Consent

• Author: Roger McConchie; David Potts
• Profession: Member of the Bars of British Columbia and Alberta/Member of the Bar of Ontario
• Pages: 521-529

C H A P T E R

T

W

E N T Y- T W O

I

Consent

A.

DEFINITION

This

defence

is

aptly

described

in

Philip

Lewis,

Galley

on

Libd

and

Slander,

8th ed.

(London:

Sweet

&

Maxwell,

1981)

at

paragraph

851:

It

is a

defence

to an

action

for

defamation that

the

plaintiff

consented

to the

publication

of

which

he now

complains

by

participating

in or

authorizing

it.

Thus,

if the

plaintiff

has

consented, expressly

or

impliedly

or by

conduct,

to

the

publication

of the

words substantially

as

they were used,

or to the

find-

ings

of a

tribunal

in a

specified

newspaper, whatever

the

findings might

be,

there

is a

good defence

to the

action.

But the

proof

of

consent must

be

clear

and

unequivocal.

See

also,

Burnett

v.

Canadian

Broadcasting

Corporation

(No.

2)

(1981),

48

N.S.R.

(2d) 181,

per

Grant

J. at

paras.

159-62

(S.C.).

B.

AN

UNSUCCESSFUL

DEFENCE

Peter

E

Carter-Ruck

&

Harvey

N.A.

Starte, Carter-Ruck

on

Libel

and

Slander,

5th ed.

(Butterworths:

London,

1997)

at

188:

A

man who

provides

a

newspaper with

false

information about himself will

not be

able

to sue

that newspaper when

it

publishes

the

information.

On the

other hand

the

fact

that

in a

lighter moment

a man has

told

an

anecdote

against

himself will

not

excuse

a

newspaper repeating that anecdote

in its

columns.

[Cook

v.

Ward

(1830),

6

Bing

409].

It is one

thing

to

make oneself

a

laughing stock

in an

after-dinner speech;

to be

made

to

look ridiculous

in

a

newspaper

is

quite

a

different

matter. Because

one

consents

to the

former

it

does

not

follow

that

one has no

objection

to the

latter.

521