Executive Oversight

• Jurisdiction: Canada
• Author: Craig Forcese
• Pages: 88-118

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 

Executive Oversight

Having explored the six values embedded in Canada’s national security

system, the balance of this book examines in greater detail the mech-

anics of “control” and “scrutiny” — the two pillars of democratic regu-

lation of security services. is chapter focuses on executive oversight,

while the next chapter examines judicial and quasi-judicial control

and scrutiny. Chapters  and examine specialized national security

reviews. Finally, Chapter  outlines other forms of scrutiny relevant to

Canada’s national security system.

Recall that in Canadian practice, oversight is a form of account-

ability in which the accountability body is involved in decision mak-

ing concerning the activities of the service. e accountability body

may vet the service’s conduct in advance of the activity and may be

involved in various forms of approval (among other things). In the

national security system, executive oversight responds to the weak-

nesses of more conventional forms of democratic accountability for

security services. First, much national security activity takes place in

secret, beyond the scrutiny of conventional democratic accountability

bodies. Second, security services are expected to meet values of ecacy/

eciency, legality, and necessity/proportionality, and a failure to do

so may have serious consequences for both security and liberty given

the considerable power the services wield. is requires the security

Executive Oversight | 

services to meet enhanced standards of accountability and motivates

augmented executive oversight. As noted in Chapter , this should

mean that “the more intrusive the operation, the higher-up should

be the decision-maker” and that operations should be “authorised

by someone outside the agency.” In practice, oversight comes in two

forms in Canada: horizontal oversight and vertical oversight.

I. HORIZONTAL OVERSIGHT

Horizontal oversight is oversight performed by the “centre of gov-

ernment,” often exercising inuence through proximity to the prime

minister and to the Cabinet process. Horizontal oversight is less about

holding individual services and departments to account and more

about coordinating (at a high level) the activities of Canada’s decen-

tralized national security and intelligence community. e key central

agencies in horizontal oversight are the Privy Council Oce (PCO)

and, to a lesser degree, the Treasury Board Secretariat. In practice,

observers regularly regard Canada’s horizontal oversight as weak as

contrasted to that of its allies, such as the other Five Eyes partners.

A. Privy Council Oce

e PCO is the “public service department of the Prime Minister.”

us, “under the leadership of the Clerk of the Privy Council and

Secretary to the Cabinet, the PCO provides direct support to the

primeminister across the range of functions and responsibilities of the

head of government.” e PCO plays a key role in coordinating gov-

ernment policy; indeed, it has sometimes been called the “nerve centre

of government.” In the national security area, the PCO is responsible

1 Peter Gill, “Of Intelligence Oversight and the Challenge of Surveillance Corporatism”

(2020) 35:7 Intelligence and National Security 970 at 972.

2 The Five Eye partners are Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States,

and Canada.

3 Privy Council Oce, “The Responsibilities of the Privy Council Oce” (last modif‌ied

7 December 2017), online: www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/services/publications/

responsibilities.html.

4 Donald Savoie, Governing from the Centre (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 109.