Steele v. Mountain Institution, (1990) 121 N.R. 198 (SCC)

• Judge: Dickson, C.J.C., Lamer, C.J.C., La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory and McLachlin, JJ.
• Court: Supreme Court (Canada)
• Case Date: November 08, 1990
• Jurisdiction: Canada (Federal)
• Citations: (1990), 121 N.R. 198 (SCC);[1990] 6 WWR 673;[1990] SCJ No 111 (QL);11 WCB (2d) 347;1990 CanLII 50 (SCC);[1990] CarswellBC 245;JE 90-1595;121 NR 198;80 CR (3d) 257;2 CRR (2d) 304;[1990] 2 SCR 1385;51 BCLR (2d) 1;60 CCC (3d) 1

Steele v. Mountain Institution (1990), 121 N.R. 198 (SCC)

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

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Warden of Mountain Institution (appellant) v. Theodore Steel (respondent)

(21878)

Indexed As: Steele v. Mountain Institution

Supreme Court of Canada

Dickson, C.J.C., Lamer, C.J.C., La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory and McLachlin, JJ.

November 8, 1990.

Summary:

In 1953 the 18 year old Steele pleaded guilty to attempted rape, was declared a "criminal sexual psychopath" under s. 1045A of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1927, c. 36, and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment plus an indeterminate sentence thereafter. Steele was first paroled in 1960, but parole was revoked following a 1962 common assault conviction. Steele was paroled to a half-way house in 1970, but was caught drinking and breaking curfew and parole was again revoked. From 1980-1987 Steele was released on escorted temporary passes. His only problems were curfew related. The National Parole Board denied Steele parole from 1988-1990. In 1988 Steele applied for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid and for relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Steele claimed that his continued detention (now 37 years) constituted cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Charter.

The British Columbia Supreme Court, in a judgment reported 72 C.R.(3d) 58, held that an indeterminate sentence did not violate s. 12. However, Steele's incarceration for 37 years was prima facie grossly disproportionate to the circumstances of the original offence and therefore violated s. 12. The court stated that Steele's continued detention was not necessary to protect the public. The court ordered Steele's unconditional release. The Crown appealed.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a judgment reported 76 C.R.(3d) 307, dismissed the appeal. The court stated that habeas corpus was available and agreed that although the original indeterminate sentence was valid, Steele's continued detention violated s. 12. The court stated that the National Parole Board was the appropriate body to determine whether continued detention violated s. 12, however, given Steele's age and the length of detention, it would be inequitable to require him to recommence his application by means of judicial review of the National Parole Board's decisions. The court made Steele's release conditional on the Crown's right to apply to the Supreme Court for an order that Steele be reincarcerated should his conduct warrant it. The Crown appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. An indeterminate sentence, per se, did not violate s. 12; continued detention was always subject to review by the National Parole Board based on the factors listed in s. 16(1) of the Parole Act. It was clear that the National Parole Board erred in dealing with Steele. The Board misapplied or disregarded the s. 16(1) factors over the years, keeping Steele imprisoned long after he should have been paroled. Steele's continued detention violated s. 12, because "the inordinate length of his incarceration has long since become grossly disproportionate to the circumstances of the case". The court confirmed the conditions imposed by the Court of Appeal on Steele's release.

*(Editor's note: Dickson, C.J.C., was Chief Justice at the time of hearing; Lamer, C.J.C., was Chief Justice on the date of judgment.)

Civil Rights - Topic 3826

Cruel and unusual punishment - What constitutes - Indeterminate detention - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that sentencing a dangerous offender to an indeterminate sentence did not violate s. 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, because the regular parole review of an offender's continued detention ensured that the sentence would be tailored to fit the circumstances of the individual and the offence - See paragraph 58.

Civil Rights - Topic 3826

Cruel and unusual punishment - What constitutes - Indeterminate detention - A 55 year old man imprisoned since 1953 (37 years) as a dangerous offender claimed his continued detention violated s. 12 of the Charter - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that indeterminate sentences, per se, did not violate s. 12, but s. 12 was violated where his continued detention for 37 years had long since become grossly disproportionate to the circumstances of the case - The National Parole Board misapplied or disregarded, in refusing parole over the years, the factors in s. 16(1) of the Parole Act, thereby continuing his detention long after he should have been paroled - The s. 12 breach resulted not from the review process itself, but from the Board's errors in executing its duties under the Act.

Civil Rights - Topic 3826

Cruel and unusual punishment - What constitutes - Indeterminate detention - [See Criminal Law - Topic 5667].

Criminal Law - Topic 5667

Punishments (sentence) - Parole - Forfeiture, revocation, refusal or termination of - Judicial review - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "the continuing detention of a dangerous offender sentenced pursuant to the constitutionally valid provisions of the Criminal Code will only violate s. 12 of the Charter when the National Parole Board errs in the execution of its vital duties of tailoring the indeterminate sentence to the circumstances of the offender. This tailoring is performed by applying the criteria set out in s. 16(1) of the Parole Act. Since any error that may be committed occurs in the parole review process itself, an application challenging the decision should be made by means of judicial review from the National Parole Board decision, not by means of an application for habeas corpus" - See paragraph 83.

Habeas Corpus - Topic 1200

Grounds for issue of writ - Imprisonment - General - [See Criminal Law - Topic 5667].

Cases Noticed:

Mitchell v. Attorney General of Ontario (1983), 35 C.R.(3d) 225, refd to. [para. 49].

R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309; 80 N.R. 161; 82 N.S.R.(2d) 271; 207 A.P.R. 271, appld. [para. 49].

Milne v. Canada et al., [1987] 2 S.C.R. 512; 81 N.R. 36; 25 O.A.C. 100, refd to. [para. 49].

R. v. Smith (E.D.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045; 75 N.R. 321, refd to. [para. 81].

Statutes Noticed:

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, sect. 12, sect. 24(1).

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1927, c. 36, sect. 1054A [para. 4].

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, sect. 687 [para. 32].

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 761(2) [para. 59].

Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, sect. 28 [para. 32].

Parole Act, S.C. 1958, c. 38, sect. 8(a) [para. 64].

Parole Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-2, sect. 16(1)(a) [para. 60].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Canada, Report of the Inquiry into Habitual Criminals in Canada (1984), vol. 1, p. 83 [para. 76].

Counsel:

I.G. Whitehall and M. Taylor, for the appellant;

Michael Jackson, for the respondent.

Solicitors of Record:

John C. Tait, Ottawa, Ontario, for the appellant;

Michael Jackson, Vancouver, British Columbia, for the respondent.

This appeal was heard on May 25, 1990, before Dickson, C.J.C., Lamer, C.J.C., La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory and McLachlin, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada.

On November 8, 1990, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada was delivered in both official languages by Cory, J.