Economic Instruments

AuthorJamie Benidickson
Pages367-387
367
CHAPTER 17
ECONOMIC
INSTRUMENTS
Economic instruments, another of the more recently prominent ap-
proaches to environmental protection, take a va riety of forms. Not all of
the economic incentives currently in place or under consideration are
particularly innovative, even though efforts to appreciate the environ-
mental implications of their operation have intensif‌ied in recent years.
Nor is the focus entirely on initiatives that are explicitly directed at
improving environmental conditions, for the environmentally-adverse
impacts of other policy measures is of equal signif‌icance. A simple ex-
ample is subsidies to the agriculture, energy, transportation, and in-
dustrial sectors which have encouraged waste, pollution, and excessive
natural resource consumption.1 Although this is an important matter,
it will not receive much attention here.
After discussing the general attractions of economic instruments
and market mechanisms from an environmental perspective, as well
as noting some of the reservations that are expressed about them, this
chapter describes non-tax instruments, tax incentives, and public
funds dedicated to the environment. The chapter concludes with refer-
ence to insurance and f‌ina ncial institutions in light of their potential to
use economic incentives in the interests of environmental protection.
1 Improving the Environment through Reduc ing Subsidies (Paris: OECD, 1998);
Environmentally Harmf ul Subsidies: Challenges for Reform (Par is: OECD, 2005);
Subsidy Reform a nd Sustainable Development : Economic, Environmental and Social
Aspects (Paris: OECD, 2006).
ENVIRONMENTAL L AW
368
A. SOME BASIC PROS AND CONS
Proponents of economic incentives anticipate that environmentally ap-
propriate behaviour can be encouraged if the environmental costs of
various activities are recognized, and then appropriately valued and
allocated. Certain elements of the legal regime can already be seen
as consistent with an economic approach to regulation. For example,
statutory arrangements assigning f‌inancial liability for cleanup costs
and other expenses to “persons responsible” for the damages express
the general intention that the burden of compensation for environ-
mental losses should be borne by those who stand to benef‌it from the
activity that resulted in the damage. As the Supreme Court of Canada
remarked in Imperial Oil, the polluter-pays principle “assigns pollut-
ers the responsibility for remedying contamination for which they are
responsible and imposes on them the direct and immediate costs of
pollution.”2 In this regard, prof‌it-stripping provisions are expected to
eliminate the f‌inancial attraction of disregarding environmental pro-
tection requirements. Legal implementation of the polluter-pays prin-
ciple is also often assumed to cre ate incentives for preventive measures
and alternative approaches that serve to avoid environmental harm in
the f‌irst place. Such an observation might be made in connection with
the following provision from Newfoundland legislation:
Where pollution occurs and the person or municipal authority that
the minister c onsiders responsible for the occurr ence of the pollution
fails to do the things that the minister considers are appropriate to
prevent, control, eliminate or ameliorate the pollution, the minister
may take appropriate act ion to prevent, control, eliminate or amelior-
ate the pollution and the cost s incurred by the minist er in taking that
action are a debt due the Crown and a re recoverable from the person
or municipal authority that the minister considers responsible for
the occurrence of the pollution.3
Principles that di rect the court to consider both use values and non-use
values as aspects of environmental damage that serve as “aggravating
factors” in the context of sentencing also underscore economic conse-
quences.4
2 Imperial Oil v Q uebec, [2003] 2 SCR 624 at 642.
3 Environment Act, SN 1995, c E-13.1, s 21. Now see Environmental Protection Act,
SNL 2002, c E-14.2.
4 Canadian Environme ntal Protection Act, 1999, SC 1999, c 33, s 287.1 [CEPA 1999].

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