Publication and Republication

AuthorRoger McConchie; David Potts
ProfessionMember of the Bars of British Columbia and Alberta/Member of the Bar of Ontario
Pages257-287
CHAPTER F 0 U RTEEN:
Publication
and
Republication
A.
AN
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
Proof
of
publication
by the
defendant
to a
third party
is an
essential element
in an
action
for
defamation
and the
burden
of
proving this element rests
on
the
plaintiff.
Gaskin
v.
Retail
Credit
Co., [1965] S.C.R.
297 per
Ritchie
J. at 1.
Arnottv.
College
of
Physicians
and
Surgeons
of
Saskatchewan,
[1954]
S.C.R.
538
per
Locke
J. at
555.
Dickhoffv.
Armadale
Communications
(1993),
108
D.L.R.
(4th)
464,
per
Lane
J.A.
at 469
(Sask. C.A.).
Pressler v. Lethbridge (2000), 86 B.C.L.R. (3d) 257, per Southin J.A. at para.
53
(C.A.).
B.
PUBLICATION REQUIRES COMMUNICATION
There
is a
distinction between publication
and
simply creating
or
uttering
defamatory
expression. Publication requires
an act on the
part
of the
defen-
dant which communicates
the
defamatory expression
to a
third party
McNichol
v.
Grandy,
[1931]
S.C.R.
696, where Anglin
CJ.C.
states
at
699:
The
material
part
of the
cause
of
action
in
dispute
is not the
uttering,
but the
publication,
of the
language
used
(Hebditch
v.
Madlwaince
54,
at
58, 61, 64,
O'Keefe
v.
Walsh
[1903]
2
Ir.
R.
681,
at
706).
and at the
same page approves
the
following statement
from
Clement
Gatley
Galley
on
Libel
and
Slander,
2d ed.
(London: Sweet
&
Maxwell, 1929)
at 92:
257
258
CANADIAN LIBEL
AND
SLANDER
ACTIONS
...
publication
can be
effected
by any act on the
part
of the
defendant which
conveys
the
defamatory
meaning
of the
matter
to the
person
to
whom
it is
communicated.
Newson
(Chief
Provincial
Firearms
Officer
for
B.C.)
v.
Kexco
Publishing
Co.
(1995),
17
B.C.L.R.
(3d)
176 per
Lambert J.A.
at
para.
21
(C.A.):
But
publication
for the
purposes
of
libel means communication,
not
creation
of the
text
for the
purposes
of
printing.
Pullman
v.
Hill
&>
Co.,
524 per
Lord Esher M.R.
at
527:
What
is the
meaning
of
'publication'?
The
making known
the
defama-
tory
matter
after
it has
been written
to
some person other than
the
per-
son of
whom
it is
written.
C.
ONE
PERSON SUFFICIENT
Publication
to one
person other than
the
plaintiff
is
sufficient
to
constitute
the
cause
of
action
for
defamation.
McNichol
v.
Grandy,
above
at
699,
approving
Duke
of
Brunswick
v.
Harmer
(1849),
14
Q.B.
185 at
188-89.
D.
EACH PUBLICATION
IS A
SEPARATE CAUSE
OF
ACTION
Every
sale
or
delivery
of a
written
or
printed
copy
of a
libel
is a
fresh
pub-
lication,
for
which
an
action lies.
Lambert
v.
Roberts
Drugstores
Ltd.,
[1933]
4
D.L.R.
193,
per
TruemanJ.A.
at
195
(Man.
C.A.).
Similarly,
each slanderous statement
is a
distinct
tort. Every
person
who
repeats
the
slander becomes independently liable
to the
plaintiff.
Stewart
v.
Sterling
(1918),
42
O.L.R.
477,
per
Clute
J. at
para.
16
(C.A.),
cit-
ing
W.B. Odgers
&
WJ.
Tremecar,
Odgers
on
Libel
and
Slander,
(Canadian
notes only),
5th ed.
(London: Stevens,
1912)
at
177.
Pootlass
v.
Pootlass
(1999),
63
B.C.L.R.
(3d) 305,
per
Burnyeat
J. at
para.
14
(S.C.),
citing
Emmerton
v.
University
of
Sidney,
[1970]
2
N.S.W.R.
633
(N.S.W.C.A.)
and
Thomas
v.
Canadian
Broadcasting
Corporation
and
Sanders,
[1981]
4
W.W.R.
289
(N.W.T.S.C.).

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