. v. Gomboc (D.J.), [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211; 408 N.R. 1; 490 A.R. 327; 497 W.A.C. 327; 2010 SCC 55, refd to. [para. 26].

R. v. Jackpine (R.), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554; 347 N.R. 201; 210 O.A.C. 200; 2006 SCC 15, refd to. [para. 56].

R. v. Rodgers - see R. v. Jackpine.

R. v. Joseph (D.W.) (2012), 326 B.C.A.C. 312; 554 W.A.C. 312; 2012 BCCA 359, refd to. [para. 121].

Statutes Noticed:

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 719(3), sect. 719(3.1) [para. 27].

Truth in Sentencing Act, S.C. 2009, c. 29, generally [para. 2].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Driedger, Elmer A., Construction of Statutes (2nd Ed. 1983), p. 87 [para. 46].

Sullivan, Ruth, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (5th Ed. 2008), pp. 210 [para. 90]; 466 to 480 [para. 24]; 469 [para. 72].

Trotter, Gary T., The Law of Bail in Canada (3rd Ed. 2010), p. 9-2 [para. 34].

Counsel:

Gregory J. Tweney and Molly Flanagan, for the appellant;

Timothy E. Breen, for the respondent;

Russell Silverstein, Ingrid Grant and Corbin Cawkell, for the intervener, the Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario.

This appeal was heard on October 11, 2012, before Cronk, Pepall and Tulloch, JJ.A., of the Ontario Court of Appeal. The following decision was released for the court, by Cronk, J.A., on March 12, 2013.