Civil Liability for Environmental Harm
Author | Jamie Benidickson |
Pages | 101-121 |
101
CHA PTER 5
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL
HARM
The civil courts have a long histor y of dealing with d isputes that would
readily be acknowledged today as env ironmental in nature. Nuisa nce
claims, along with negl igence, strict liability, trespass, and riparian
rights have all been a sserted — occasionally in combination — on be-
half of those seeking judicial protection from the effects of conduct
that has resulted, or that may result in the future, in some form of en-
vironmental d amage.1 Intermittently, courts have provided strong en-
couragement for private claims of this nature. Justice Rinfret remarked,
for example, that “[p]ollution is always unlawful and, in it self, consti-
tutes a nuisance.”2 Nevertheless, private litigants have faced sig nificant
obstacles in pursuing env ironmental claims. The cha llenges naturally
include specific doctrinal requirements, but encompass as well com-
plex evidentiary burden s, and the costs of litigation, possibly including
responsibility for defendants’ cost s where environmental claims ultim-
ately fail. Some of the constraint s — notably in connection with cl ass
actions — have recently been addressed through statutory reforms.
1 Analogous cla ims arise under the Civil Code of Q uébec (CCQ). See, for example,
c III, s III, arts 98 0, 981, & 982 concerning r iparian rights and w ater quality.
For discuss ion of no-fault liability under ar t 976 r especting environ mental dis-
turbances, s ee St Lawrence Cement Inc v Barrette, 20 08 SCC 64.
2 Groat v Edmonton (City), [1928] SCR 522 at 532.
ENVIRONMENTAL L AW
102
A. COMMON LAW CAUSES OF AC TION
1) Nuisance
The common law doctrine of nuisance affords some protection to per-
sons whose use and enjoyment of land is un reasonably interfered with
by the actions of another, typically though not exclusively a neighbour.
The cause of the plaintiff ’s complaint might be toxic fumes, chem-
icals or smoke, unpleasant odours, or excessive light or noise, while
the interference experienced might involve actual physical damage to
property, personal injury or risk to hea lth and safety, or discomfort or
inconvenience. A significant distinction has been drawn bet ween nuis-
ance entailing physical d amage and interference described a s amenity
nuisance.3
The courts’ central concern in nuisa nce is to determine whether the
activity complained of substantially and unreasonably interferes with
the plaintiff ’s own reasonable use of the land:
[I]t i s the impact of the defendant’s activ ity on the plaintif f’s interest
which is the focus of attent ion and not the nature of the defendant’s
conduct. The interference must be unre asonable in the sense t hat
the plaintif f should not be required to suffer it, not th at the defend-
ant failed to ta ke appropriate care. By the same token, i f the level of
interference is unre asonable, it is irreleva nt that the defendant was
taking al l possible care. Furt hermore, it makes no differe nce that
in his mind he wa s making reas onable use of his land, or th at his
operation was benefici al to the community. The plaintiff satisfie s the
substantive requi rement of the tort if he can point to t angible dam-
age resulting from t he defendant’s activity or a sign ificant degree of
discomfor t or inconvenience.4
A judicial formulation of the requirements drawing upon a scholarly
synthe sis indic ates that act ionable nuisa nce
must be such as to be rea l interference with the com fort or conven-
ience of living according t o the standards of t he average man. . . .
Moreover, the discomfort must be subst antial and not merely wit h
reference to the plainti ff; it must be of such a degree that it would
be substanti al to any person occupyi ng the plaintiff ’s premises, ir-
respective of hi s position in life, age, or state of health; it mu st be
to SCC refused, [2011] SCCA No. 539.
4 JPS McLaren, “Annotat ion” (1976) 1 CCLT 29 at 300.
To continue reading
Request your trial