Spousal Support On or After Divorce

AuthorJulien D. Payne, Marilyn A. Payne
Pages216-369

 
Spousal Support On or After Divorce
A. DEFINITION OF “SPOUSE” AND “SPOUSAL SUPPORT”
Pursuant to sect ion  of the Civil Marriage Ac t, “marriage, for civil pur poses,
is the lawfu l union of two persons to the exclusion of al l others.” Consequen-
tial on thi s parliamentary recognition of t he validity of same-sex ma rriages,
section () of the Civil Marriage Ac t has amended section () of the Divorce
Act to provide that “‘spouse’ mean s either of two persons who are ma rried to
each other.” A same-sex couple, who are mar ried according to the law, may,
therefore, invoke the prima ry and corollary re lief provisions of the Divorc e Act.
e expression “spousal supp ort” is somewhat misle ading because it
includes the pay ment of support to an ex-spou se. Furthe rmore, some prov-
incial and ter ritorial st atutes impose “spousal ” support obligations on u n-
married coha bitants who have lived together for a designated period of ti me
or who are the parents of a child .
B. FORMAL LEGAL EQUALIT Y BETWEEN SPOUSES
Formal legal equ ality ex ists between d ivorcing spouses insofa r as support
rights and obligations a re concerned. A husband in need ha s just as much
right to seek spousa l support from his  nancial ly independent wife as she
has if their nancial situ ation is reversed. In realit y, divorcing or divorced
husbands rarely seek or obta in spousal support.
SC , c .
RSC  (d Supp), c . See MM v JH, [ ] OJ No  (Sup Ct).
Moge v Moge, []  SCR  at ; Rivard v Rivard,  ONSC .
Chapter : Spousal S upport On or After Divorce 
C. TYPES OF ORDERS
) Diverse Types of Orders
e diverse typ es of spousal support orders that may be gra nted pursuant to
subsection . of the Divorc e Act are as follow s:
an order to secure a lump sum;
an order to pay a lump sum;
an order to secure and pay a lump sum;
an order to secure period ic sums;
an order to pay periodic sums; a nd
an order to secure and pay period ic sums.
e court is not restricted to m aking only one t ype of order. A combina-
tion of the various t ypes of orders may be accommodated . Any of the afore-
mentioned orders may be granted by way of inter im or permanent relief,
although they are a lways subject to var iation or rescission in the e vent of a
material ch ange of circumstances.
) Nominal Orders; Final Orders
An order for nominal spou sal support is not necessary for the purpose of
preserving a f uture right to claim spousa l support following a divorce.Nom-
inal orders have, never theless, been granted where the applicant establ ishes
a present need but the respondent has no ability to pay or where t here is
no current need but there is a predict able future need. A nomin al order for
spousal support m ay be vacated on appeal where no cur rent need has been
demonstrated and any futu re need would be unrelated to t he marri age. Ac-
cording to the judgment of the Br itish Columbia Court of Appeal in Gill-S ager
v Sager, the law is unsettled on the question whether the d ismissal of an ap-
plication for spousal suppor t under section . of the Divorce Act pre cludes
the applicant from ever succee ding on a subsequent application, regardles s of
a change in his or her c ircumstances. Only the Supreme Court of C anada can
provide a denitive an swer to this question. If the applicant is d isentitled to
spousal support at t he time of the original applicat ion but might reasonably
be subsequently entitled to rel ief in the event of a change of ci rcumstances,
Traversy v Glover, [] OJ No  (Sup Ct).
Vickers v Vickers, [] NSJ No  (CA). For the sug gestion that nomina l orders are
not “support orders” w ithin the meani ng of the Divorce Act, s ee Gill-Sager v Sager, []
BCJ No  (CA ). Compare Labbe v Labbe,  B CSC .
Gill-Sager v Sager, [] BCJ No  (C A); see also BGD v RWD, [] BC J No  (CA).
Compare Tierney-Hynes v Hynes, [] OJ No   (CA).
  
for example, by reason of deteriorat ing health, an appropr iate order should
be couched in terms th at do not preclude a subsequent application for spousal
support.
) Interim Support Orders
Section .() of the Divorce A ct empowers a court to grant an inter im order
requiring a spou se to secure and/or pay such lump sum and/or periodic sums
as the court deems rea sonable for the support of the other spouse. A n interim
spousal support order is intended to provide a reasonably acceptable shor t-
term solution until a pre-t rial conference allows for a more thorough and ju-
dicious resolution of the issues or the m atter goes to trial when an in-dept h
examin ation can be undert aken. e nature of interim spousal suppor t dic-
tates that the court does not have to embark upon a detailed e xamination
of the merits of the cla im for permanent spous al support. Nevert heless, a
prima fac ie entitlement to interim suppor t must be established in accord-
ance with the provi sions of section . of the Divorce Act. Sec tion .() of
the D ivorce Ac t includes no explic it reference to the variation of a n interim
spousal support order, but the cour t has an inherent jur isdiction to var y
such an order in response to a mater ial change of circums tances or when the
assumptions on which t he order was made later prove to have been c learly
understated. Where an interim order prov ides for periodic spousal support
to be paid from the date of the  ling of the applicat ion but payment of the
instant arrea rs thereby created is to be deferred p ending the resolution of
outstanding monetar y issues, the arrears may be subsequently e xpunged by
a trial judge w ithout proof of a change of circu mstances since the g ranting
of the interim order. In addressing t he wife’s contention that section (.)
of the Divorce A ct required the trial judge to  nd a change of circu mstances
before varyi ng the interim spous al support order, the Newfound land and
Labrador Court of Appea l in Whelan v Whelan observed that section (.)
DMB v DBB,  SKQB , c iting Jacobson v Jacobson,  SKQB .
Lapp v Lapp, [] AJ No  (CA); Kowalski v Grant, [] MJ No  (QB); Gab el v
Gabel, [] NWTJ No  (SC); K nowles v Lindstrom,  ONSC  ; EAG v DLG, 
YKSC .
Squires v Squires,  NBQB .
 Dunn v Dunn,  A BQB ; Noonan v Noonan,   PEICAD ; see als o Fong v Fong,
 MBQB . Compare Muchek eni v Muchekeni, [] NWTJ No  (SC); Balayo v Mead-
ows,  ONSC .
 Carvell v Carvell, []  OR  (CA); Lipson v Lipson (),  RF L  (Ont CA); PLM v
SYB,  NBQB  ; Torres v Marin, [] YJ No  (SC).
 [] NJ No  (CA). See also Janmohamed v Janmohamed,   BCSC ; Colter v
Colter,  NSSC ; Damaschin-Zamrescu v Damaschin-Zamrescu,  ONSC  at
paras  –.

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